Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

811.44 Willkie, Wendell L./9

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)⁵⁶

undated

[Extracts]

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Mr. Willkie’s activities in the Soviet Union.

a. In Kuibyshev.⁵⁷

Mr. Willkie’s airplane landed at the military-factory airport near Kuibyshev shortly after 3 p.m., on September 17. The party was met by Lozovski and other Foreign Office officials, the Mayor of Kuibyshev, the Chinese Ambassador⁵⁸ and members of his staff, the British Counselor,⁵⁹ the American Ambassador and members of his staff. The party was driven to the country house placed at Mr. Willkie’s disposal by the Soviet Government where luncheon was served. Later in the afternoon the Ambassador took Mr. Willkie to call formally on Vyshinski and Lozovski at the Foreign Office. That evening he gave a reception at his residence in honor of Mr. Willkie, to which were invited Foreign Office and local officials, various Soviet personalities, the chiefs of diplomatic mission in Kuibyshev, and his own staff. Generals Bradley and Faymonville, Colonel Michela, and the representative of the American Red Cross⁶⁰ had come down from Moscow at the suggestion of the Ambassador to meet Willkie.

The greater portion of September 18, from 10 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. was spent inspecting; in company with Government and local officials, the airplane factory at which the IL–2, an attack bomber, is manufactured near Kuibyshev. Luncheon was served at this plant. Mr. Willkie talked with numerous workers, both men and women at this factory and interviewed at length the plant manager. A noticeable feature of all these conversations was that in practically every instance and evidently by design Mr. Willkie was asked when the second front would be opened and advised that the whole Soviet people were anxiously and impatiently awaiting its development.

The factory in question had been Evacuated from Moscow last fall and was the identical one visited by members of the Harriman–Beaverbrook Mission in October, 1941. It was then known as Aircraft Factory No. 1. Great improvement in the present plant was noted, especially in the machine shop and assembly plant, and in most respects it could be considered a large modern establishment with up to date equipment. The Engines were manufactured elsewhere and shipped to Kuibyshev—otherwise it was stated that every other part of the planes was made in the Kuibyshev factory. This, however, was considered an overstatement. Officials of the plant were, very cautious in releasing information and the majority of questions regarding production were evaded or left entirely unanswered.

A reception and dinner were given for Mr. Willkie by the Chinese Ambassador from six to eight on this evening, following which he attended as guest of honor a performance of the ballet “Swan Lake”. Before the curtain rose on the first act Mr. Willkie’s presence, as special representative of the President, was announced from the stage and the audience gave him a very demonstrative welcome. Between the acts he was presented to the members of the company and after the final curtain he mounted the stage and presented the principal dancer with a bouquet of powers and a kiss. This gesture was loudly acclaimed by the audience, and the general atmosphere was one of the utmost friendliness. It is worth recording, however, that various persons with whom Mr. Willkie entered into conversation, between the different acts of the performance also raised the question of the second front. Both here and at the airplane factory Mr. Willkie stated to inquiries that it was his personal opinion that a second front would be opened very soon.

On September 19, leaving at 7:00 a.m., Mr. Willkie’s Party, members of the Embassy and the Ambassador were taken as guests of the Soviet Government on a boat trip up the Volga to Stavropol about fifty miles above Kuibyshev. Landing there at 11:00 a.m. a visit was paid to a State farm in the vicinity. Details of the operation of the farm were given Mr. Willkie and he was repeatedly photographed inspecting livestock, talking to farmers, children, and so forth. A lavish luncheon was served at the home of the superintendent of the farm and the entertainment in the form of food and drink was extremely abundant on the boat trip both to and from Stavropol. The only occasion on which the second front issue was raised during this trip was in the course of the proposal of a toast at the luncheon mentioned, by the commandant of the local garrison, to which Mr. Willkie replied that “the United States was in favor of a second front but Great Britain was not”.

