851A.01/35
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The French Ambassador20 called at his request. He said that he had sent to his Government the substance of his last talk with me21 relative to the St. Pierre-Miquelon question, without including some of the sharp points contained in my conversation. He then expressed his regret that the matter had not progressed further at Vichy. At this point I clearly expressed the deep disappointment which I had felt upon receiving a reply that seemed to be indifferent and lacking in appreciation of the unusual conditions and circumstances surrounding this matter. I added that it was vitally important to his Government to realize that, unless a settlement is made now, everything will be thrown wide open insofar as the conduct and attitude of the countries interested may be concerned, with the result that nothing but inevitable injury to the French and ourselves would follow. I said that, therefore, both sides should move promptly in a spirit of mutual concession. I stated that this action would not do the slightest injury to the prestige of France, but would safeguard her rights and interests in the Western Hemisphere, which would otherwise be thrown more or less open to seizure by other countries.
After a few interchanges of suggestions we reached the conclusion that his Government could well afford at once to propose on its part [Page 656] first, that it would select a governor whose conduct and attitude would be broad enough and impersonal enough to be free from reasonable objections on the part of the United States, the Canadians and the British and any considerable number of the people on the islands, and second, to shut down each of the radio or wireless stations on these islands and agree for the Canadians to observe these stations sufficiently to see that they are not reopened and used at any time and for any purpose. We further reached the conclusion that this Government could well attach one or two naval observers to the American Consulate at St. Pierre just as we have done at Martinique. The Canadians could do likewise with the further understanding that their newly established naval attaches were to observe the radio situation at all times to the extent of seeing to it that none of the stations is used. This method of attaching naval officers to the consulates of this country and Canada would save the face of the French on the question of sovereignty. In return, the radio difficulties and dangers having been thus safeguarded and provision made for a peaceful and non-partisan conduct of the affairs on the islands, the Free French forces would depart simultaneously with the changes made by the French, the Americans and Canadians in accordance with the agreement, above stated. The Ambassador said that he was strongly in favor of this proposal and would cable his Government in the hope that it would approve the proposal without delay.
- Gaston Henry-Haye.↩
- See Secretary Hull’s memorandum of December 30, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 565.↩