811.79680/205
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
Mr. Helm4 came in to see me at my request.
I referred to the memorandum presented by the British Embassy to Mr. Welles5 under date of April 15, 1942, together with a copy of a note from the British Foreign Minister to our Embassy in London.6 Both the memorandum and the note expressed concern lest military services being inaugurated through Pan American Airways between Washington and Cairo might become commercial air services. Hope was expressed that any endeavor to convert these routes into commercial air routes for Pan American should be handled through the diplomatic channel and in consultation with Great Britain.
[Page 20]I said that the British Government was correct in understanding that these routes had been arranged as routes for military and government services. There had not been any intention of making them at this time commercial air routes. We were aware of the fact that without the knowledge of this Government, agents of Pan American Airways had approached the Governments, both of Egypt and of Iraq, with a view to securing commercial concessions. This had not been done with the knowledge or consent of any branch of the United States Government. I said that we would, prior to making any change in the governmental nature of these routes, take it up with the British Government.
I said that I wished to make two distinct points in this connection.
- First: In agreeing that we would consult the British Government, we did not wish to be understood as accepting the principle that American airlines could or should be excluded from these areas after the war, or that entry into these areas should be dependent on the consent of any foreign government. The assurance given was intended to mean merely that we would enter into friendly consultation on the subject.
- Second: We did not wish to indicate that the service rendered by the planes running on the military routes should be limited necessarily to military service. We were agreeable to their not being used for strictly commercial service—that is, to make it clear that Pan American could not advertise a commercial service on a military plane. On the other hand, I felt that the authorities of the United States Government in these areas should be at liberty to use any unfilled space on the planes for any reasonable governmental transport service, which might include repatriation of American nationals, transport of needed materials, carriage of mail and the like. It would be absurd not to use all the transport space available merely because the use intended was not strictly “military”.
To this Mr. Helm readily agreed.
I said that the reason for being willing to consult with the British Government regarding air routes in these areas did not, of course, imply on our part any acquiescence in the idea that any power could preempt areas of the earth’s surface outside its own borders and claim the right to exclude us from the air transport field.
I did feel that at the close of the war, or at an appropriate occasion, instead of indulging in a scramble for air routes, the British Government and we ought to sit down and consider the matter in entire friendship. Otherwise, the situation would develop into a concession hunter’s scramble, which neither of us ought to permit.
Mr. Helm agreed to this, saying that in his own view, the result would probably be competitive air services in the same area, which he thought was entirely healthy. The Imperial Airways had been [Page 21] competing in this very area with the Dutch, and he thought the Dutch had done a better job. If it had not been for the Dutch competition, the Imperial Airways probably would not have improved its own services.
He then inquired what our attitude would be towards a treaty by one government with another, under which an independent government agreed to give to one nation exclusive rights for airplanes of one country to traverse its skies.
I said that if I understood him correctly, he referred to a situation in which, for example, Great Britain might have a treaty with, say Spain, under which Spain gave exclusive right to British airplanes to traverse Spain. I said I thought our Government would undoubtedly object to any such arrangement. We could hardly be expected to welcome an agreement between two countries preventing American traffic from crossing the area. Mr. Helm noted the point.
I had an uneasy suspicion that probably the British may have contemplated some such arrangement with Egypt. Mr. Helm did not elucidate the point. He indicated that he, personally, was entirely sympathetic to holding all questions of this kind open, endeavoring to make a fair adjustment when the appropriate time came.