851.01/472
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
M. Tixier came in to see me today at his request.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tixier then started in on Martinique.39a He said he had received instructions to give us a note but before giving it, he wanted to talk to me. His Committee wished to discuss questions raised both by Madagascar and by Martinique. They considered that the Free French Movement had as its principal object the bringing of all French territory into the war against the Axis. Accordingly, they considered:
- (1)
- That they were entitled to be associated with every military effort to seize any part of French territory, and
- (2)
- That they were entitled to the government of these territories as and when recovered.
I said that this communication raised two separate and distinct points.
The first was military. I could not admit that military measures were the subject of discussion along these lines. The armed forces had to take such measures as were needed for their safety. I was by no means clear that bringing Frenchmen of the Free French Movement to fight other Frenchmen was a sound military principle, since thus far it had resulted in the killing of Frenchman by Frenchman, and in great bitterness.
[Page 515]The second point was political. As to Madagascar, I imagined that the participation of the Free French in the government of that island was more properly a matter for discussion between the Free French Committee in London and the British Government than for discussion in Washington. As to Martinique, we were acting only in the military plane, the object being to immobilize the French forces there. I did not consider that we were dealing with political matters at this time.
Tixier said that our communiqué40 went farther than that. It intimated that we were recognizing Admiral Robert41 as the governor of the possessions.
I said that he had misinterpreted the situation. What was proposed was not an occupation of Martinique but the military immobilization of forces there. Naturally there would be no change in government unless American forces were compelled to move in. Only when that happened would the problem of a changed government arise.
I said I permitted myself to give M. Tixier two words of personal advice in this matter. The first was that it would be, in my judgment, highly unwise to raise the question of the political status of the French islands and of Guiana at this time. Once that discussion was opened, there were other strong nations lying close by who might have something to say about it; and it was vastly better to leave the matter in abeyance.
Second, I said I thought the Free French might seriously consider learning how to govern the territories they had before insisting on an absolute right to undertake the government of others.
I said we all hoped, of course, that the Free French Movement might so evolve that it might have a wider scope; but that there was a great deal of work to be done first.