Returning to Kuibyshev at 7:00 p.m., the party had scant time to repair to their quarters preparatory to attending a dinner given in Mr. Willkie’s honor by Vyshinski, at which his associates, the Ambassador and members of the Embassy staff were guests. During the dinner table conversation Mr. Willkie made a number of remarks on the need for better understanding between the Soviet and American peoples. (See section 5)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

b. In Moscow⁶¹

It is impossible to give as full a description of Mr. Willkie’s activities in Moscow as has been done in Kuibyshev since with few exceptions he and his party acted completely independently of the Embassy and information regarding his activities was often received second-hand and in a fragmentary form. It appeared that Mr. Willkie, probably through Mr. Barnes had made and was keeping in direct contact with the Soviet authorities and that he did not desire to deal through the Embassy.

Immediately after his arrival in Moscow, Mr. Willkie held a press conference. He maintained daily and intimate contact with the representatives of the American press during his Moscow visit. On September 21 a brief announcement of the arrival of the Willkie party appeared in the Soviet press without additional comment. That morning he received the British Ambassador; in the afternoon he called upon Mr. Molotov accompanied by the American Ambassador. An account of Mr. Willkie’s interview with Molotov is set forth in Section 3 of this memorandum.⁶² …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Mr. Willkie’s Interviews.

a. With Stalin⁶³

During the call which Mr. Willkie and the Ambassador made on Molotov on September 21, Mr. Willkie expressed a desire to make an appointment with Stalin at which time he wished to present a letter from the President to Stalin. Later in the conversation he asked Molotov how he would be informed of the decision in the matter. Molotov replied that he would take the matter up with Stalin and would inform Mr. Willkie through the Embassy. On September 23 the Ambassador was informed indirectly by a minor Soviet official that the appointment had already been made. The Ambassador inquired of Molochkov⁶⁴ if he had heard of the appointment and was informed that Mr. Willkie himself had told him that morning that the date had been set for 7:30 the evening of the 23rd. Since the Ambassador had not been informed of this matter, he assumed that he was not expected to be present at the, interview. He therefore informed Mr. Willkie that in view of the manner in which the notification of the appointment had been made he assumed that it was not intended that he should accompany him. Mr. Willkie stated that that was his understanding. He added, however, that he would inform the Ambassador of what took place at the interview. That afternoon at the Embassy reception described above⁶⁵ Mr. Willkie called the Ambassador over to where he was sitting with General Bradley and asked if the Ambassador thought he should take up the question of General Bradley’s flight with Mr. Stalin. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did not wish him to take up any official matters with Mr. Stalin other than those regarding which he had received definite instructions from the President. He stated that there were certain matters regarding which the Embassy was concerned and for Mr. Willkie to discuss them at a meeting at which the Ambassador was not present would leave the Ambassador in an embarrassing position and without knowledge as to what actually took place.

Mr. Willkie called the Ambassador at about 10:00 p.m. that night, stated that he had just returned from his interview with Mr. Stalin and that he would be glad to come over and tell the Ambassador what had happened. Knowing that Mr. Willkie was leaving very shortly for an all night trip to the front,⁶⁶ the Ambassador replied that he thought it would be better to wait until he returned. Mr. Willkie stated that Stalin had given him permission to return to the United States via Siberia and requested the assistance of the Embassy with a view toward placing his pilot in touch with the appropriate Soviet authorities in order to make arrangements for the flight. This was done the following day.

