740.00116 European War 1939/578: Telegram
The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 8—7:20 a.m.]
Yugoslav Series [No.] 64. Your 3, October 2, 10 p.m. Replying your questions in corresponding order:
(1) I understand that in course of past month Mr. Eden34 told Russian Ambassador Maisky35 he earnestly hoped his and the Yugoslav [Page 823] Governments could reach an early agreement in connection with the conflict between Mihailović and the “Partisans”. Moreover, in Mr. Eden’s address at the opening of Yugoslav house September 24, he significantly emphasized his and his Government’s admiration of Mihailović’s patriotic and courageous struggle.
(2) Neither Yugoslav circles nor I know of any British circles who have become either tolerant of the “Partisan” faction or mistrustful of Mihailović. Fotitch just wired his Government that British censor in Washington had received instructions from here to give as little as possible mention to Mihailović’s name. Yugoslavs, however, are inclined to mark this down to British Government’s desire to avoid offending Russians. In this connection, the Russians are, to my mind, aware that Mihailović shares his Government’s strong opposition to communism and its desire to lean westwards after the war, rather than to be included in Russia’s orbit. This question is, in my opinion, the root of Moscow’s antagonism toward Mihailović and includes the Balkans as a whole. Regarding Mihailović’s position vis-à-vis “Partisans”, my inquiries among Russian as well as Yugoslav circles, discloses that situation as of August boiled down to following:
In Serbia, Mihailović’s control undisputed; in Montenegro, “Partisans” control undisputed. (More recent reports, however, show Mihailović rapidly gaining control of Montenegran situation.) In western Bosnia, “Partisans” had upper hand; in Eastern Bosnia, Mihailović had upper hand; in Slovenia, “Partisans” had upper hand; both in Croatia and Dalmatia, situation not clear. As regards the Communists, I understand that, aside from their leaders (whose ultimate purpose is hitherto unknown), the feelings of the Communists are more emotional (in terms of traditional affection for “grandmother Russia”), than ideological.
(3) A series of Cabinet meetings is currently taking place, in an attempt to elevate intragovernmental differences from question of personal disagreements to that of state policy. In this connection, there are a number of important issues with which present Cabinet has not hitherto treated. (See page 5 my despatch No. 21, September 4, 1942.)36 While not very optimistic, I am hopeful that this attempt may serve to allay present intragovernmental misunderstandings and tension. Moreover, certain Government officials have indicated their intention to consult me in course of their Cabinet meetings.