740.00116 European War 1939/633
The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 2.]
Sir: Referring to my cable Yugoslav Series No. 6 [64], of October 7, 1942, (12 midnight), and my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 22, of September 9, 1942, I have the honor herein to report the substance of my very recent conversation with Monsignor Kuhar (Slovene), Yugoslav Envoy to the Polish Government. In my frequent contacts with him I have found him objective, clear-thinking and well-informed. It was he who first informed me in November 1941 concerning M. Stalin’s37 post-war frontier aspirations in general, and in particular M. Stalin’s ambitions to move Russia’s economic and military frontiers to the Adriatic. (See my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 6, January 7, 1942).38
In my recent talk with him, Monsignor Kuhar emphasised his opinion that Moscow’s attitude toward Mihailović extended beyond personal considerations, to the larger question: Russia’s post-war aims in the whole of the Balkans. (This concurs with my views expressed in cable Yugoslav Series No. 6 [64], of October 7, 1942). He said, moreover, that he interpreted the activities of the Communist bands in Yugoslavia as a Moscow directed move in the interests of Russia’s post-war plans; that the Communists aimed to rid the horizon of those who might stand in their way of linking up with Russia after the war. In support of his opinion on this score, he cited the following among other points: (a) In Slovenia the Communist bands had systematically killed off most of the leading economists and outstanding political figures; these were men whom he had known well, and with whom he had long collaborated. Their loss was irreparable; (b) the long record of ambush shootings by Communist bands of isolated individual Germans and Italian soldiers in villages and towns indicated a deliberate effort by the Communists to provoke severe reprisals against the community. It was always the leading figures in the communities who suffered most from these reprisals.
In connection with the foregoing, Monsignor Kuhar went on to say that Ambassador Bogomolov’s39 denials as to Moscow’s connection with and control over the Communist leaders in Yugoslavia were inconsistent with the fact, that usually three days after a given conflict had taken place, the Moscow Radio not only reported what [Page 825] had taken place, but also gave the names of the village and leading individuals involved. On the other hand, reports of the same conflict did not reach the Yugoslav Government for about three weeks. It was interesting to note, however, that his Government’s reports in most cases were similar in substance to those previously given out over the Moscow Radio.
In further connection with Communist activities in his country, he said that in late March a leading Italian Communist had been brought in a Gestapo automobile to Ljubinja for a Communist meeting. When he had first read this report he could not make up his mind whether this indicated a joint German-Italian plot to stir up further internal strife in Yugoslavia, or whether it was a conspiracy between Italian and German Communists and Communist elements inside Yugoslavia. In view of recent reports, he was inclined now to mark it down to a Communist conspiracy.
The question had now arisen in his mind, moreover, as to whether Russia was not already in the process of setting up her machinery preparatory to bringing all or the greater part of the Continent into her post-war orbit. He had made discreet inquiries among a number of our mutual friends in Allied Governmental circles in an effort to ascertain their trend of thought in this respect. Most of those with whom he had talked had discreetly admitted that continued reports on Communist activities in Yugoslavia, together with reports regarding Moscow’s contact with the Communist organization in France, had aroused their suspicions as to Moscow’s long range motives. Several had gained the impression that a mot d’ordre had gone out from Moscow to the Communist centres in Europe to exploit for Russia’s long range benefit whatever antagonisms the continental peoples might respectively have for the English and German speaking nations.
By way of drawing him out further, I reminded Mgr. Kuhar that M. Molotov40 had remarked during his last visit here that Russia would want to see a strong France after the war; that Russia’s experience in Spain had shown her that attempts to introduce Communism into Latin countries only served to stir up internal strife; that, therefore, efforts to introduce it into France would only serve to defeat Russia’s own ends; i. e. a strong united France. Monsignor Kuhar said he seriously doubted the sincerity of these remarks. Unless and until the Comintern41 were liquidated there could be no real assurance as to an end of the drive for “world revolution.” He understood, moreover, that the Russian authorities only recently indicated to the Fighting French Mission in Kuibyshev that unless a strong [Page 826] and durable understanding were eventually concluded between Russia and France, Russia would have to resort to the alternative of Bolshevising Germany as a bulwark against a potential western pressure. Mgr. Kuhar added that, while this alternative was undoubtedly aimed as an instrument of pressure, there were many well informed and objective Continental authorities here who suspected that Moscow would, in any case, like to Bolshevise Germany as a Westward-pointed Communist spearhead.
Respectfully yours,
- Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier).↩
- Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 337.↩
- Alexander Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Allied Governments in Exile at London.↩
- Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩
- The Third (Communist) International founded by the Bolsheviks in Moscow in March 1919.↩