Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

860C.014/118½

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] December 9, 1942.

Observations of the European Division on Certain Aspects of the Polish Question Based on the Assumption That It Is the Policy of This Government To Support the Re-Creation of a Strong Independent Poland

Mr. Secretary: Before taking up in detail the questions relating to Polish frontiers in postwar Europe, Eu⁹⁵ feels very strongly that there are a number of general considerations which must be kept constantly in mind. These are:

a. The degree to which a proposed territorial settlement will further or obstruct the creation in postwar Europe of a general system of collective security rather than the acquisition at the expense of others by one state or another of strategically important frontiers or areas which it considers necessary for its national security against its neighbors.

b. There is general admission that the question of the relations between the U. S. S. R. and the western democracies is one of the most vital to the postwar settlement and peace of the world. There is at least the possibility that the Soviet Union will abandon its previous basic hostility toward the non-Soviet states and be disposed, in its own interest as a national state to cooperate on a realistic and sincere basis in plans for a peaceful and orderly Europe. This possibility, in the opinion of Eu, would be definitively removed if the Soviet Government is given any grounds for believing that the proposals for the organization of Central-Eastern Europe reflect the desire to create a series of buffer states or cordon sanitaire to isolate the Soviet Union from Europe.

c. That Great Britain is geographically more directly connected with Europe and would therefore resent any arrangements, no matter how tentative or general they may be, for territorial settlements in continental Europe discussed by the United States with any of the Governments-in-exile.

1. Poland, being the largest country in area and homogeneous population in Eastern Europe and the only country in that area with a sufficiently strong sense of nationalism, naturally affords the best possibility of creating a great state. Furthermore, it is the greatest Catholic state in the United Nations today. It should be borne in mind, however, that this strong sense of nationalism has for the most part of the past 150 years, been of a “destructive” character directed against the established régime and for an independent Poland. For this reason it should be remembered in envisaging a new and more powerful Poland that its modern government from 1919 to 1939 found it difficult to readjust itself to a “constructive” canalization of this nationalist spirit and to a realistic and far-sighted sense of its duties and place in the family of nations.

2. Poland will dominate the northern area of any federation of eastern European states.

3. Poland must, therefore, have free and unthreatened access to the sea. The annexation of East Prussia to Poland would appear to be a reasonable means of achieving such access to the sea while at the same time removing a constant threat to Poland’s security.

4. Any question of Polish relations to any of the Baltic States must not be discussed at this time.

5. There is some force to the argument that Poland’s western frontier should be so established that Germany should not have an enclave into the vitals of Poland and also that the greatest security for Poland’s access to the sea be assured. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that there is no natural frontier between Poland and Germany.

6. Since Poland’s southern frontier borders on Czechoslovakia, this question is essentially one for their mutual agreement.

7. Poland’s northern frontier with the Baltic States, including the Vilna areas, should be determined primarily in connection with the final decision in regard to the Baltic States.

8. In regard to the eastern frontiers of the future Polish State, Eu feels that any attempt to reconstitute the 1939 frontiers of Poland, which were those established by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, will lay the seed of continuing hostility between the Soviet Union and the new Poland since the return to Poland of the eastern provinces inhabited virtually entirely by White, Russians and Ukrainians would split the Ukrainian and White Russian people. It will be recalled that the Curzon Line of 1919 [1920]⁹⁶ was suggested in accordance with ethnic considerations while the Soviet-Polish frontier of 1921 was the result of the military outcome of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920. The problem of the Vilna area and the status of the Baltic States fall into a different category and should, as indicated above, be left to future consideration.

9. There may be much merit in the proposals for federations of states in the Eastern European area. They are all in the tentative stage, however, and a decision concerning them will rest primarily with the respective peoples themselves. Further, to promise success they must embody these considerations:

a. No idea that the U. S. S. R. is being isolated, or that the federations are designed to concentrate a heavy force against an eventual Russian threat;

b. An approach different from the conceptions of the Little Entente⁹⁷ and the Balkan Entente⁹⁸ which were in effect defensive and offensive instruments against non-members;

c. A provision for adherence of nonmember states, including the present enemy states (Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania) on tolerable terms;

d. A basis sufficiently general to fit into an eventual scheme for Overall European cooperation.

e. A more realistic approach to the economic factors involved.

