740.0011 E. W. 1939/26867
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called at his request.
I reminded the Ambassador that the President has made one or more worldwide appeals for the unification of all United Nations military forces and all people behind the lines in support of those forces. I added that I myself have made two broad appeals to this same effect.
I then with emphasis remarked that not one word has come from the British Government with regard to this matter, but instead constant reports of a trouble-making nature relating to de Gaulle and this country, de Gaulle and Darlan, or de Gaulle and some other disturbing factor have been received here through despatches from our Embassy at London and through the British press and radio. I said the war is not yet won. It could be lost. The battle of Africa is not won and it is not at all certain that the last word has been spoken in Spain. The situation behind the lines in the African campaign is as difficult and delicate as it can possibly be. In these circumstances, I stated that it did seem to me that the British Government could serve the Allied cause very much by putting out to the world an earnest appeal for unity and teamwork among all the United Nations, such as the President and I have already issued more than once. The Ambassador said he agreed that something should be done and he would present the matter to his Government.
In referring to the de Gaulle situation, which, as I remarked, leaves trouble in its path much too often, the British Ambassador said that the fact de Gaulle refused to go along with the Vichy [Page 554] Government, but instead joined with them in opposing the Axis after the overthrow of France, naturally caused the British to feel most kindly toward de Gaulle and that this probably accounts for the existing relationship. I replied that that was all fine and I appreciated the spirit of the British and the splendid patriotism of de Gaulle. I said that he was entitled to a great deal of credit for his position and for his services in support of the United Nations cause, and all of us should see to it that he gets recognition accordingly. I added that on the other hand this Government maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy despite its strong hostility toward any and all elements there that were tainted at all with Hitlerism, in a determined effort to keep the French fleet, air and naval bases from falling into the hands of the Nazis. I then remarked that it would not be difficult to look back now and see what probably would have occurred had this Government joined with the British in active support of the de Gaulle movement and denounced the Vichy Government. The probability, of course, is that the fleet and the bases would have gone almost straight into the hands of Hitler. Our policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy was constantly commended and insisted upon by Mr. Churchill and others in the British Government during the two years in which we were planning and working first with respect to the French fleet, the air and naval bases, as stated heretofore, and second to build up everywhere in France and Africa a constantly increasing disposition and spirit to resist Hitler militarily as well as in other respects. We think that all of these undertakings proved to be valuable and timely if not indispensable to the Allied cause. I added that as to de Gaulle, we have never felt unkindly toward him, but we have frankly felt that at times he was making himself a sort of nuisance by constantly injecting personal and political matters when we felt that we should have been confining our thoughts and efforts jointly to military matters and objectives. However, I said there were no hard feelings whatever and that this situation is but natural for the reason that we are all struggling as best we can in a common cause but a spirit of cooperation must prevail, if success is to be the outcome. I concluded by saying that, of course, when we are confronted with such extremely critical situations as for instance the great movement to win over the western and central Mediterranean coast of Africa with the entire matter hanging in the balance, it is all-important that individuals, groups and large segments of the military forces whether under the command of General de Gaulle, some Britisher or an American, should make it their primary objective to make themselves a component part of the military structure and to function one hundred percent militarily. I had in mind the example [Page 555] of General Longstreet with his marvelous ability as a commanding officer and the excellent troops which he commanded, whose failure to attack when ordered at Gettysburg, probably caused the loss of that decisive battle. The British Ambassador agreed that the view I expressed was sound and timely.