741.61/981
The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
Mr. Berle: I feel myself in full accord with the views expressed in your memorandum. You may, however, not have read all of the many preceding memoranda of conversations on this subject which I have had with the British Ambassador. You may further not be aware of the messages which the President has sent to Stalin and to Churchill on this subject.
After repeated efforts on our part to prevent the conclusion of any treaty of this character, the Soviet Government to all intents and purposes has refused to discuss the question with us and the British Government has now informed us that they have reached the final determination to conclude this treaty. The treaty is to be public, not secret.
In my own judgment, the treaty violated the clear terms of the Atlantic Charter and is indefensible from every moral standpoint, and equally indefensible from the standpoint of the future peace and stability of Europe.
The President has stated to the British Government that he would neither directly nor indirectly indicate any approval of the treaty. He has stated to them that he was utterly opposed to the treaty. By his direction however, I informed the British Government that in view of the facts above stated, the President hoped that at least the unfortunate inhabitants of the Baltic countries would be permitted to leave those territories if and when the Russians occupied the republics once more so that at least the inhabitants of those states would not be forced into a situation which would be equivalent to slavery.
[Page 542]I have felt more strongly on this issue, namely, the conclusion of this treaty, than on any other matter which has come before me in recent years. The attitude of the British Government is, in my judgment, not only indefensible from every moral standpoint, but likewise extraordinarily stupid. I am confident that no sooner will this treaty have been signed than Great Britain will be confronted with new additional demands for the recognition of the right of the Soviet Union to occupy the Bucovina, Bessarabia, and very likely eastern Poland and northern Norway. Those are the views expressed to me by General Sikorski78 and those views I share.
I do not understand, however, the argument set forth on page 4 of your memorandum.79 In view of the fact that this Government has consistently and vigorously opposed the conclusion of this treaty and has done everything practical it can to prevent it, I am at a loss to understand why this Government will be accused of having negotiated a Baltic Munich. We have absolutely no part in the negotiation of the treaty. We have informed both sides that we are dead against it and it was only after we had been officially informed that the British Government had determined to sign the treaty that on grounds of humanity we made a last-minute appeal for at least an amelioration of the condition of the human beings involved. That in no sense implies or could be construed as implying any participation on our part in the responsibilities incurred.
- Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, had a conversation on March 25, 1942, with Acting Secretary of State Welles. For his views on this subject, see Mr. Welles’ memorandum of the same date, p. 123, particularly paragraphs 4, 5, and 6; also section V of the Polish memorandum of March 24, to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, pp. 125, 129.↩
- See the third and fourth paragraphs from the end of the memorandum, supra.↩