851R.50/23: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 30—7:03 p.m.]
6763. Your 5915, November 24, 8 p.m. We have discussed contents of Department’s 5915, relating to proposed organization to meet civil economic requirements of North African area with Foreign Office, Ministry of Economic Warfare, and Censorship.
British understand that North African Command now contemplates the organization of above activities under two boards both responsible to General Eisenhower, (1), a North African Shipping Board, and (2), a North African Economic Board. Both boards would have members from both Great Britain and the United States. We assume that this type of organization was worked out subsequent to despatch of Department’s 5915 and that full details are known to you. We also assume that civil experts mentioned in Department’s message will be responsible to these boards. British plan to despatch some supply, censorship and communication experts, and a Treasury representative soon.
British concur with other arrangements envisaged in Department’s message. They feel primary responsibility rests with United States and are anxious to cooperate as circumstances permit. In addition to six functions outlined in Department’s message, they and we wish to stress the importance of the following economic warfare objectives.
[Page 464]- 1.
- Censorship and Communications. Control of communications and the establishment of an effective censorship constitutes an essential element in both military and economic administration of North Africa. Immediate steps have been taken to secure ad interim censorship of mails. The situation with respect to wire and radio communications between North Africa and Axis Europe is obscure. Final steps for organization to control these activities and to integrate procedures into the general United Nation controls can only be worked out after a survey on the ground. Accordingly E. S. Herbert, Director, Postal and Telegraph Censorship here, desires to leave for North Africa this week with small party. After a short visit there he plans to proceed along to Washington to work out final arrangements with United States authorities. He is also anxious to explore the possibility of establishing a major censorship base for South American mails in North Africa. We feel this is important.
- 2.
- Contraband Control. We would suggest that possibility of combining such a base with a contraband control station to replace Gibraltar and free Gibraltar facilities for other uses be seriously explored. We have been engaged in informal discussions with British on this subject but have not as yet received definite suggestions for transmission for your consideration.
- 3.
- Export Control. Some system of export control in North Africa will be necessary to insure that goods shipped from North Africa do not reach the enemy. The border between French and Spanish Morocco, for example, would provide an easy route for such shipments as well as for the smuggling of diamonds.
- 4.
- Finance. To the various financial controls mentioned in the Department’s message, there should be added the safeguarding of the Polish and Vichy gold in North Africa.
- 5.
- Supplies from North Africa. North African supplies can play an important part in our economic warfare activities, aside from the effects which we will gain by blockading the enemy from access to these commodities, particularly phosphates. You will no doubt remember that the British and ourselves gave assurances to Spain and Portugal that their economic interests would not be endangered by our occupation of North Africa. Subject to this consideration, phosphates should give us a strong bargaining counter.
- 6.
- Trading with Enemy Legislation. The opening of North Africa to our forces and the resumption by us of responsibility for its economic survival will require many readjustments in existing controls. Control of local concerns from enemy or Vichy territory will have to be broken.
- 7.
- Economic Intelligence. Access to North Africa and to official and business records there offers a large and fertile field for economic intelligence activities. We have already initiated work in this area, (1) by forwarding to the military authorities suggestions of type of economic information in which we and Ministry of Economic Warfare are interested, and (2) by preparing material to brief the examiners who are interrogating the members of the armistice commission who have been brought to this country. We have also requested permission from General Eisenhower for the immediate [Page 465] despatch of Edmund Gullion of the Economic Warfare Division to North Africa for a brief stay to survey the problems of using this area for economic intelligence purposes. We have just received word from General Eisenhower that he welcomes this arrangement. Departmental instructions are accordingly urgently requested authorizing Gullion to travel to French North Africa for these temporary duties and return to this office upon their completion.
The British authorities, in discussing the various problems referred to above, have stressed the need for a pragmatic approach, particularly in view of present uncertainty with respect to exact status of existing French civil administration. They are not sure how far British personnel will be welcome. So far as Ministry of Economic Warfare is concerned, they welcome American initiative in economic warfare activities in North Africa and will give us the fullest support in any way we suggest.
Because so many of the economic warfare problems tie in intimately with the machinery now located in London as well as with the Washington controls, we recommend that one or two of the American civil experts contemplated in Department’s message be drawn from the Economic Warfare Division here. The despatch of Gullion has already been arranged. He will be fully capable of making arrangements on matters relating to economic intelligence. We would now like to make a similar arrangement for the despatch of Major John Easton to North Africa. He is fully conversant with the British Economic Warfare controls as well as those in Washington, and would, we feel, make an excellent liaison officer during the early stages of organization of economic warfare activities in North Africa. We contemplate the return to the Economic Warfare Division of both Gullion and Easton as soon as the preliminary organization in North Africa is completed.