Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume II

851.85/494: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

Vichy, April 7, 1942—8 p.m.
[Received 9:17 p.m.]

512. The purport of Department’s 229 of April 3, 5 p.m. was communicated to the Foreign Office which in a note dated April 6, 1942, has replied as follows:

“Referring to the note from the Embassy of the United States dated April 4, 1942, relating to the use by the Japanese Government of French ships in Far Eastern ports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following to the Embassy:

(1) The French Government was careful as soon as it was informed of the objections put forward by the United States (conversation between Mr. Atherton⁶⁰ and M. Henry-Haye on January 31, 1942⁶¹) opposing the Japanese charter demand to inform the Embassy of the United States and the Department of State of the proposed solutions. The Ministry in particular stressed (aide-mémoire and note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States dated February 2 and February 13, 1942, respectively⁶²) that in order to take these objections into consideration it would do its best to obtain the consent of Japan that the ships liable to be chartered to that power should not be used for military purposes.

Despite the fact that the communication of February 13 received no answer from the Federal Government the French Government did not fail to follow these lines in these negotiations and obtained from Japan the formal promise to utilize those French ships which might be put at its disposal only for purely commercial transport and on strictly limited itineraries.

Faced by the Tokyo Government with the necessity of proceeding to a conclusion embodying these guarantees—failing which unilateral measures would be taken by the Japanese—the French Government took the initiative on April 2 of informing the Embassy of the United States of the proposed provisions.⁶³

(2) In its note of 543, 1942,⁶⁴ the Embassy of the United States stressed that ‘any agreement whatsoever which would make French ships available for use against the United States would be an unfriendly act’.

From the indications given in paragraph (1) above it is apparent beyond contention that none of these French vessels, the charter of which is at present planned, could be ‘made available for use against the United States’.

(3) The French Government was therefore very much surprised to see that the note delivered on April 4 in reply to its démarche of April 2 which was made on its own initiative by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy is in opposition to the proposed Franco-Japanese agreement and considers it ‘as constituting the agreed delivery of French vessels to Japan for their military ends’.

(4) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot share this viewpoint which furthermore is not in agreement with that set forth in the Embassy’s note of February 7. It considers on the contrary that for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 above the modalities of the Franco-Japanese proposed agreement are of such a nature as to deprive it of all character of military assistance. Furthermore it believes it necessary to call the attention of the Embassy to the fact that these modalities present as regards the United States far less serious drawbacks than might result from unilateral measures to which failing the conclusion of an agreement the Japanese authorities might be induced to proceed.

As a matter of fact the conclusion of an agreement such as is at present planned:

(a) excludes all military use of vessels chartered to Japan and permits the limitation of their itineraries to the Indochina–Shanghai–Japan run only;

(b) leaves at the disposition of the French authorities in Indochina a large part of French tonnage at present in the Far East.

On the other hand the unilateral seizure by Japan of the French Fleet would permit the Japanese authorities:

(a) to make use of the total tonnage of this merchant fleet;

(b) to use it for all operations which they may consider necessary (including the transport of troops, of material of war and the conversion of these ships into auxiliary cruisers) that is to say for military purposes as such against the Armed Forces of the United States. The Federal Government under such circumstances could not avoid the consequences which the French Government was able to avoid by negotiation with the Tokyo Government—that is to say the ‘delivery of French vessels to Japan for the military ends of that power’ against the delivery of which the Embassy’s note of April 4 is in specific opposition.

(5) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes it necessary to point out to the Embassy that in addition to these grave consequences for the United States, the seizure by Japan of the French merchant fleet in the Far East will have a serious effect on the sovereignty and political prestige of France in Indochina. Effected in a territory where this sovereignty has been recognized by Japan, a seizure of this kind, which is contrary to the basic element of national heritage, runs the risk of establishing a precedent for similar measures which might affect other elements of such a heritage (mines, industrial enterprises, banks, et cetera) which the French Government is anxious to safeguard to its utmost.

(6) It appears consequently that by persisting in considering the proposed agreement in the light of a measure of assistance against the United States and in forcing the French Government to forego any arrangement calculated to limit Japanese domination over the French merchant marine, the American Government assumes a responsibility for which it must be fully conscious.

(7)

(7) If therefore the Government of the United States finds it necessary to maintain its point of view despite the foregoing arguments, the French Government could only resign itself thereto provided it could be assured of adequate compensation for Japanese unilateral measures. Consequently and in the event that the French Government, owing to the opposition of the United States, should be kept from carrying out the Franco-Japanese charter negotiations, and in the event that this should result in the seizure of French ships in the Far East by the Japanese authorities, it would be essential for the Federal Government to place at the disposal of the French authorities an equivalent amount of tonnage through the release of French ships captured by Great Britain or, failing this, by the return, to a French port, of ships at present immobilized in the West Indies.”

The aide-mémoire and the note referred to in the above paragraph numbered 1 were transmitted in our telegrams Nos. 169, February 2, 8 p.m. and 241, February 14, 11 [10] a.m.

Leahy

60. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.
61. No record of conversation found in Department files.
62. For texts of aide-mémoire and note, see Embassy’s telegrams No. 169, February 2, 8 p.m., and No. 241, February 14, 10 a.m., respectively, pp. 673 and 677.
63. See telegram No. 490, April 2, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in France p. 680.
64. This phrase may be garbled.