740.00112 European War 1939/7562: Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

3740. Stahle66 who returned together with Boheman on December 27 yesterday called on me and later discussed with Klath at considerable length seriousness with which Swedish Government views probable consequences of American and British insistence that two Göteborg ships be released. He stated that informal Swedish Cabinet decision was negative as to ships but that their cargo could be reloaded if two new ships are sent to Sweden especially for that purpose. An alternative would be to assign airplanes in sufficient number and size to transport most important part of cargo. He estimated cargo at about 8,000 tons, valued at 30,000,000 crowns, of which about 1,000,000 pounds sterling represented ball bearing production equipment.

Stahle reiterated that Germans would immediately cut off Göteborg traffic if ships were released (see Legation’s 3643, December 22, 4 p.m.). This would in Swedish Government’s opinion mean that traffic cannot be resumed during war. He feels that it would be advisable to reconsider whole question to determine whether cargo on these two ships is of sufficient value to counterbalance such subsequent disadvantages as:

(1)
Severing sole Swedish contact with United Nations and canceling only means available for political influence on Swedish future course of action.
(2)
Driving Sweden into hands of Axis as only supplier of essential commodities, including petroleum for air and naval forces. This would mean increased Axis pressure and gradual decline of any Swedish opposition to German demands which would be sure to increase while Swedish possibilities of resistance would be broken.
(3)
Probable cancellation of all Swedish export licenses for Allies and stoppage all air service across North Sea.
(4)
Possibility of Sweden considering herself released from British war trade agreement under which exports of several hundred commodity items are restricted. This would mean heavy increases in exports to continent of typical Swedish products extremely useful to Axis war efforts. For instance, arsenic is a commodity included in restricted group.
(5)
Creating a situation under which German demands upon [Page 375] Sweden could not be resisted for any length of time and finally resulting in more or less complete Swedish subservience.

In conclusion Stahle again strongly urged that whole problem be given most careful consideration by responsible officials in Washington and London.

Repeated to London.

Greene
  1. Nils Stăhle, of the Commercial Division of the Swedish Foreign Office.