Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume II

851A.01/1–1842

Memoranda by the Minister in Canada (Moffat) of Telephone Conversations, January 14–19, Regarding St. Pierre-Miquelon³²

Ottawa, January 14 to 19, 1942

January 14.

Mr. Dunn telephoned me as follows:

On Thursday, January 8th, the Secretary of State had sent to the President the following suggested formula for solving the St. Pierre-Miquelon mix-up.³³ It was to be cleared with the British and Canadians and then once again with Vichy. On Monday, January 12th, Mr. Churchill had approved the formula, sent it to London for clearance with the British Government and had undertaken to clear it with Ottawa.

The formula follows:

1. The islands are French and will remain French.

2. To avoid any potential threat to the shipping of the governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the islands will be subject to the supervision and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates.

3. The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war.

4. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.

5. All armed forces will be withdrawn.

6. The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands, and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given. Arrangements are being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which the islands are dependent, and to provide the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.

Mr. Dunn instructed me to read the foregoing to the Canadians, find out whether they had already received the text from the British, and, if so, the nature of their reaction. I was also to explain to Mr. King that whereas the Secretary had understood that the two of them were to work out the solution, in practice Mr. Churchill kept taking the ball in his hands, insisting that he would clear the formula with Ottawa, and then apparently did nothing about it. The Secretary was afraid that Mr. King would feel that he was being sidetracked, and accordingly wondered if Mr. King would prefer any other method of proceeding than the one now being followed.

I telephoned Mr. Robertson who told me that the Canadians had seen a copy of Mr. Churchill’s telegram to London containing the new formula. Mr. Churchill had stressed the urgency of a reply. He had also included the phrase: “I understand that Mr. King has taken the position that he will accept any formula that is agreeable to the President and ourselves.” That being the position of the Canadian Government there was no desire on the part of Ottawa to bring out any new points. Nonetheless, Mr. Robertson felt that two points that he understood would be brought out by the British Government were very sound:

(1) The British felt that the phrase “the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council” should make it clear that a new body was meant. I said that I had been told that the phrase was purposely ambiguous. Mr. Robertson replied that whatever advantages ambiguity might have in submitting the formula to Vichy, he did not feel that any ambiguity should remain in our thinking.

(2) The French [British?] were going to suggest that there be a delay after the formula had been cleared with everybody, including Vichy, in order to allow General de Gaulle to withdraw his expedition on his own, before public announcement was made. Did I know how far London had gotten with General de Gaulle? I said that our Government was not interested and wanted to keep out of this phase. Personally, the suggestion of a delay before public announcement struck me as a good one. Mr. Robertson said it had so struck Mr. King. I said: “May I then say, when the British have presented this formula to us, which they had not yet done, that it seems to Mr. King and yourself to possess real merit?” He said: “Very definitely.”

The conversation then dealt with the method of approach and I gathered that there were no hurt feelings in Ottawa on this score.

I telephoned Mr. Atherton³⁴ (Mr. Dunn had left for Florida). I told him that the Canadians had seen Mr. Churchill’s telegram giving the draft. He asked whether Mr. Churchill had given the formula full endorsement. I said I judged he had. Had the Canadians seen the British reply? I said I gathered that they had,—purely inferentially,—as they knew two points about the British attitude. I then told him what these were. I added that I liked the suggestion about a delay between clearance and announcement in order to enable General de Gaulle to withdraw his troops, apparently voluntarily. Mr. Atherton indicated that he did also. I urged that every step be taken to clear this problem up quickly as it was beginning to fester. Mr. Atherton said that no one was in greater haste than the Secretary and he.

January 15.

Mr. Robertson telephoned me this morning to say that there had been a meeting of the War Cabinet late yesterday afternoon after he had spoken to me. Mr. King had not been present but most of the senior Ministers were. The telegram from Mr. Churchill to the British Government had been read to the War Cabinet and had caused the utmost consternation. Churchill’s tone was pretty savage. De Gaulle must be made to pull out was the gist of his message; if necessary, the Arkansas would steam into the harbor of St. Pierre-Miquelon. The War Cabinet was pretty angry that the use of force to eject de Gaulle should even be suggested. They were fearful about its effect on public opinion in the Province of Quebec. They felt it would be a blow to the war effort and unity. There was no wish to justify de Gaulle’s original action, but there was a feeling that redress by force would have almost as many adverse repercussions as the original seizure.

