740.0011 European War 1939/24890: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]38

885. My 874, October 10, 5 p.m. The decree of October 9 abolishing the system of military commissars has given rise to much discussion and speculation among the Soviet population and foreign observers and in general has been popularly received.

As the result of experience gained in the early part of the Finnish-Soviet war of 1939–40 there has been little doubt in military circles here that during a period of actual warfare a system, which impairs the principle of the unity of command, is disadvantageous from a purely military point of view. During the course of that war, therefore, the military commissars were deprived of all military authority.

Following the tremendous initial successes of the Germans last year Stalin decided to restore military authority to the commissars in spite of the resultant military disadvantages. It is believed that this decision was based on his conviction that many officers of the army did not have full confidence in his leadership and could not be depended upon to be entirely loyal to the new military structure which he had created since the army purge of 193739 or to him personally and that the strengthening of the authority of the system of military commissars, the tentacles of which were extended into all army institutions and units while not necessarily adding to the army’s military effectiveness, would nevertheless place the commissars in a better position to combat the crystallization of feelings of dissatisfaction with himself.

Although the Embassy does not possess means which enable it to state with assurance the precise reasons for the issuance of the decree just at this time, it believes from such information as has come into its possession from various sources that the following factors are among those responsible for Stalin’s decision:

(1)
A greater confidence on the part of Stalin in the reliability and personal loyalty to himself of all ranks of officers in the Red Army. [Page 464] The close personal relationship between Stalin and his leading generals was evident at the Churchill dinner.
(2)
The dissatisfaction of his officers with the present situation. The regular line officers as a rule have considered the powers possessed by the Military Commissars as a reflection of a lack of confidence in their own loyalty, which they felt themselves to have demonstrated on the field of battle. They, furthermore, have complained that they have frequently found themselves unable, because of the necessity of conferring in advance with the military commissars, to make decisions with the speed demanded by this military situation.
(3)
The deteriorating effect of the commissar system upon army discipline. The success of the campaign which has been waged, particularly during recent weeks, to improve discipline has been impeded by the lack of unity of command and the absence of mutual confidence between regular line officers and the commissars. It is particularly important during the coming winter when the men at the front will be receiving news of the privations of their families in the rear that every effective means be taken to promote strict discipline.
(4)
The lack of personnel of officer calibre sufficient to supply the needs of the military commissar system and simultaneously to replace the regular line officers who have fallen. Many of the military commissars after a short period of training will make effective regular line officers. Some of them have already been acting in such a capacity.

The issuance of the decree by no means indicates the cessation of political pork [work] in the army. The order of the Commissariat for Defense of October 9 supplementing the decree as well as comments carried in the editorials of the leading Soviet newspapers makes it clear that although all former commissars will be commissioned as line officers, the political work in the future will be carried out by line officers acting as assistants to and under the direction of various grades of commanders and qualified in case of need to take command.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Henderson
  1. The last section of this telegram, in which the Chargé quoted from an editorial in Pravda of October 11, which was largely a summation of the preceding observations, is badly garbled and consequently omitted.
  2. See Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 377380, 383386.