Office of the Historian

851R.01/181

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Reber)

[Washington,] December 28, 1942.
Participants: The Secretary of State; Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil of General Giraud’s Civil Affairs Staff; Mr. Georges-Picot, Liaison Officer with the Giraud mission; Mr. Atherton and Mr. Reber

After welcoming Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil to the United States, the Secretary explained the policy which this Government has followed with respect to France since the fall of Paris, emphasizing that the [Page 494] degree of resistance to German aggression by the various French elements provided the basis of American relations with them. After reviewing the position taken in the past and mentioning the policy of dealing with the French authorities on the basis of the foregoing and of their control of French territory, the Secretary asked whether Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil had any views with regard to the relations between General Giraud and General de Gaulle and specifically mentioned the four-point program alleged to have been prepared by the French National Committee in London making it the political representative body for all French elements.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil replied indicating that he had no specific information regarding General Giraud’s views subsequent to the assassination of Admiral Darlan. He continued, however, that previous to his departure General Giraud’s position could be summarized along the following lines:

1.
It was at the invitation of the group of Frenchmen who had never accepted the German victory that discussions looking toward the eventual entry of American troops into North Africa had been carried on since 1940. These talks had been directed to the end that France and French North Africa would re-enter the war but as a French entity rather than as the result of American occupation.
2.
General Giraud had agreed to return and head the movement upon the basis of a specific accord with Murphy recognizing him as the head of a French Government.
3.
Whatever Government that might be established to unify French resistance could only take the form of a provisional government until France should be free.
4.
The establishment of some such Government should not be delayed as otherwise time would give the French National Committee ideas regarding its own status and an opportunity to bargain, thus weakening the position of General Giraud.
5.
The present indications are that General de Gaulle is prepared to associate himself in some fashion with General Giraud; but such association cannot be along the lines desired by the French National Committee, namely, that entire political control should be exercised by the latter.
6.
The necessity for a unified command under the supreme head of General Giraud was inherent in the military situation. (Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil later indicated that whereas the cooperation between General Eisenhower and General Giraud was complete the same could not be said for General Anderson11 and this difficulty could only be solved by appointing General Giraud to the supreme command.)
7.
General Giraud’s group considers that de Gaulle should be brought into the general French organization in the first instance through an association with the Imperial Council and secondly as a military commander in which past technical knowledge and experience would be of extreme value.

  1. Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson, Commanding British First Army.↩