Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

860C.014/118⅔

Memorandum by the Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) on the Polish-Russian Frontiers²

December 23, 1942

1. A lasting peace in Central and Eastern Europe depends on Polish-Russian collaboration, which in turn is subsequent to the settlement of the question of the common boundaries and the loyal observance of treaties binding the two countries.

2. It must be emphasized from the very outset that by the Treaty of Riga in 1921 Poland renounced all claims to about 55% of her former area and has no territorial assertions whatever with regard to the Soviet Union. It should also be borne in mind that the Treaty of Riga resulted from a compromise based on political, economic, and strategic considerations and had never been put in question by either of the contracting Powers until the conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of 1939.

3. It was not until after the outbreak of the present war and subsequent to the German-Soviet pacts that certain imperialist tendencies of the Soviet foreign policy became evident. Some of them took their origin from the traditional policy of Russian imperialism, whilst others—which are primarily directed against Poland—are the outcome of the Communist imperialism of the Bolsheviks.

4. The historical claims of the Soviet Government are consistent with the political testament of Peter the Great, in that, they incline towards the possession of ice-free ports in the Baltic and the command of the Dardanelles. These claims are explained by the Soviet Government, as successor to the Tsarist traditions, under the pretence of strategic and economic necessities. The accomplishment of these designs against the will of the nations concerned is a problem of world politics, and will depend upon the actual disposition of forces between the Great Powers at the time of the termination of the war. The sympathy of the Polish people, who are suffering such extremities on account of their devotion to freedom, are unquestionably oil the side of the weaker nations. Poland, however, is not sufficiently powerful to undertake the defence of their interests.

5. The pressure of the Soviet Government in the direction of the eastern borders of Poland and their intentions against Lithuania admit of demands of a more recent period and are dictated by the precepts of Bolshevik Imperialism, for it is evident that the territories seized by Russia in 1939 as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, and held for two years on the basis of Russo-German collaboration, have no value to Russia whatever.

6. The northern and central areas are very poor in natural resources. The southern part which contains our only oil fields is of great importance to Poland, whereas the high cost of production and the comparatively low output (400–500.000 tons per annum) would make it insignificant to our neighbour, nor would it bear comparison with his vast capacities or economic facilities of production. In this part of Poland there is also ozocerite, natural gas, potassium chloride, timber and water-power. The industry of these resources forms the basis of a living for many hundred thousands of Polish families inhabiting outside this area.

7. The potential of Poland consists mainly in the large reserves of manpower, whereas the shortage of raw materials does not afford the opportunities for sufficient employment. There is ample scope for the development of economic intercourse between Russia and Poland, provided that political factors do not interfere with the manufacture and exchange of goods. Russia, for instance, imported to the industrial area of Leningrad millions of tons of coal, which could be supplied without difficulty by Poland, whereas it was brought from Russian Mines across a distance of over 3.000 miles. In exchange, Poland could receive the raw-material output of the neighboring Ukraine and the Caucasus. For the raw iron of Krivoy Rog, Poland would be capable of returning manufactured goods satisfying in addition the home market. The industrial development of eastern Poland would be economically justified, besides being beneficial to the local population, owing, to the circumstance that the industrial areas are distant from that region on either side of the Polish-Russian border. There are many reasons, besides these, for the anticipation of great results from economic enterprise between Poland and Russia which would be equally advantageous to both countries.

8. The arguments of a strategic nature brought forward by the Soviet Government in justification of their territorial claims with regard to the eastern part of Poland are not convincing. A span of an additional hundred miles could hardly be of significance to a territorial dimension such as Russia, whose width extends over seven thousand miles. The Russian capital is situated one thousand miles from the western borders of the Soviet Empire. A boundary following the so-called Curzon line (along the river Bug) would from the strategic point of view be infinitely more disadvantageous to Russia than the Russo-Polish frontier previous to September 1939. The Bug is a small river that can be waded without difficulty, while the Polesie³ marshes, even during the present war, have proved to be a natural obstacle of great military significance. They are important to Poland as a defensive barrier, but worthless as a bridge-head for offensive operations.