10. Of all the Polish leaders, Sikorski undoubtedly has preeminence in his potentialities as an individual, and he is generally regarded as representing sufficiently the majority of Polish option to assure his continued leadership during the interim.

11. It should be borne in mind, however, that any special considerations shown the Sikorski Government will be taken as a pattern for our relations with other Governments-in-exile. The European Division strongly believes we should not at this time make any formal commitments or declarations which in any way indicate that the American Government is committed to a policy of imposing upon the people of occupied countries a government now in exile.

12. This Government has with considerable success impressed on the various governments that we will not negotiate on questions of European frontiers at this stage of the war. Any weakening on this line—which still seems to have such great practical utility that it would be unfortunate to abandon it—will bring nearly all of the United Nations to us with their claims. In many cases these claims are those of allies against each other or each other’s pretensions. Therefore the European Division does not recommend any direct communication to the head of any exiled government that in any way indicates commitments at this time.

13. The European Division believes, however, that in the customary exchange of telegrams between the President and General Sikorski on the termination of the latter’s visit,⁹⁹ in addition to the usual personal references to General Sikorski, the President should stress the fact that Polish resistance to the German enemy within Poland and the Polish contribution to the prosecution of the war has provided further evidence of the dynamic force of the Polish people and the inextinguishable vitality of their national life which is the best guarantee for the restoration of a free and independent Poland.

14. Finally we recommend that General Sikorski be told shortly before his departure that the United States Government is vitally interested in the future of the eastern European countries and that we encourage the countries of eastern Europe to make careful studies of their mutual problems to determine points of agreement and disagreement in order that at all times in a position to envisage a plan of sufficient magnitude upon which desired federations could be worked out on the most equitable and permanent basis after full consideration had been given to all economic, ethnic and political questions (a committee of Exiled Governments in London¹ is already studying these problems). It should be indicated to General Sikorski that not until such time as the powers concerned had tried among themselves to reduce their mutual problems to basic points of agreement and disagreement would it be possible for the United States to discuss these questions, in consultation with other interested powers, with a view to reaching a constructive and final solution of the eastern European problem.

R[ay] A[therton]

[Annex]

It is very important to observe that in the aggregate the proposals presented by General Sikorski set forth a point of view greatly at variance with the basic principles we have adopted as the real general war aims included in such documents as the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations. An examination of the several documents now presented shows that they cover reparations, war guilt, frontier pretensions, occupation, military booty, land and sea bases, et cetera, all in the spirit of extreme nationalism, with only a mild suggestion of Poland’s own plans for international collaboration, and nothing whatever regarding some of the aspects (minorities, Jews, and rehabilitation) which particularly affect the Polish area The proposals in effect lay down Poland’s maximum nationalistic demands. It is suggested that some indication be given to General Sikorski that we view them in that light.

95. Division of European Affairs.
96. See footnote 16, p. 496.
97. The treaty organizing the Little Entente among Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia was signed at Geneva on February 16, 1933; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxix, p. 233.
98. The treaty organizing the Balkan Entente among Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was signed at Athens on February 9, 1934; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cliii, p. 153.
99. General Sikorski visited the United States in December 1942 and January 1943.
1. An informal, semi-official Main Committee, composed of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the (eight) Allied Governments in Exile and representatives of the “Fighting French,” was created in London during October 1942, to discuss postwar and other problems in common. Several subcommittees were soon appointed to prepare suggestions on particular subjects which were later to be submitted to the three great Allied powers for their approval. (840.50/832) Instructions were sent to London that “the Department would appreciate being kept closely informed concerning the progress of any such discussions.” (Instruction No. 1842, September 24, 1942, to Winant (and also to Biddle), 740.00119 European War 1939/1164b (1164a).)