Mr. Willkie called at the Embassy on September 25 and informed the Ambassador that he had taken up the Polish question with Mr. Stalin along the line that had been indicated in the Department’s telegram No. 767, September 10,⁶⁷ pointing out particularly that it was in the common interest of the United Nations that there should be the maximum cooperation and the least possible cause for friction between the different nations fighting against the Axis, that Mr. Stalin had asked specific questions in regard to the Polish complaints but that he had replied that he did not wish to argue the details of the case. Mr. Stalin finally said that he would be willing to discuss the Polish question with Polish officials with a view towards ironing out existing difficulties. Mr. Willkie then informed the Ambassador that he had stated to Stalin that his two assistants, Mr. Barnes and Mr. Cowles, were very anxious to meet him. Mr. Stalin thereupon requested that they be sent for. After their arrival the conversation became more or less of a general nature and touched mainly on the seriousness of the Russian military situation. The Ambassador asked Mr. Willkie if he had made any reports to the President regarding the interview and was informed in the negative since the information which he had to convey to the President was so confidential that he did not wish to trust it even to coded messages. The Ambassador referred to Mr. Molotov’s statement to the effect that Mr. Willkie would be informed of the meeting with Stalin through the Embassy and asked Mr. Willkie whether or not he had been instrumental in arranging that the Ambassador should not be present at the conference. Mr. Willkie denied emphatically that he had anything to do with the matter and added that he supposed the invitation had come directly from Stalin. The Ambassador then discussed informally the position in which he had been placed in regard to the matter, stating that the fact that the invitation had gone directly to Mr. Willkie left him no other course than to believe that the Russians had deliberately avoided having the Ambassador at the conference. In the absence of any information the Ambassador felt that this placed him in a very embarrassing position. Mr. Willkie expressed the view that if the Ambassador allowed that feeling to influence him in the slightest degree and did anything concerning the matter, any such action would really place him in an embarrassing light and make him look very small.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. The Kremlin Dinner.

During the interview which Mr. Willkie had with Stalin on September 23, Stalin told Mr. Willkie that he planned to give him a dinner and asked Mr. Willkie to name the date and submit a list of guests that he would like to have invited. September 26 was agreed upon and Mr. Willkie gave Stalin a list of guests, which included his entire party (excepting the enlisted men), the American Ambassador, General Bradley, General Faymonville, Colonel Michela and Captain Duncan. Later, Mr. Pavlov, of the Foreign Office, called the Embassy and informed it in a casual way of, the date of the dinner and the names of those given by Mr. Willkie and asked for names of other members of the mission who might be included, Mr. Page took a list to Mr. Pavlov and Mr. Pavlov suggested that the Embassy take the matter up with Mr. Willkie. As it was Mr. Willkie’s party the Embassy did not feel that it should take the position of asking Mr. Willkie to include any other members of the mission in the list of guests.

The dinner was held in the dining room of the palace quarters of the Kremlin. There were thirty guests which included, in addition to Mr. Willkie’s party and the Embassy staff noted above, Stalin, Molotov, Mikoyan, Admiral Kuznetsov,⁶⁸ General Voroshilov, Beriya,⁶⁹ Lozovski, Dekanosov,⁷⁰ Molochkov, Sobolev (Secretary General of the Foreign Office), Sherbakov⁷¹ (Chief of the Soviet Press Bureau), Kozyrev⁷² (Secretary to Molotov), Oumanski, Pavlov and Potruback⁷³ (interpreters) and the British Ambassador.

Mr. Molotov acted as host. Mr. Willkie’s party was the first to arrive and was followed immediately by the Ambassador and his staff. Stalin made his entry as on previous occasions after the guests had all arrived and went the entire round of the room shaking hands with each guest. Stalin was seated at the center of the table with Mr. Willkie on his right and the American Ambassador on his left. Molotov, seated opposite, had the British Ambassador on his right and General Bradley on his left. The dinner followed the procedure of previous occasions with Molotov acting as toastmaster throughout. Molotov toasted Mr. Willkie and the Ambassador gave a toast to Stalin. Mr. Willkie gave a toast to Prime Minister Churchill and Molotov gave a toast to the American and British Ambassadors. Practically all of the guests were recognized and toasted. With few exceptions, the toasts were of little significance. On one occasion Stalin rose and stated that the Soviet Government questioned why the British and American Governments supplied the Soviet Government with inferior material. He stated that the American Government has furnished the Soviets with P–40’s instead of Aircobras and that the British had supplied Hurricanes instead of Spitfires, both of which were inferior to German planes; that when 150 Aircobras were allocated to the Soviet Union the British intercepted them and sent them somewhere else. He stated that the Russian people knew that both the Americans and the British had planes which were equal to or better than the German planes and could not see why some of these planes were not supplied to the Russians. This statement brought a reply from the British Ambassador in which he stated that he had full knowledge of the Aircobra diversion, that he could only say that he believed that the disposition made of these 150 Aircobras was of far greater value to the Allied cause than would have been the case had they been delivered to Russia.⁷⁴ The American Ambassador had no knowledge of this matter. It later developed that the planes were diverted for the use of American flyers.