The foregoing had been reported to Mr. King who had been impressed by it. I remarked to Robertson that all the foregoing dealt with Mr. Churchill’s outgoing message to London; he had not referred to London’s reply. He said that London most reluctantly accepted Churchill’s recommendations but gave no indication whatsoever of de Gaulle’s attitude. Mr. King, although he stood by his position that he would accept what the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to, asked that a message be conveyed to the President explaining the effect any use of force would have upon Canadian unity and his hope that every means, including delay, be tried before armed ejection was considered. That message he was sending through me. A similar message was being sent via the Canadian Legation in Washington to Mr. Churchill. I said that any intimation that Canada was balking at a U.S.–U.K. agreement would just encourage de Gaulle to hold out. He said that no such intimation could possibly reach him, as there had been no talking on any subject between the Canadians and the Free French for between three weeks and a month.

I telephoned the foregoing to Ray Atherton. I remarked that it was the first I had ever heard of the possibility of an ejection by force. Mr. Atherton asked if Mr. Churchill had specifically referred to an American ship. I said yes, by name. He seemed surprised by the message and said he would report it to the Secretary within the next few minutes and call me back probably in the afternoon.

Mr. Atherton called up a few hours later to say that the Secretary wished to thank me for the information. He had instructed Mr. Atherton to tell me the following textually, over the telephone: “One thing the President has consistently opposed is any idea of sending armed ships to the islands. Every time the President and the Secretary have talked about the islands, the Secretary has assured him that the State Department has not even considered such a solution. The Secretary had no reason to believe and does not believe that the President’s position has changed in any way.”

I said that I had been thinking about the problem, which divided itself into two parts: first, the acceptance of the formula; second, British pressure on General de Gaulle. When Robertson referred to London’s “reluctant consent,” he could not have referred to the formula but must have been referring to putting pressure on de Gaulle. The suggestion that the Americans might use force may have been given London by Churchill as an indication that pressure must be put on de Gaulle and must be put on him quickly. The delay in Churchill’s answering about the formula may be due to the fact that he was still without information from London as to de Gaulle’s attitude. All this was supposition, but it was at least logical. I could not probe in greater detail as the Canadians were naturally somewhat reluctant about discussing Churchill’s private messages to London with me. More accurately, they were worried that Churchill should find out that they were doing so.

Was I to pass on the Secretary’s message to the Canadians. Mr. Atherton, instead of replying directly, said: “Wasn’t I instructed to tell you this by telephone? That is hardly a secret means of communication.” “No”, I replied, “I used to know the man who listened into my conversations but I think he has been changed and I am not sure whether they listen in when I telephone from the house.”

An hour or two later Mr. Atherton called back to say that on second thought the Secretary would prefer that I do not pass on his message to the Canadians for fear that it would reach the British and perhaps complicate matters.

January 19.

I called on Mr. Robertson this morning and asked if he had any late news on St. Pierre. He said that Mr. Eden³⁵ had seen General de Gaulle on Wednesday and had reported to Mr. Churchill that he endeavored to persuade him to accept the new draft. General de Gaulle had refused once and for all to accept in any way the sentence—“The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war.” He said that his whole purpose was to bring French territory back into the war. Acceptance of such a condition would destroy the very foundations on which he was working. He was willing to go along with a modified draft excluding this sentence, subject to three secret reservations. These reservations were: (1) that the Free French Administrator remain on the island, though he might be assimilated into the new elective Consultative Council; (2) that the French Marines remain on the island in order to protect it from attack; (3) that the Canadian-American observers do not control the wireless but cooperate with the authorities.³⁶ General de Gaulle would issue a statement that it had never been his intention to keep ships stationed at the islands. This was as far as he was willing to go.

Mr. Churchill had apparently discussed this with the President, and as far as I could make out had been impressed by the de Gaulle formula but had been worried by the secret reservations. He had told the President that British opinion was very hostile to anything savoring of “appeasing Vichy”, and would be most reluctant to support anything savoring of a breach with de Gaulle. In the circumstances, he asked that the matter be left over until he returned to London and could see de Gaulle in person. The President had agreed. Nothing further has been heard.

The only reference to the use of an American naval ship was Eden’s report of a comment by General de Gaulle with reference to the “first sentence of Churchill’s paragraph five”. He remarked: “Does this mean they would be willing to fire on me?”

Mr. Robertson again commented that both the State Department and the British Embassy seemed to be about two days behind the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations.

32. Memoranda obviously drafted in Ottawa and apparently received by the Department about January 21, 1942.
33. Secretary Hull’s memorandum to President Roosevelt not printed.
34. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.
35. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
36. An informal memorandum from an officer in the British Embassy, January 26, 1942, gives the third reservation as “The Council will be under the orders of the National Committee.” (851A.01/86)