851R.01/52½
Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Mr. Welles: The telegram which I stated had been answered was Kuibyshev’s 1014 of November 21, 3 p.m.,86 giving the full text of the President’s statement concerning Darlan.
The telegram to which you refer, namely Moscow’s 482, November 20, 11 p.m., was considered in this Division. I venture to repeat Henderson’s wording: “He (Molotov) would appreciate it if I would inform my Government that the Soviet Government was deeply interested in French Africa and that it hoped that the American Government would not take any steps in the direction of setting up any kind of a Government in French Africa without first consulting the Soviet Government. I told him that I would be glad to transmit his message.”
I think this telegram of Moscow’s should be read in connection with London’s 6636 of November 25, 2 p.m.,87 wherein Maisky88 [Page 469] reports that “although the Russian Government could understand the situation, it disturbed their people for fear there might be political reasons in the future for dealing with the German generals or others”. You will note that by this really what the Russians are seeking are assurances to bind our hands as to whom we intend to deal with when the time comes on the Continent and not North Africa alone. Consequently, Eu89 is of the opinion it would be more advisable not to reply to Moscow’s telegram first above referred to, to which you made reference, but let Admiral Standley90 on his return state that he had arranged to be kept informed of our progress in North Africa and would be glad to keep the Russian Government informed of our future thinking.
Such a procedure would obviate what Eu considers might be the certain step once we give the assurances Molotov has asked of Henderson, namely, that this Government give similar assurances that the Russian Government would be consulted before we took any steps or made any undertakings of a political nature on the European Continent. I do not feel we can bind our hands to this extent and I do not believe we should pretend to the Russians that we will do something, if we have any reservations in our minds.