A toast of interest was one given by Mr. Barnes, a former newspaper man in Moscow who is believed to have Communist leanings. In responding to a toast he spoke very enthusiastically about his previous experience at Moscow and of his associations there, especially mentioning Oumanski and Lozovski. The utterances of Mr. Barnes were important because of the advisory status he occupies with Mr. Willkie.

The dinner was a comparatively small one and the toasts were comparatively tame especially when compared with the Churchill dinner. The food, although plentiful, was all on the table and was not served in courses as on previous occasions. There was an absence of the usual effort to have the guests consume all the wine on the table.

The dinner terminated about 11 o’clock and the guests proceeded to the smoking room. Stalin arranged for his own group which was made up of Mr. Willkie, Pavlov (interpreter), Molotov, Oumanski, Voroshilov, Sobolev, the British Ambassador, the American Ambassador, and later General Bradley. The discussions were in a way rather general and light in character but on one point in the conversation Mr. Stalin looked across the table at the American Ambassador and said “why don’t you come back to Moscow”. The Ambassador replied, “Mr. Stalin, I ask you why I do not come back to Moscow. I understand that your seat of Government is in Kuibyshev and I supposed that I was complying with your desire by continuing my operations in that city.[”] Mr. Stalin replied “there is no reason why you should not come back. Are you afraid to come back?” The Ambassador replied that he would be glad to return to Moscow and would do so as soon as possible. The Ambassador asked Stalin if it would not embarrass him in connection with the Japanese to which he replied “not at all because in two or three months I think all the diplomatic missions will come back”. The Ambassador then inquired if Stalin had heard a B. B. C. report that evening which had quoted a statement made by the newly appointed Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.⁷⁵ Upon receiving a negative reply the Ambassador informed Stalin that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was reported to have made a statement in Tokyo to the effect that Japanese-Soviet relations were in the state they had been for a long time—that there were no misunderstandings and no difficulties on the Siberian front and no chance of any disturbances there. The Ambassador said this had aroused his curiosity because he had heard in Kuibyshev rumors to the effect that certain conversations were going on between the Japanese and the Russians and that the statement of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that these discussions had terminated harmoniously. Stalin replied that there had been discussions. He added he had been informed that the Germans had demanded that the Japanese attack Soviet Siberia but that the Japanese had replied that if the Germans would supply Japan with one million tons of steel, five hundred thousand tons of shipping and with aluminum and other alloys and materials required for Japanese industry Japan would consider the German request, that the Germans had refused and that therefore Japan had refused to attack Russia. Stalin stated that the German refusal indicated that the Germans had no steel or other materials to spare and that Japan was in a difficult situation so far as raw materials for her industries was concerned. Stalin then made certain other statements in regard to the weakness of Japanese industrial facilities and again spoke about the return to Moscow of the Ambassador to which Molotov nodded his approval.⁷⁶

About midnight Stalin suggested that the guests see a motion picture, “The Defense of Moscow”, which was shown. The picture lasted about one hour and the party broke up at 1 a.m.

5. Statements made by Mr. Willkie.

Mr. Wilkie and the members of his party while in Moscow made their own arrangements for seeing and talking with various Soviet officials, foreign diplomats and correspondents. The Embassy therefore did not know whom they saw or by whom they were entertained, whom they talked with or what they said. Its knowledge of statements made by Mr. Willkie to the press is based on hearsay or on information received over the radio or published in newspapers. There is summarized however some of the conversations which did take place in the Ambassador’s presence.

