740.00112 European War 1939/7483: Telegram
The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:26 p.m.]
3643. I conferred with Foreign Minister this afternoon and made representations authorized in Department’s 1133, December 19, 5 [Page 373] p.m. It appears that Cabinet after Mallet’s visit yesterday had discussed question and Foreign Minister was able to say that while there had been no formal vote taken, Cabinet was agreed Göteborg ships would not be released. He wished to make it clear that refusal to permit ships to leave was not a punitive measure applied because British had armed ships that left Göteborg some months ago; it was due to political considerations based upon inevitable result that if they were to leave Göteborg, traffic would automatically be cut off by Germans. He repeated statement made to Mallet yesterday with one difference (see first paragraph my 3634, December 22, 9 a.m.) that he had not told German Minister that he would inform him if any change in decision were made but that he had himself felt that he should so inform German Minister having months ago told him of Government’s decision not to release ships. Mallet has been corrected on this point by Söderblom subsequently.
Minister pointed out that decision did not affect cargoes of ships provided some practicable means could be discovered by transshipping them by other means to Great Britain. Apparently this was brought up in conversation with Mallet and Ministry of Economic Warfare representatives who pointed out double risk in attempting run blockade with other ships both directions and they feared if such ships successfully entered Göteborg, they might then be held up by Swedes.
Foreign Minister [apparent omission] could definitely be cleared up before any ship made attempt to run in to Göteborg. Minister also suggested that larger and better airplanes at more regular intervals could carry most essential parts of cargo even some of heavy machinery and that Sweden would interpose no objection to that. Minister also said that if Germany once closes this traffic as would be inevitable if ships were to be released it would no doubt be closed for duration of war and that he could not help but feel that not only Sweden but United Nations would have much to lose by this step, that if Sweden could not realize its urgent need to carry on trade with western powers it would be forced to increase its trade with Germany, and it would of course lose its power of resistance very rapidly with loss of future sources of naval fuel oil and aviation fuel gasoline.
Mr. Günther said he could not refrain from expressing his great surprise that Boheman was confronted with this issue so late in our conversations when all points under discussion seemed to indicate that if Sweden were to satisfy requests of an entirely different nature oil quota and other questions of supply would be settled on a more or less permanent basis. Minister wished to say that while there was no hope of Göteborg ships being released he still maintained a hope that some solution might be reached in this critical problem which would be less disastrous to Sweden and have no such adverse effect [Page 374] on United Nations’ war effort and that as soon as matter could be property studied after Boheman’s return some communication would be made to British Minister of which this Legation would be informed.
Repeated to London.