Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/19753: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm , February 25, 1942—7 p.m.
[Received 11:21 p.m.]

355. My 330, February 21, 7 p.m.⁹ I had a talk yesterday afternoon with Mr. Boheman, Secretary General of Foreign Office.

1. Referring to rumored German plan to attack Sweden Mr. Boheman said there was nothing new of significance to point in this direction nor had there been any specific German demands or threats in last few days. He said however that Swedish Government continues to receive warnings from many sources that something from Germany is in air against Sweden. Majority of these warnings come from friends of Sweden in Germany. Boheman is inclined to discount possibility of an Allied attack on Norway this year which would perhaps offer most outstanding provocation to Germany for attacking Sweden but he said pessimists in Swedish circles argue that whether Germany takes seriously possibility of such an Allied attack or not, it would have little effect on her decision to attack Sweden as in any case she would desire for strategic reasons to forestall any Allied attack on peninsula and have herself entrenched in Sweden before it came. Referring to warnings received and to more pessimistic views Boheman said that he personally did not “believe a word of it,” although obliged to admit anything was possible from Germany.

Sweden of course is in as great a state of preparedness as she can put herself. Military units on active service Boheman pointed out were greatly reduced on account of difficulty of maintaining morale of large numbers of troops under winter conditions when physical activities are necessarily restricted. Large numbers of men are now being called into service. Boheman said that numbers were no greater than intensified spring and summer activities would justify although he said they are being called up somewhat earlier than would ordinarily be case. (Military Attaché is reporting on these figures to War Department.)

I mentioned to Boheman general trend of Swedish press comment on possibility of Sweden being involved in war which has been comment for past few days (my 341, February 24¹¹ gives typical examples of this comment; see also my 340, February 24¹¹). Boheman said that line taken by press yesterday in particular was directly inspired by Government and accurately stated Government’s policy. In my view it also reflects accurately the will of the overwhelming majority of the Swedes. He remarked that Sweden was made neutral by sheer force of circumstances, that it would be quite impossible to induce Swedish people to fight either Norway or Finland; that to fight Norway would mean being first joined with Allies and that to fight Finland would mean being first joined with Germany; that Sweden could be made to fight either Norway or Finland only by being attacked herself.

Although our conversation was on a most informal and friendly basis Boheman emphatically stated that it was determination of Swedes to resist by force any attack on their territory from whatever quarter it came. He remarked incidentally that according to estimates of Germans themselves, which were known in Sweden, 35 to 40 divisions are considered least number which would be necessary for successful invasion and occupation of this country.

Knowing that Schnurre¹² had been in Sweden for past week without publicity I asked Mr. Boheman if there was anything he could tell me regarding purpose of his visit. He replied that Schnurre had stopped in Sweden en route to Germany from Finland where he had been negotiating a trade agreement; that he had spent past week here with friends without seeing any officials; that on Monday¹³ he made a formal call at Foreign Office prior to his departure for Germany; that he had not brought up anything new but had merely again asked question which either he or German Legation asks every week or two—that is whether Sweden is not ready to change her mind about various controversial matters.

2. Toward end of our talk Boheman referred briefly to conditions in Norway and to immense sympathies which Swedish people feel for Norwegians under their present trials.

He was most critical of the “commando” raids by British at different points on Norwegian coast; said that in his opinion they accomplished nothing of value to Allies and that their only result was that on each occasion Germans or their satellites found an excuse to kill all of good Norwegians.

He also spoke in very disparaging terms of Sir Stafford Cripps¹⁴ whose unfortunate speech of 2 weeks ago made a very bad impression here. Boheman met Cripps sometime ago when he came through here and talked with him. He said that Cripps was undoubtedly “intellectual” but in his view by no means “an intelligent man”. Boheman also interpreted Stalin’s speech of 2 or 3 days ago as a direct reply to Cripps’ speech and directed to the world as well as to his own people. He pointed out that Stalin had stated Russia was fighting this war alone while Germany was helped by Allies, and made no reference to Great Britain or United States or to material aid these countries were giving Russia, that he expressly stated he had no quarrel with German people and that Russia had no intention of occupying German territory. Boheman was of opinion that Cripps’ speech had not served purpose either of Great Britain or of Russia in any direction.

Johnson

9. Not printed.
11. Not printed.
11. Not printed.
12. Karl Schnurre of the Office of Trade Policy in the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
13. February 23.
14. British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, June 12, 1940–January 22, 1942; became Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons February 19, 1942; made speech at Bristol February 9 on Soviet policy.