032 Willkie, Wendell/85: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 25—3:43 p.m.]
371. Monday afternoon79 I called on Molotov to present Willkie. After the preliminary exchanges in which Willkie remarked how much he had enjoyed his visit in Kuibyshev and the opportunity to see something of the local situation at first hand, which had already altered many of his preconceived ideas about the Soviet Union, he said that he now had two remaining main purposes in view: To go to the front in order to judge for himself conditions there, and to proceed from Moscow to Chungking and thence home by the Siberian route. He said that there appeared to be some confusion about the plans and asked that his pilot be placed in touch with the appropriate military authorities to the end that the necessary arrangements be completed as quickly as possible. Molotov replied that this could be done. I said at this point that this matter of Willkie’s flight to China and on through Siberia would require Molotov’s personal attention as I knew that it had already been referred back and forth between the Foreign Office and the military authorities several times. It [I] heretofore feared nothing would be accomplished unless he himself gave specific instructions with regard to it. Molotov assured me he would do this.
Willkie then expressed his desire to see factories and hospitals in the Moscow area. Molotov said he would be given every facility in this connection but that most factories had been evacuated from this district. [Page 649] Willkie said that his sole aim in coming here was to tell the Soviets what America is thinking and doing and to take back home a corresponding picture of what Russia is doing and thinking now. He emphasized the vital need for cooperation between our two countries not only for the war effort but for the ensuing peace.
Molotov replied that war necessarily imposed restrictions and that some things might not be open for inspection but that as far as possible Willkie would be shown all that he wanted to see. Willkie then remarked that he hoped to be able to leave Moscow on next Sunday.
I then took occasion to inquire of Molotov respecting pessimistic statements I had heard were being made in London and Washington on the subject of the Russian front (see my 367, September 22, 11 a.m.80). Molotov did not answer directly but said that he could not be too optimistic regarding the Russian front, that they were fighting desperately, that in some cases the same position would change hands several times in one day, that there were great losses on both sides, that the Germans were trying to drive a wedge through the center of Stalingrad which extends along the Volga for 60 kilometers and that the situation in the Caucasus was serious. He said, however, that there was no idea of surrendering the city, which he felt would be defended, and that the Caucasus would also be defended successfully.
Molotov then asked Willkie to outline his own opinion and opinion in the United States on the war situation on the various fronts. Willkie proceeded in reply to give Molotov estimates, statements and figures with which he had evidently armed himself for just such an occasion. In summary he drew a rather optimistic picture of the long run situation in the Pacific and of the outlook on the Egyptian front. While believing that the Germans remained strong, he expressed the conviction that they would be defeated, but only by direct action and not by bombing, starvation, or internal disaffection. Molotov here remarked that the bombing was, nevertheless, of material assistance. Willkie then, discussed airplane production, planes, and summarized the situation with respect to merchant shipping. Here again his analysis of the long run perspective was hopeful.
I remarked to Molotov at this point that as regards the question of increased aid to Russia I had just learned from General Bradley that he had been informed the Soviet authorities in Washington had told the American authorities that operations in connection with the delivery of airplanes to Russia across Siberia had been discontinued81 and that this subject was no longer a live issue. I said I hoped this was not true. Molotov replied that if we put down planes in Alaska [Page 650] the Soviets would fly them here but that they could not keep Russian pilots sitting there with no planes to fly.
Earlier in the conference Willkie told Molotov that he had a letter from the President to Stalin concerning the desirability of his flight from Moscow eastward,82 and that he hoped to have an opportunity to present this letter in person. Molotov replied that this would be afforded. Later Willkie added that in order for the information he was assembling to be of real effectiveness it should be taken back as quickly as possible, and that he accordingly hoped he would be able to proceed by the Siberian route as he could thus get home a week sooner. Molotov then said that the route had not been used, would be difficult, would have to be studied, he expressed doubt that it would prove to be practicable. I pointed out that the trip as far as Chungking, which I supposed would not present such difficulties, was urgent and Molotov said that he would issue orders so that the necessary technical discussions might begin at once. In conclusion I asked Molotov if he would kindly endeavor to arrange the meeting with Stalin as soon as convenient and he said that he would do so and inform the Embassy when the appointment had been fixed.83