740.0011 European War 1939/22839: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 10—6:20 p.m.]
3815. Personal to the President and the Secretary. This week Eden showed me an exchange of telegrams between the British Embassy in Moscow and the Foreign Office. He suggested that we might be interested in their content. I told him that we would and at my request he sent on to me the following letter which is a summary of the exchange:
“In a telegram which Clark Kerr sent recently from Moscow, where he has spent some 3 weeks, he reported that he was impressed by the change for the better which the signature of the Anglo-Soviet treaty had wrought upon the public and official mind alike. He added, however, that he was still more impressed by the way in which both the public and members of the Government assumed that the opening of a second front this year was a thing that could be taken for granted. He went on to report that when he and Admiral Standley lunched with Molotov on the 26th June, the latter spoke as if the opening of a second front this year was decided on and was at pains to make clear to Admiral Standley and Clark Kerr, the immense importance the Soviet people and Government attached to it. Molotov spoke much of what he called “Anglo-Saxon promises” and of the cruel disillusionment that would follow any failure to redeem them. He swept aside any suggestion that no fast promise had in fact been given by saying that the test of the treaty lay in a second front and that we and the United States Government must understand this.
We were rather perturbed by this report from Clark Kerr and we, therefore, instructed him to see Molotov and to tell him that the Prime Minister and I were disturbed at the impression derived from the account of the Ambassador’s conversation with him on the 26th June, that he might be overestimating the probability of the early establishment of a second front in western Europe this year. Clark Kerr was instructed then to remind Molotov of the discussions on this subject in London which made clear all the difficulties of the operation and to suggest to him that the tenor of his conversation on the 26th June and the Soviet Government’s publicity about a second front to their own people seemed to be of doubtful wisdom. We particularly regretted that Molotov should have implied that if we were unable to open a second front this year, we should be failing to redeem definite promises and that the treaty would lose its value; we felt also that the present line of Soviet publicity, which could not but raise definite hopes of a second front being opened this year, might, if those hopes were not fulfilled, lead to a loss of morale and perhaps to a feeling of resentment against this country and the United States of America which we must surely all deplore and which might have results upon the issue of the war that all three countries would have cause most bitterly to regret.
Clark Kerr carried out his instructions on the 4th July. The conversation [Page 609] was very friendly. Molotov replied by saying that there had been much “subjective” matter in what he had said on the 26th June and claimed that it was no more than he had said in London and Washington. He admitted, however, that our views and the difficulties had been made clear to him in London both orally and in writing and added that he had explained them to the Soviet Government who understood them well. Their understanding of the matter was as explained in his speech to the Supreme Council in which he had made no mention of promises.
Nonetheless Molotov did not of course admit that what was in the minds of the Soviet people had been fostered by the way in which it was presented to them; but said that both they and the Red Army were eagerly awaiting a second front and that it was not unnatural that their attention should have focussed on the references to the second front in the Washington and London communiqués and that they should have created a feeling of assurance.
The United States Government have no doubt had a report from Admiral Standley about the conversation with Molotov on the 26th June and they may like to know of the action we took on receiving Clark Kerr’s report of it and of Molotov’s reaction.
We felt it essential to lose no time in correcting any false impression that might be gaining ground owing to a somewhat partial presentation of the case by the Soviet Government. I think this was wise, and M. Molotov does not seem to have attempted to deny that we in London were quite frank in attaching very specific reservation to our forecast of future possibilities. I know that you desired that your Government should be kept informed of our action.”95
- A full summary of this letter was sent by the Department in telegram No. 351, July 17, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union with a request for “any comment you may care to make with respect to Eden’s letter, particularly with regard to the attitude assumed by Molotov in discussing the second front with you and the British Ambassador.” The reply is in Ambassador Standley’s telegram No. 629, July 22, 7 p.m., p. 612.↩