On September 25 [19] Vyshinski, the First Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, gave a formal dinner for Mr. Willkie at which Lozovski, the other Assistant Commissar, other members of the Foreign Office, Soviet military officials, members of the Embassy staff and of Mr. Willkie’s party were present. During the course of the dinner Mr. Willkie informed Vyshinski and Lozovski that he had come to the Soviet Union with the purpose of obtaining material which would enable him to give the American people a more favorable picture of the Soviet Union than they had at present. During the two days that he had been in the Soviet Union he had come to realize how unfairly the Soviet Union had been represented in the past to the American people. False reports with regard to the Soviet Union had been circulated by certain vested interests which feared that the Soviet Government was endeavoring to spread the Soviet system to the United States. These enemies of the Soviet Union for instance had caused many Americans to believe that the Soviet Government did not permit freedom of religion in the Soviet Union and was persecuting those who practiced religion.⁷⁷ He now knew that the stories of religious persecution in the Soviet Union were false and hoped to take back with him material which he could use in convincing the American people that there was freedom of religion in the Soviet Union. It was now his understanding that the Soviet Government was opposed to priest craft as distinct from religion. He personally also had little respect for priest craft and that in America the Church and the State were separate and he hoped that the American people could be brought to understand what the real situation was in the U. S. S. R.

The American people also were being led to believe that the Soviet Government not only had abolished private property in the Soviet Union but that it was endeavoring to bring about the abolition of private property in the United States. Two days in the Soviet Union however convinced him that there was not so great a difference in the Soviet outlook and the American outlook as many people in the United States believe. He was convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union from a social point of view were approaching each other and believed that within a few years the social systems of the two countries would be very similar. This last statement was received coldly by Vyshinski and Lozovski who were not inclined to admit that the Soviet Union was developing in a direction towards capitalism.

Mr. Willkie then assured Lozovski that if the Soviet authorities would give him an opportunity to find the answers to the many questions he would raise and freely to travel and meet people in the country, he would be able upon his return to the United States to place the Soviet Union in a much more favorable light before the American people. Vyshinski remarked dryly that Mr. Willkie was over optimistic, that if Mr. Willkie upon his return would write and speak favorably of the Soviet Union in the United States, persons in the United States hostile to the Soviet Union would say that he had been duped or shown only the most favorable aspects of Soviet life. Mr. Willkie said he was convinced that he could do much to bring about a more friendly feeling in the United States toward the Soviet Union. Twenty-three million people had voted for him, the American people had confidence in him, they knew that he was a man who frankly told the truth and the whole truth and that he could be trusted. He again expressed his earnest hope that he be given full freedom to investigate for himself conditions in the Soviet Union as they were. The Soviet authorities could be sure that if he saw something which he did not like or which made known in the United States might create an unfavorable impression, he would remain silent to it. His great desire was to improve Soviet-American relations and therefore he would not in the United States give voice to any unfavorable impression which he might receive.

Turning to the international field Mr. Willkie said that frankly and personally speaking it was his opinion that two countries and only two countries could be depended upon to win the war and that those two countries were the United States and the Soviet Union. He said, “without mentioning any other country—and I am sure you will know the country to which I refer, I am convinced from my recent travels that imperialism is as dead as a dodo bird”. At this remark both Vyshinski and Lozovski looked at each other in some astonishment hut offered no comment. A few moments later when Vyshinski rose to make a toast he dwelt upon the fact that the winning of the war would require the united efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

On the afternoon of September 28 [19], a luncheon was given for Mr. Willkie by the officials of a Soviet farm. Members of the Foreign Office and Soviet military officers were present. During the course of this luncheon Mr. Willkie stated that the United States desired the establishment of a second front but that Great Britain was opposed to it. At the above mentioned dinner, in replying to Vyshinski’s toast, Mr. Willkie observed that the American people desired the immediate creation of a second front.

It is assumed that most of the statements issued by Mr. Willkie to the press have been made available to the Department. An account of a press interview with Mr. Willkie which appeared in the Moscow Izvestiya of September 27 is of particular interest and is attached herewith. A part of this account read as follows:

“I asked myself what can be the most effective method of winning our war by helping our heroic Russian ally. There was only one answer for me—to establish together with Great Britain a real second front in Europe and within the shortest time our military leaders will approve. Perhaps the American public will have to prod them: a little.”⁷⁸

6. Comments on the visit.

It is assumed that Mr. Willkie will make a full report to the President of his activities as the President’s Special Representative in the Soviet Union and other countries. It may be stated that insofar as the Embassy is aware, the Soviet authorities from Stalin down to the lowest official have shown him every courtesy and have given him exceptional facilities for visiting places rarely seen by foreigners and for having conversations with persons who are as a rule inaccessible to foreigners.

