851.85/433: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 3—12:48 a.m.]
169. Reference Embassy’s telegram number 167. Following is translation of the text of the confidential memorandum from the Foreign Office. We understand that its purport has been telegraphed to Henry-Haye.50
“On January 20 the Naval Commandant at Saigon received an urgent démarche from the Japanese Naval Mission in Indochina suggesting the use in behalf of Japanese interests, and under exclusively French exploitation, of French vessels of 4000 tons or more immobilized in Indochinese ports.
At the same time the Japanese Embassy put forward to the French Government at Vichy a request for the chartering of 80,000 tons of French merchant vessels stationed in Far Eastern ports (9 ships of 4000 tons or more) of which 50,000 would be used for the Manchukuo–China–Indochina traffic and 30,000 tons for Japanese–Indochina traffic.
The Government of Tokyo intimated that if satisfaction was not given to its request it would find itself obliged to proceed to the requisition of the total tonnage of French merchant vessels in the Far East (over 100,000 tons of shipping) of which certain vessels are directly under Japanese control at Shanghai and Macao.
The Naval Commandant in Indochina received instructions to defer placing the ships stationed in our colony at the disposal of the Japanese Naval Mission.
In the meanwhile the French Government is endeavoring to obtain from the Japanese Government:
- (a)
- That France should retain the maximum number of vessels for exclusively French needs;
- (b)
- That should it prove impossible to prevent the placing of certain ships at the disposal of Japan, these ships should at least be used exclusively for commercial traffic between Indochina and Japan in accordance with the Franco-Japanese Commercial Accord of May 6, 1941,51 it being understood that all transport of war material or that [of?] rubber as well as troops on behalf of Japan would be strictly prohibited. These negotiations have not only not resulted in any agreement but are at present still in their [apparent omission] stages.
It is not without interest to note that in so far as the Japanese request is concerned the French Government finds itself in a position similar to that in which it was placed by American exigencies regarding French tonnage in the United States. The Federal Government should have no difficulty in understanding that between the threat of seizure which would result in depriving France of all of her tonnage in the Far East and allowing the Japanese to utilize this tonnage for military needs on the one hand and the alternative of a negotiation which will prevent in exchange for certain limited concessions the use of French vessels for military purposes and the retention of some of these ships for French needs on the other hand the French Government should have chosen to negotiate.
It is well to add that France’s position in the matter is no more contrary to neutrality than the accord52 initialed by Monsieur Henry-Haye, and Admiral Land53 with regard to French tonnage in the United States.
While the French Government was unable to prevent the Normandie being used as a troop transport, it is making every effort that this should not be the case as regards vessels which it will not be able to avoid chartering to Japan.”
- Gaston Henry-Haye, French Ambassador in the United States.↩
- For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, pp. 767, 775.↩
- See bracketed note, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 539.↩
- Adm. Emory S. Land, Chairman of United States Maritime Commission.↩