740.0011 European War 1939/25143½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Standley), Temporarily in the United States43

Admiral Standley: You are requested to discuss orally with the Soviet Government, upon your return to your post, this Government’s Finnish policy with a view to placing before the Soviet Government the considerations upon which that policy is based and to obtaining, to such an extent as may be feasible, an expression of the Soviet Government’s concurrence in the general practicability of such policy.

This Government’s estimate of the situation in Finland, based upon reports over the past year from the Legation in Helsinki and upon conversations with other competent observers who have recently come from Finland after several years stay in the area, is as follows:

(1)
German forces now in Finland seem unwilling to attempt fresh advances into Soviet territory north of Leningrad unless they are aided by Finnish armed forces.
(2)
Neither the people nor the Government of Finland desire to mount fresh military offensives against the Soviet Union.
(3)
There is reason to believe that German pressure on Finland to furnish further military aid is heavy and increasing. It is still open to question whether such pressure will be decisive.
(4)
Given the foregoing situation it is the present policy of the American Government to exert counter pressure on the Finnish Government. Under present circumstances it is the opinion of all American observers in Finland that the Finnish people and certain officials of the Finnish Government place great value on maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States and that the maintenance of [Page 91] such relations acts as a strong brake on successful German pressure for increased aid from Finland. These observers feel that, conversely, if we should break relations with Finland under existing conditions the last political weapon in the hands of the United Nations to counteract German pressure on Finland would be destroyed and increased Finnish military aid to Germany, perhaps of the decisive character referred to above, would soon result. It is also felt by these observers that instead of creating disunity among the Finnish people the immediate effect of a severance of relations with Finland on the part of the United States would be to increase the influence and power over the people on the part of the pro-German elements in Finland, a development almost certain to lead to more extended Finnish military collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union. Accordingly it is the opinion of the American Government that there is a definite military advantage to the Soviet Union obtained in the maintenance of Finnish-American relations under present circumstances. (The maintenance of American relations with Finland in no way precludes, under present circumstances, military action by any member of the United Nations against Finnish territory.)

In presenting these considerations to the Soviet Government please endeavor to obtain to such an extent as may appear feasible, its views on the Finnish situation. If possible, it is. desirable to obtain its specific approval of this Government’s policy in this matter.

  1. William H. Standley, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had arrived in Washington for consultations; he returned to the Soviet Union in January 1943.