740.0011 European War 1939/24913: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 18—11:45 p.m.]
892. Agitation in the Soviet press for the immediate establishment of the second front has continued with few occasional lulls since the Churchill visit. It has been especially intense at times when stimulated by such events as the Willkie intimation that a little prodding of the military might be helpful and the letter of Stalin to Cassidy.
This agitation in the press has been in the form of quotations from articles published in Great Britain and the United States demanding [Page 465] an immediate second front and of articles, editorials, statements, caricatures and so forth of Soviet origin.
Some of the articles of Soviet origin attempt to prove that the military and naval situation is such as to render feasible the immediate opening of active military operations by the Allies on the European front; Others draw on history to prove that one of the weaknesses of a coalition has been that each member has a tendency to derive there-from the greatest possible benefits at the least possible cost to itself.
One such article by Tarle,40 the well-known Soviet historian, published in Pravda of October 9, frankly emphasizes errors made by British diplomacy in previous wars. In another article a Soviet Major-General attacks the theory supported by certain British and American circles that the war can be decided by air attacks on Germany.
Recent Soviet editorials and articles for the use of propagandists touching on the second front have in general followed the line that Red Army must be prepared to fight on alone until the second front, which in time will undoubtedly be established, can relieve the German pressure. Tarle articles differ in emphasis from some of the foreign news items and articles simultaneously quoted which dwell upon the desperate need for the immediate opening of a second front.
The press campaign has contributed to the stimulation of a deep and wide interest among the Soviet people in the matter of a second front. Members of the Embassy staff are quizzed frequently by Soviet citizens with whom they enter into conversations in shops and trains etc. regarding the reasons for the delay of the establishment of a second front. It would appear that the Soviet people have been led to believe that Great Britain and the United States have agreed to open a second front during the year 1942 and that they will consider the failure to establish such a front as a violation of obligations. It seems that more criticism is directed at Britain than the United States for the delay and in sane [some] Soviet circles it is intimated that the British “with their customary duplicity” do not desire a strong Soviet Union after the war and would not be displeased if Germany, while exhausting itself, should further weaken the Soviet Union.
The question of the second front also continues to occupy a prominent place in propaganda and agitation work other than that carried on by the press. A member of the Embassy staff attended an Agitprop lecture41 last night at which foreigners apparently were not supposed to be present. The subject was “A Survey of International Events” and most of the address was devoted to the second front. In general [Page 466] the speaker followed lines similar to those of the press. He endeavored to prove that Great Britain and America were strong enough in view of the present distribution of German troops to invade western Europe and to show that no serious difficulties of a purely military nature stood in the way of the immediate opening of a second front. He stressed Willkie’s suggestion that it might be helpful to prod British and American military leaders and pointed-out that although Willkie was not expressing the official opinion of the American Government, he was the spokesman for 22 million American voters and was in the Soviet Union as a personal representative of the President. The speaker said that therefore Willkie should be considered as a competent spokesman for the American people. Some of the lecturer’s remarks were of an extremely satirical nature and were not calculated to promote feelings of friendliness for the American or British Governments. While making it clear that the Soviet Union was glad to have the United States and Great Britain as allies, he gave his audience to understand that these allies by failing to open a second front were responsible for present Soviet military difficulties.
It is impossible with assurance to list or to attempt to weigh the various reasons prompting the Soviet authorities to carry on an agitation campaign of the character of that outlined above. From an external point of view, there can be no doubt as [that?] they are, at least in part, motivated by a desire to bring greater pressure upon the American and British Governments to increase aid, and in particular open at once a front in Western Europe. It is believed that internally they are endeavoring to cope with a growing dissatisfaction arising from the absence of a second front, the establishment of which they had encouraged the Soviet people to expect this year. They are trying to make it clear that they have made and are making use of all means at their disposal to bring about this front, and that the failure of this front to materialize would indicate that the United States and Great Britain have violated their obligations rather than that the Soviet leaders have not been entirely frank with the Soviet people. It seems that a particular effort is being made gradually to accustom the Red Army to the idea that it may be compelled to carry on the struggle at least through the fall and winter without the armed assistance from the west which allegedly had been promised.
Certain aspects of the campaign strengthen my impression that although the Soviet authorities are permitting and at times even encouraging expressions of tolerance and occasionally of friendliness for the United States and Great Britain, they are not yet prepared to permit the Soviet people to have feelings of confidence in, or wholehearted friendliness for, any of the so-called capitalistic nations even though for the time being some of these nations and the Soviet Union are associated in a struggle against a common foe.