125.0060D/57: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:10 p.m.]
624. I am prompted by your 148, July 25, 118 to point out again that Finnish Government has been for sometime aware of imminence of crisis in relations with us. Arrival here July 24 of Finnish Minister at Stockholm presumably for consultation suggests that your latest intimation through Swedish Minister at Washington is now known here. Following as it does long and consistent series of similar appeals, [Page 77] warnings and intimations this latest expression is doubtless well understood.
It is evident that Finnish Government has braced itself to meet final deterioration in relations with us though it may still come as shock to public here. This fact was shown by uniformity of controlled press comment attending recent break in consular relations and its political significance. Comment was based on premise that present hostilities are due solely to Soviet aggression against Finland which premise underlies same order of ideas as prevailed during Winter War and rationalizes policy adopted in June last year or earlier.
Men who managed Finnish policy at time of transit agreement with Germans in September 1940 are still in control and have followed with characteristic tenacity line then entered upon.
Regardless of its original motivation, or wisdom of Soviet contribution to its adoption prior to June 1941, Finnish policy has clearly taken little or no account of changed circumstances since then. In past year Finnish leaders have said openly that issues of general war do not concern them and even that the war involves no moral issues. Nevertheless, I know that many of these leaders understand issues quite well. They merely choose to ignore them in shrewd hope that Finland may profit by German success against USSR while avoiding consequences of attendant subordination of this country to Reich for the latter’s purposes in the general war. In doing this they choose also, to ignore effects upon American interests of their subordination to Germany. On other hand, I have no doubt they have measured with complete deliberation the risks attendant on our disproval of their course and even on our hostility. If and when crisis comes, these leaders, like many of the Finnish public, may sincerely regret it but they have persuaded themselves that they have no alternative to course they are following and are prepared to accept the consequences.
Meanwhile they hope devoutly for cessation of German-Russian hostilities, if not for formal peace, and present development of military situation in Russia has gone far to confirm this hope. In these circumstances it seems improbable that further warnings or appeals to Finland on our part will be more effective than hitherto.