851.01/496
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador first of all handed me the memorandum, herewith attached36 which contains information received from his Government concerning the reaction of the Free French Committee in London to the occupation by the British of Madagascar.37
The Ambassador then went on to discuss the general topic of the Free French movement. He said he had discussed this question with the Secretary of State the other day38 and he had rather gained the impression that Mr. Hull and he were at cross purposes. He asked me if I would clarify the situation for him and let him have more specific information regarding the position of this Government in the matter.
I said that Secretary Hull had spoken with me regarding his conversation with the Ambassador and that it had seemed to me that the Secretary of State had outlined our position as clearly as possible, granted the somewhat fluid state in which the Free French movement and everything relating to it found themselves.
[Page 512]I said that I had not, however, had an opportunity of discussing the question in full detail with Secretary Hull and that I had not discussed the matter fully recently with the President and that I consequently wished to make it clear that the statement I was about to make to the Ambassador was to be regarded as entirely individual and in no sense an exposition of the considered or final position of this Government.
I stated that in my opinion this Government should never undertake to recognize any French national committee as a French government in exile. I said that I made this statement because of my belief that neither the British nor the United States Government had any right to determine for the French people what their government should be after the war since such a government could only be determined upon by the French people themselves. I added that if we undertook now to accord recognition to a French group as the legitimate government of France in exile, we would undertake to do something that was purely fictitious, that would exasperate French public opinion and strengthen the hand of the Germans, and that, finally, would constitute a step which would result in placing certain French individuals in a preferential position should they seek to utilize such position to further their own selfish political ends.
At the same time, I said, it was very clear to me that the Free French movement as represented by General de Gaulle and his associates was rapidly falling to pieces. Knowledge of the situation in London and in the United States made this particularly clear. I said I thought that the result of this would be exceedingly unfortunate both on the morale of the French people in occupied and in unoccupied France and likewise from a purely practical standpoint because of the fact that it made it infinitely more difficult for the United Nations to deal with French colonies and territories not under the control of Vichy from the military and naval standpoint.
It was my thought, therefore, that a solution could be found through the creation, as a result of United States and British agreement, of a French national committee composed of not more than fifteen persons, representative of all tendencies among the French people, who were determined to resist Germany and to assist in the fight for the regaining of French independence. It seemed to me, I said, that the sole requirements should be that the individuals forming this committee be undistained from the standpoint of French public opinion from the political or financial point of view, and that they be really representative of liberal democratic French thought. Such a committee I felt should have no executive authority, but should be primarily consultative and [Page 513] perhaps be given some administrative control with regard to civilian administration in Free French colonies. If this were done obviously General de Gaulle should be a member of such committee and should perhaps be recognized as having supreme command both over Free French military and naval forces. If General de Gaulle and this committee could pull together in the manner prescribed, I felt that the beginning of a solution might be achieved. If further developments took place, of course this rudimentary idea might have to be modified or expanded, as the case might be.
In any event, I said some step in my judgment should promptly be taken by the British and United States Governments in order to avert a complete collapse of any semblance of unity among the Free French elements.
The Ambassador asked if I would talk with him again on this subject after this Government had reached a more considered point of view and I said that I should be glad to see that he was kept informed.