Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume II

851V.01/4: Telegram

The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State

Aden, December 10, 1942—11 p.m.
[Received December 14—8:52 a.m.]

48. Following report on Djibouti visit, refer Department’s telegram December 4, 10 p.m. Very cordial reception by General Dupont, who is now Governor, and Antoine. My visit could be used give face their false statement re negotiations already reported. We three talked from arrival 11:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. I clearly stated terms instructions and insisted repeatedly I was only an official reporter and entirely without power to take any positive action, make any commitments or give any indication of Department’s present attitude or future policy re French Somaliland. Then requested statement their position and hopes, supply and medical position and urgent needs.

Their first position was as follows:

1. French Somaliland must at all costs remain French with French flag flying.

2. Vichy directive to be retained, strict neutrality to be preserved.

4. [sic] Economic agreement only to be sought and no political questions to be introduced.

5. No introduction Free French or Darlanists. They said food adequate for 6 to 8 months, popular health good, no epidemics and still have slender medical supplies (I obtained trustworthy independent verification supply medical situation and believe no present possibility collapse that account). Lack canned milk, prepared baby food, vitamins and dry goods.

Stating comments were personally mine, I said I felt sure they would admit that Vichy prisoner of Germany could [not] speak for France or Frenchmen, that developments North and West Africa had to be carefully taken into account, that Djibouti’s geographic and political isolation following North African and Madagascar reorientation was very obvious and that Allied nations now most anxious obtain voluntary cooperation against the common enemy. I said I felt time had come for them to acknowledge Vichy lacks independence of action and declare change in politics. They then said (very ingenuously) they would have to consult Vichy regarding any such change.

At 9:00 next morning had further talk Governor and Antoine and they produced position number two as follows:

1. Point 1, position 1, retained intact.

2. Agreed discard Vichy directive after opening any future conversations but continue reporting Vichy time being.

3. Form neutrality to be observed but vague statement cooperation with Allied nations to be made.

4. Agree political implications could not be avoided in discussions.

5. Desire purely local gentleman’s agreement on line of Robert’s agreement in Martinique⁵⁴ and definite exclusion Free French or Darlanist intervention—agreement to be American, preferably, or Anglo-American.

I said, in my opinion, Germany had to be beaten, that active cooperation was needed, that most Frenchmen realize now Germany’s hand in France clear and any pretence follow armistice scrapped, that the opinion of all of large number of French recently leaving Djibouti was same and that time for positive assistance to Allied war effort had arrived. General Dupont, who is an honest and sincere soldier and no politician, was worried over rejection Vichy not because of politics but because of his oath to Pétain. Antoine, a very clever politician, supported Dupont’s position regarding oath and added that a flat statement of full cooperation would give Germans cause to wreak vengence on families in France—Dupont agreed.

Dupont and Antoine then tried get me to leave so that I could make report and ask instructions, expressing hope I could obtain powers to negotiate on basis their second position. I had been politely but carefully prevented so far from talking with anyone except two mentioned and particularly wanted to see Vincens, head of Bank, Gerbal, head Railway, Monnot, head Navy, Delge, head Air Force, and Bertraud, a leading merchant. I said I very much wanted to see first two and Bertraud. Antoine temporized and so I said I could hardly expect my Government to give much weight to a report if I was forced to admit I had been able to obtain only the official governmental attitude and had not sounded financial business and private opinion. Antoine then came back with the proposal that 10 leading citizens submit through Governor to me written [apparent omission] said I wanted to cover ground which they might not cover in memoranda and then asked the Governor and Antoine flatly whether they wished me not to see the people I wished to see. They gave way gracefully in the end.

Had 2-hour talk with Vincens, a very good friend, informed and trustworthy, who gave following: 1. Large majority French favor active full cooperation with Allied war effort. 2. That sentiment strong all business people and all officers up to rank Colonel above, but not Monnot or Delge, are conservative and on fence, unanimous commanding desire all people French Somaliland remain French. 4. [sic] Grip of Governor and Antoine very precarious but Dupont now best and most trusted person for Governor due honesty and control army. 5. Antoine’s influence strong, his honesty not impugned, but known ability and love of political maneuvering mistrusted to considerable extent. 6. On November 28, General Truffert resigned governorship given him on November 10 when Nouillhetas left. Resigned because inability choose whether obey oath of office as Governor and soldier and order deserters shot or follow his humanitarian instincts and knowledge hopeless position to permit unmolested exit. Pouvreau who was very Vichyist Secretary General then issued proclamation he had assumed governorship. Vincens and any [many?] others then staged demonstration 28th forced Pouvreau out and put Dupont in. Antoine preferred Pouvreau but went with Dupont. Position present Government shaky or Vincens et al would be in jail. Vincens believes Dupont best available Governor and that Antoine can be won over or neutralized. I agree entirely. Gerbal, Guignot, Bertraud, Monnot and Delge are in complete accord with Vincens.

Italian Armistice Commissioners still Djibouti still surprised not jailed when North Africa occupied. They are not expected to try escape.

