851R.01/12¾
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary
of State (Welles)
[Washington,] November 18, 1942.
The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this
morning at his request.
Sir Ronald handed me a copy of a message sent on November 17 by Mr.
Churchill to the President and an instruction the British Ambassador
here had received under the same date from the British Foreign
Office, both dealing with the Darlan question. These messages are
attached herewith. I told Sir Ronald that the points raised in
paragraph 6 of Mr. Eden’s message to the British Embassy were
actively under consideration.
[Annex 1]
Message Sent to the President by the British
Prime Minister on November 17, 1942
I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are
stirred by the arrangement with Darlan. The more I reflect upon
it the more convinced I become that it can only be a temporary
expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle. We must
not overlook the serious political injury which may be done to
our cause not only in France but throughout Europe by the
feeling that we are ready to make terms with local Quislings.
Darlan has an odious record. It is he who has inculcated in
French Navy its malignant disposition by promoting his creatures
to command. It is but yesterday that French sailors were sent to
their death against your line of battle off Casablanca and now
for the sake of power and office [Page 446] Darlan plays turn-coat. A permanent
arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan government
in French North Africa would not be understood by the great
masses of ordinary people whose simple loyalties are our
strength.
2. My own feeling is that we should get on with the fighting and
let that overtake the parleys, and we are all very glad to hear
that General Eisenhower expects to be able to order the leading
elements of our First Army to attack the Germans in Tunis and
Bizerta in the course of the next few days.
[Annex 2]
Copy of Telegram From the British Foreign
Office to the British Embassy in Washington, Dated November
17, 1942
You will have seen from message sent by the Prime Minister to the
President today that we are becoming increasingly concerned at
grave political dangers into which we are running.
- 2.
- It may well be that Darlan’s collaboration is
indispensable for military reasons as an interim measure.
But neither we nor I feel sure that United States Government
could have any confidence in him as permanent head of a
North African Administration.
- 3.
- Darlan’s record needs no emphasis. He is universally
distrusted and despised in France and throughout occupied
Europe. De Gaulle has already made plain that he cannot work
with Darlan in any circumstances. I realize that de Gaulle
has not the same standing in the United States as he has
here but we are pledged to de Gaulle and any appearance of
throwing him over in favour of Darlan would produce a strong
reaction in our public opinion.
- 4.
- But more serious than this is the disturbing and
disillusioning effect which any enduring arrangement with
Darlan must have upon the great body of men and women in
France who are our friends. In occupied countries also
feeling will now grow that we shall in the last resort make
terms with their Quislings also. Nor can we expect the
Soviet Government to take kindly to this development and
recent improvement in our relations with them so painfully
achieved may receive a set-back. There is above all our own
moral position. We are fighting for international decency
and Darlan is the antithesis of this.
- 5.
- For these reasons it seems to me imperative that we should
not commit ourselves finally to Darlan as the permanent head
of an Administration in North Africa, even though it has
been found expedient to make terms with him for the time
being. Moreover it is our joint intention to raise a French
Army in North Africa and to supply it with equipment. We
could never have confidence [Page 447] in a Government headed by Darlan nor know
against whom any tanks provided would in fact be
used.
- 6.
- We do not know the long-term plans of United States
Government. But once we have established ourselves firmly in
Tunisia they will presumably wish to put men who have their
confidence into key positions in North Africa and this would
necessarily entail elimination of Darlan. It ought to be
possible to find men who though they may not have come out
openly on our side in the past, are not contaminated by
Vichy and have not actively cooperated with the enemy.
Noguès himself might fall into this category. Men like
Giraud, Béthouart and Mast (the last two of whom are
apparently still in prison) would of course be retained or
placed in high command. Such an Administration would
undertake actively to participate in the war with us against
the Axis. It would be better perhaps not to call it a
Government but to preserve some such title as “Provisional
Administration”.
- 7.
- If this course were followed we should hope that all
resisting Frenchmen including those who have joined the
Fighting French could be united.
- 8.
- We should be grateful if you would speak in this sense to
the United States Government and let me have their
views.