740.0011 European War 1939/21256: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 28—5:02 a.m.]
309. Upon his return to Helsinki from an absence President Ryti received me today and I spoke to him in sense of your 63, April 23. President expressed confidence that Russian resistance to Germans would be broken this year and countered any intimation of possible further Finnish offensive in Soviet territory by asserting that it was Russians who continued to attack Finnish positions. These attacks in recent past and still going on in some sectors at no time represented serious threat to Finnish positions and in general he gave impression that Finnish military situation remained satisfactory.
[Page 54]He said he could not know outcome of war against Germany but he remained sure that if Germany were defeated and Russia victorious Bolshevism would sweep Europe, including Britain and even threaten internal stability in United States. President while disclaiming sympathy with Nazism considers Hitler pivot of balance between Nazi Party and German Army which balance might be destroyed by his elimination and deliver Germany to Bolshevism while in Britain and United States the lowering of standard of life, the casualties and other losses incident to war on its present scale would similarly prepare ground for proletarian upheavals at least akin to Bolshevism if in form different from its expression in Russia.
Ryti expressed doubt that we would be able to restore European position in Far East and said he expected the present would not be the last war between United States and Japan. Ryti said that if Finland and the other northern countries survived present war it would be necessary with Sweden and Norway to form the northern coalition which Finland sought to create in 1940 and which was accepted in principle by Swedes but failed for various reasons.78
In response to inquiry as to effect of continuance of war on Finland’s internal economy President was vague but expressed view that in Finland as well as in other belligerent countries including Britain and United States public debt being piled up would never be repaid.
So far as Finland’s relation with Russia and Germany was concerned the President said frankly that as a Finn he would prefer the danger attendant upon German domination of the continent to decapitation of the Finnish people which would follow Russian control of this country because the first danger could be met by passive resistance in which Finns were experienced whereas the second danger would mean destruction of nation. He said that during the peace negotiations at Moscow in March 1940 Molotov had frankly admitted to him that purpose of Soviet policy was creation of a new Soviet nationality and elimination of all traditional national groups in the Soviet Union.
My conversation with President which lasted more than 2 hours and covered pretty well entire range of world affairs was first I have had with him since November and I do not think he has changed in slightest his view of what Finnish policy should be. I would describe that policy as designed to make maximum use of Finland’s relation with Germany to prevent Russia from controlling this country but with no inclination specially to facilitate possible German plans for propagation of Nazi ideology here. Policy mentioned undoubtedly includes also hope that territorial gains already achieved can at least be held pending result of European War and perhaps extended if Russian [Page 55] power is forced back to line of Volga River which the President mentioned. He clings tenaciously to the claim that hostilities last June were initiated by Russians against Finland and said in response to my inquiry as to reason for such action on part of Russians that it was undoubtedly due to Soviet Government’s knowledge of its own military power, which was unknown outside Russia, and to belief that relatively small number (about 30,000) of German troops then in this country could be destroyed and Finland taken over because of its supposed exhaustion as a result of Winter War.
So far as our relations with Finland are concerned, my view is that nothing we can do short of direct military action or a free offer to feed Finland will change Finnish policy. The President said as much when he pointed out that if Russia were on victorious side at end of war she would dispose of this country as she saw fit and we could do nothing about it. Britain, he said, was already committed to Russian domination of this country and President asserted that he knew this to be fact although he admitted that we were still governed in our view of status of Finland and of the small nations in Russian orbit by our interpretation of Atlantic Charter.79
Summing up—there has been no essential change in Ryti’s view of general European situation. He still expects European War to end in relatively short time, say within a year with defeat of Russia or her withdrawal to Volga and a compromise peace between Germany and the Western powers. He seems still to count on German victory for salvation of Finland but said that he would make peace with Russia the moment he could get “security.” I did not press for any definition of that term in view of your no. 61, April 22.80
- See footnote 54, p. 41.↩
- For text of the Atlantic Charter, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367. The Minister in Finland commented in a later telegram, No. 320, April 29, 5 p.m., that the Finns still believed that “despite our displeasure at their collaboration with Germany,” at the end of the general war our sympathy “will at least preserve their independence and lead us to contribute to reconstruction of the country. They are strengthened in this view by fact that, notwithstanding our warnings since last fall, they have been able to keep to their course and at the same time maintain official relations with us.” (740.0011 European War 1939/21300)↩
- See last paragraph of telegram No. 296, April 22, 5 p.m. to the Minister in Sweden, p. 52.↩