It was apparent from the outset that Mr. Willkie while in the Soviet Union desired to depend upon members of his party for political advice and counsel and that he did not desire suggestions from the Embassy with regard to the attitude which he should assume towards the officials of the Soviet Union and other governments, towards the Soviet citizens whom he had an opportunity to meet and towards the press and with regard to private or public statements which he might make. The Ambassador, and the Embassy, therefore unfortunately were not able to give him much guidance particularly after he had made it clear that he preferred to be completely independent of the Embassy.

Mr. Willkie did however as a result of the Ambassador’s suggestion stop at Kuibyshev for two days before proceeding to Moscow and the Ambassador had an opportunity while in Kuibyshev to present him to the appropriate officials in the Foreign Office who arranged for him and his party to get acquainted with certain industrial and agricultural Soviet achievements. The Ambassador also went with Mr. Willkie to Moscow and presented him to Mr. Molotov who agreed to arrange an appointment for him with Mr. Stalin. It had been the understanding of the Ambassador that he was to introduce Mr. Willkie to Mr. Stalin and the Ambassador felt that it was important that he should be present during the interview. Circumstances the nature of which are not clear to him resulted in his not being present during the conversations between Stalin and Mr. Willkie and members of his party.

56. This memorandum, undated and unsigned, was brought by the Ambassador when he returned to Washington for consultation and was attached to a covering letter to the Secretary of State, dated October 24, 1942.
57. Ambassador Standley sent a telegram, No. 366, September 22, (not printed), partially describing these events.
58. Shao Li-tze.
59. Herbert Lacy Baggallay.
60. Robert J. Scovell.
61. Mr. Willkie and his party arrived in Moscow by airplane from Kuibyshev at 2:15 p.m., September 20, 1942.
62. This portion of Section 3 not printed, but see telegram No. 371, September 23, midnight, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, infra.
63. Ambassador Standley sent a telegram (No. 380, September 26, 1942, not printed) stating that this meeting had taken place and that Mr. Willkie had informed him of the substance of the conversation.
64. Chief of the Protocol Section of the Foreign Office.
65. This portion of the memorandum is not printed.
66. In another part of this memorandum by Ambassador Standley, in connection with Willkie’s side trip to the Rzhev front, he has written: “According to the Military Attaché who accompanied Mr. Willkie on his trip to the front the party was taken to an inactive sector at least 15–20 miles behind the front and saw no action, The Military Attaché described the trip as absolutely valueless from the point of view of a military observer.”
67. Ante, p. 184. Because of the failure of W. Averell Harriman to discuss the problems in Polish-Soviet relations with Stalin during his earlier visit in August (see footnote 59, p. 178), it was proposed that Willkie should discuss these difficulties with Stalin, without going into details, in the hope that an effort would be made by the Soviet authorities to bring about an amelioration in relations. For further correspondence concerning this procedure, see pp. 175–196, pasaim.
68. Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet, People’s Commissar for Naval Affairs.
69. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriya, People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs.
70. Vladimir Georgevich Dekanozov, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
71. Alexander Sergeyevich Shcherbakov.
72. Semën Pavlovich Kozyrev.
73. Mikhail Mikhailovich Potrubach.
74. The preceding four sentences were commented upon in a memorandum of November 12 by Edward Page, Jr., p. 745. See also telegram No. 384, September 28, from the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, and telegram No. 289, October 5, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, pp. 725 and 728, respectively.
75. Masayuki Tani, appointed on September 17, 1942.
76. The contents of this paragraph were reported separately by Ambassador Standley in his telegram No. 827, September 30, 1942 (not printed). He also invited the attention of the Department to “the main features of Stalin’s own speech at the dinner table” which had been covered in telegram No. 384 from Moscow, September 28, p. 725.
77. For correspondence on the interest of the United States in freedom of religious worship in the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 995 ff.
78. Ambassador Standley reported this interview in telegram No. 821, September 21, 1942, not printed.