Had final conference Governor and Antoine 10 a.m. 8th giving following as personal observations: Feel people who have left and large majority still French Somaliland demand change policy scrapping Vichy and taking active part Allied war effort, in other words militant not passive policy, that present Government shaky as shown by disturbances, reason is failure to make such declaration, that pressure from outside is being felt and that a decision on policy must come soon. Suggested they make unilateral declaration along following lines: (1) statement respect for Pétain and allegiance to France, (2) acknowledge Vichy can no longer speak for France, (3) offer collaboration with Allies. I said if they wanted to make such a unilateral declaration I would take it out report it to Department and subject Department’s approval present it to whomever they wished. They said such declaration would burn their bridges and this they would not do so unless they knew whether such declaration would be accepted. They proposed I seek authority my Government to negotiate. I said question negotiations not raised by Department but I would report their desire. I am certain they would accept this formula as basis for negotiations. I also know they prefer me to obtain authority to make such preliminary agreement because feeling against de Gaullists still as before and they are not at all certain of Darlanists or latter’s political weight. They fear even unilateral approach by British would carry Free French commitments and are confident though they did not express it that de Gaullists would promptly put in their own people in Government Djibouti. Five minutes before departure Djibouti Vincens showed me a telegram just received from French Indochina Bank, Marseilles, saying transfer all Djibouti branch funds and credits to Algiers or Dakar had been made and needed only Vincens telegraphic confirmation either place. Governor and Antoine worried over finance. Vichy has allowed over past 2 years only limited monthly transfers credit Djibouti to keep Vichy financial pressure strong. This very significant point.

Platt practically kidnapped me on return Zeila Tuesday p.m. but I knew reason and guessed London or Platt or both were unadvised previous my visit and I wanted to see him urgently anyway to give him indication that some sort of peaceful settlement appeared to me quite possible and suggest that no undue pressure be exerted on the border pending consideration my report by Department if a peaceful settlement was a prime consideration. I also wanted personally to reassure him regarding my instructions. Had an hour with Platt alone and then another hour including General Fowkes.⁵⁵ Their instructions obviously to throw Somaliland to de Gaulle by all possible means short of attack. I told them position Djibouti just about same as 2 years before, e.g., the last people they wanted were the Free French and latter had practically no chance by them-selves. Platt then asked my opinion possible success of joint Anglo-French approach. I said it might have better chance of success but doubted that French would be fooled since they know Anglode Gaulle commitments.

It was quite obvious that British do not want American representation in actual negotiations and I am sure they fear America is holding brief for Darlan. Platt spent long time pointing out the irresponsible security that area, that America has neither troops or other personnel to undertake Somali security and that North Africa is far away and de Gaullists are already on French border and eventual personnel already named to take over in Djibouti.

Chancel, Free French representative, came in with us after dinner and of course pressed Free French interest. Avoiding direct insinuation Free French were unpopular and had no chance alone or with British even, Platt eventually suggested that since the original approach seemed most important in getting cooperation perhaps I was the best person to make the advance.

I got back to Aden, 9th, p.m., sent first telegram. Yesterday had conference as anticipated that telegram. It was even more obvious that British order preference is (1) Free French alone; (2) British Free French approach; (3) using me as mailman to deliver Anglo-Free French proposals.

For the moment the only known action being taken is letter sent 10th from Chancel to Dupont giving numerous assurances and asking opening conversations direct Chancel-Dupont.

Platt came to see me 8 a.m. today before going to Harar. Said would wait for reasonable time reply to Chancel then had recommended to London that if no reply or negative reply London ask State Department instruct me go Djibouti with following proposal.

• “A. Give Dupont assurances of continuance of French sovereignty over French Somaliland.
• B. Assure him that H.M.G. and Fighting French genuinely desire to arrive at an arrangement with the authorities of French Somaliland designed to defeat the Axis as common enemy.
• C. Invite him to enter into discussions or send representatives to enter discussions with myself assuming East Africa Command or my representative and M. Chancel delegate of the French National Committee on basis ‘for France and defeat of Axis’.”

I am absolutely sure Djibouti has long been and still is a sop promised by British … and British are making every effort to make it not a military but a political victory for de Gaulle.

Chancel received reply his letter today. Dupont said he would await possible further news from me. I am sure French will reject Platt’s proposal unless they are assured America will not join in actual negotiations. French hope we will. If Department’s policy resolution problem French Somaliland is merely to be helpful to British and/or de Gaulle and desire me to deliver Platt’s proposal suggest instruct me do so and try persuasion with additional instruction to be used only if first fails stating more or less that while United States is sympathetic, et cetera, this area is really British security problem and we could not or do not wish to take active part in actual settlement. This might work but chances very slim. If Department has any other policy in mind and/or wants to participate in actual negotiations please instruct and I will indicate other possibilities.

Timberlake

54. Agreement entered into by the French High Commissioner in the French West Indies, Admiral Robert, and Admiral Greenslade, U. S. Navy, August 5 and 6, 1940. See despatch No. 6, August 7, 1940, from the Vice Consul at Fort-de-France, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. ii, p. 513.
55. Maj. Gen. Charles C. Fowkes, British Army.