741.61/982
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Acting Secretary of State
The Acting Secretary: I feel that a word of comment for the record is required in respect of the memorandum of April 1, being an account of the conversation between the Acting Secretary and Viscount Halifax.
The subject of this conversation was a repeated attempt by the British to secure our consent to a proposed British-Russian treaty by which the British would assent to the taking over by Soviet Russia of the Baltic Republics. Heretofore, the United States has declined to accept any territorial commitments except those made in open conference.
The proposed Russo-British treaty is, in effect, a secret treaty granting to Russia the territory of the three Baltic Republics as and when they are reconquered from the German occupying armies. I have taken full account of the almost frantic pressure by the British: upon us to Secure our assent to this. The British in turn are, of course, pressed by their fear lest Russia negotiate a separate peace: with Germany.
The position of the American Government in declining to become a party to these arrangements has been based on two motives.
- First, we have felt the full force of the commitment in the Atlantic Charter to restore the peoples conquered by force to independence in their own countries.
- Second, we have not been unmindful of the extreme and unjust hardship of the fate which the Baltic Republics would suffer if their entire national life were submerged either by Russia or by Germany.
We have been and are fully mindful of the wholly legitimate interest which Soviet Russia has in the area of the Baltic Republics, namely, the necessity that they shall not be used as military or “fifth column” springboards against her; and the necessity to her of full outlet to the Baltic Sea.
I had hoped that we might work out an arrangement by which the relation of these republics to Russia would be analogous to the relationship which prevails between Cuba, Haiti, Costa Rica and the United States—that is, a relationship in which every military and [Page 540] economic interest is fully taken care of, but the life of the peoples is developed according to their own desires.
I appreciate fully that the motive in suggesting a clause in the draft Russo-British treaty providing for “reciprocal exchange of populations” was to safeguard in some measure the Baltic peoples, and to protect in some measure (if it can be called protection) the humanitarian position we have taken.
But I am forced to make certain observations.
- 1.
- “Reciprocal exchange of populations” can only be a polite phrase meaning that the unhappy peoples of these republics (whose only crime is that they exist) will have the right to go into mass exile. There can be no question of “reciprocal exchange” because there is no possible place to which these “populations” can be exchanged. No provision is made, or in the nature of things can now be made, for a place to which these wretched people can go. We are not even in a position to say that they will be granted free immigration into the United States.
- 2.
- In the present state of mind of the British Government the mere making of this suggestion will be construed as an assent to the submergence of these republics in respect of whose creation both Russia and we were so largely involved. My fear is that we are now taken to have committed ourselves to the seizure of the territory, provided there is added some pious and, in the existing circumstances, meaningless phrase about free immigration of populations to places unknown, on conditions unspecified, and, in any case, with the complete sacrifice of their tradition, their property, their habits and possibly even their language and their race.
Having had at various times in my life some experience in Baltic problems, I think it is not too much to gay that, if this development is consummated and if it becomes generally known, we shall be accused of having negotiated a Baltic “Munich”. The accusation will not be just; but there can be no doubt that every British politician will take full advantage of the situation to hide behind the name and moral standing of the President and of the United States.
It is true that by comparative standards the fate of these unhappy peoples (the total number of actual Ests, Letts and Lithuanians is probably hot more than three million) is a small one in comparison to the whole picture. It is even possible that at long last the good sense of the Russian people will work out a humane arrangement. It is conceivable (though not likely) that the Poles, whose thinking is entirely based on an independent Lithuania, who have not, as I understand, been informed of this, will not make the charge of bad faith. But I feel we are getting ourselves into a dangerous position, both morally and realistically, and, I may add, in terms of American politics.
[Page 541]I write this with full appreciation of the extreme difficulty of the situation, the forces which tend towards a decision and the kindly thought which motivates our intervention. No doubt it was this that led to the making of the decision without the usual departmental consultation.
I should have preferred (and I believe the Soviet Government would have preferred) a blunt and frank statement of our views, namely, full willingness to assure the satisfaction of every Russian interest consistent with the maintenance of the cultural and racial existence in their homelands of three free, decent, unambitious and hard-working peoples who are now apparently to be eliminated from the earth.