9. The centuries of political relationship between Poland and Russia, often agitated, have testified to the attainment of valuable results of cultural and economic intercourse, which moreover could be extensively developed in the future. Through the establishment of a larger federated block of nations, Poland, would fee capable of playing a considerably more active part by the importance of this politically independent organisation existing between Germany and Russia and constituting for the latter the most effective barrier of defense against any future German intentions. Moreover such a block could never be cause of anxiety to Russia, in the sense of a cordon sanitaire as it would be founded on the binding collaboration of all countries, bordering on Germany both in the East and in the West, at the time of the German attack.

10. The Polish Prime Minister gave manifest evidence to the importance which he attaches to the problem of Polish-Russian collaboration, when notwithstanding the ordeal suffered by the Polish population during the two years of Russian occupation, following, their treacherous aggression of September 17th 1939, he was the first to extend his hand towards Russia and in July 1941 to sign an agreement followed by the joint declaration which he later signed with Stalin in Moscow.

11. It is essential that the Polish-Russian frontiers should be firmly established. There must be a dividing line between the Communist conception of the world as represented by the Soviets and the ideals of the Western Democracies based on individual rights. This demarcation should follow the lines established by the Treaty of Riga.

12. The frontiers of the Treaty of Riga are the only ones acceptable to the Polish Nation for the following reasons:

a) All historic arguments are in their favour, particularly on the grounds that the whole of the eastern area of Poland including its two principal centres, Wilno⁴ and Lwów,⁵ was built up and promoted by the effort of Poland alone and owes its culture to Polish civilization. Moreover throughout history Lwów has never belonged to Russia and Wilno was under the domination of that Country only during the period when Poland was partitioned. It would be impossible in any way to take into consideration the so called plebiscite which was accomplished by the Russians in a unilateral and coercive manner contrary to the will of the great majority of the population.

b) Both economic and strategic reasons also recommend the maintenance of the frontiers established by the Treaty of Riga.

c) The inhabitants of those territories also desire to remain within the boundaries of the Polish State. Apart from the inhabitants of Polish nationality, who previous to the war amounted to 70% of the population of Wilno and over 60% in Lwów (whereas there were no Russians in either of these cities) it should be emphasized that the White Ruthenians adhere instinctively to Poland as their Mother Country, a proof of which is available in letters addressed to General Sikorski as Head of the Polish Government, by a number of White Ruthenians who have been deported by the Russians. The Jewish inhabitants of those provinces are equally most eager to return to Poland. This is evident were it not but by the great difficulties which the Russians are creating in respect of the admission of Jews to the ranks of the Polish troops raised among the deportees in the Soviet Union. The same sentiment and desire applies to the Polish citizens of Jewish faith in the Middle East, in England or those who have found refuge in the United States.

d) General Sikorski feels it his duty to declare most emphatically that the whole Polish Nation would repudiate the recognition of any agreement conceding the annexation of those Polish territories to Russia and would in no lesser degree regard as null and void any such commitments on the part of our Ally, than if they had been made by the enemy. Indeed the surrender of any part of Polish territory would provoke a lasting state of tension in that part of Europe and would render impossible any form of collaboration with Russia.

e) The foremost obligation of the Polish Government is the defence of the integrity of the Republic and consequently the Chief of the Polish Government has not the right whilst on foreign soil, to sign any agreement which might involve a diminution of Polish territory.

13. Nevertheless, in order to give further proof of goodwill, General Sikorski is prepared to go once more to Moscow and negotiate with Mr. Stalin a pact of friendship with Russia and discuss a number of other matters important to the shaping of future relations between the two Countries.

December 23, 1942.

2. Sent to Under Secretary of State Welles with a covering letter of December 23, 1942.
3. Pripet.
4. Vilna, Vilno.
5. Lvov.