851A.00/53

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

The French Ambassador called at his request and proceeded at once to lay before me what he said was the reply of his Government to his recent communication concerning a plan or proposal entailing support by the French Government of certain steps calculated to settle the matters in controversy at St. Pierre-Miquelon. The Ambassador’s recent communication to his Government set out this plan or proposal as contained in my memorandum of conversation with the Ambassador on January third [second?].

The Ambassador said that the first proposal of his Government was (1) to accept the idea of placing three or four people on these islands selected from Canadian and United States citizens, with the title of naval observer or something similar, whose function would be to see to it that no objectionable information went out through any of the radio stations on the islands. He said further that his Government would agree to order these stations not to send out weather reports in the future.

(2) He said that the present Administrator, whose presence there is objectionable to the interested governments, will be called to report to Admiral Robert in Martinique, and Admiral Robert will designate a new temporary Administrator to act in the place of the present Administrator. He added that the present Administrator will not be sent back until and unless there is an agreement on the date and, I inferred, until the situation was fairly satisfactory. I gathered that it would apparently be the purpose of the French to develop a good atmosphere there as rapidly as possible. I did not accept or comment on his proposal.

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(3) The Canadian Government should give a declaration that it will respect the sovereignty of these islands. He also mentioned the idea of neutrality in this connection, but it was not possible fully to understand its significance, as he expressed it.

I said to the Ambassador that he could not get any guarantees from Canada, Great Britain or my own country on the points mentioned under (3) until and unless the people on these islands made it absolutely clear and certain to Canada and other governments that their shipping would be safe from any such dangers as those to which reference has been made on several occasions. I stated that this requirement, which I had just set forth, was on all-fours with our pledges to Admiral Robert at Martinique with the exception that the considerations involved were slightly different. I proceeded to elaborate so as to prepare him and his Government for a broader position on this matter, if such is deemed at all necessary.

I then read to him from what purported to be a private memorandum of mine, in which I had jotted down some points in regard to the matter (certain excerpts from the British draft of a proposal dated January first and revised by my office) such as the following:

“that the principle that these islands are to be regarded in the present phase as demilitarized and out of the war shall be maintained. All armed forces will be withdrawn, it being understood that at the same time adequate steps shall be taken to assure that no radio station situated on the islands shall be used contrary to the interests of the united nations. The local inhabitants will be left in full exercise of their rights of domestic self government, arrangements being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which they are dependent and also to provide for the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.”

The Ambassador made some reference to the question of what was meant by rights of domestic self government, adding that it was the same government as the French Republic had afforded before the war, et cetera, et cetera. This represents about what took place when I read from our revision of the British draft.

I strongly emphasized to the Ambassador that his Government must work out a reasonable proposition for the reason that there would be no settlement on the part of the Canadians and the British certainly until they feel actually safeguarded against submarines, wireless or other like dangers; that this was a duty that the owners of this territory owed as a neutral and that unless safety is assured to Great Britain, Canada and this country, there would be no settlement and serious trouble would result in more ways than one.

C[ordell] H[ull]