851R.01/12¾

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald handed me a copy of a message sent on November 17 by Mr. Churchill to the President and an instruction the British Ambassador here had received under the same date from the British Foreign Office, both dealing with the Darlan question. These messages are attached herewith. I told Sir Ronald that the points raised in paragraph 6 of Mr. Eden’s message to the British Embassy were actively under consideration.

S[umner] W[elles]
[Annex 1]

Message Sent to the President by the British Prime Minister on November 17, 1942

I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are stirred by the arrangement with Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more convinced I become that it can only be a temporary expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle. We must not overlook the serious political injury which may be done to our cause not only in France but throughout Europe by the feeling that we are ready to make terms with local Quislings. Darlan has an odious record. It is he who has inculcated in French Navy its malignant disposition by promoting his creatures to command. It is but yesterday that French sailors were sent to their death against your line of battle off Casablanca and now for the sake of power and office [Page 446] Darlan plays turn-coat. A permanent arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan government in French North Africa would not be understood by the great masses of ordinary people whose simple loyalties are our strength.

2. My own feeling is that we should get on with the fighting and let that overtake the parleys, and we are all very glad to hear that General Eisenhower expects to be able to order the leading elements of our First Army to attack the Germans in Tunis and Bizerta in the course of the next few days.

[Annex 2]

Copy of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, Dated November 17, 1942

You will have seen from message sent by the Prime Minister to the President today that we are becoming increasingly concerned at grave political dangers into which we are running.

2.
It may well be that Darlan’s collaboration is indispensable for military reasons as an interim measure. But neither we nor I feel sure that United States Government could have any confidence in him as permanent head of a North African Administration.
3.
Darlan’s record needs no emphasis. He is universally distrusted and despised in France and throughout occupied Europe. De Gaulle has already made plain that he cannot work with Darlan in any circumstances. I realize that de Gaulle has not the same standing in the United States as he has here but we are pledged to de Gaulle and any appearance of throwing him over in favour of Darlan would produce a strong reaction in our public opinion.
4.
But more serious than this is the disturbing and disillusioning effect which any enduring arrangement with Darlan must have upon the great body of men and women in France who are our friends. In occupied countries also feeling will now grow that we shall in the last resort make terms with their Quislings also. Nor can we expect the Soviet Government to take kindly to this development and recent improvement in our relations with them so painfully achieved may receive a set-back. There is above all our own moral position. We are fighting for international decency and Darlan is the antithesis of this.
5.
For these reasons it seems to me imperative that we should not commit ourselves finally to Darlan as the permanent head of an Administration in North Africa, even though it has been found expedient to make terms with him for the time being. Moreover it is our joint intention to raise a French Army in North Africa and to supply it with equipment. We could never have confidence [Page 447] in a Government headed by Darlan nor know against whom any tanks provided would in fact be used.
6.
We do not know the long-term plans of United States Government. But once we have established ourselves firmly in Tunisia they will presumably wish to put men who have their confidence into key positions in North Africa and this would necessarily entail elimination of Darlan. It ought to be possible to find men who though they may not have come out openly on our side in the past, are not contaminated by Vichy and have not actively cooperated with the enemy. Noguès himself might fall into this category. Men like Giraud, Béthouart and Mast (the last two of whom are apparently still in prison) would of course be retained or placed in high command. Such an Administration would undertake actively to participate in the war with us against the Axis. It would be better perhaps not to call it a Government but to preserve some such title as “Provisional Administration”.
7.
If this course were followed we should hope that all resisting Frenchmen including those who have joined the Fighting French could be united.
8.
We should be grateful if you would speak in this sense to the United States Government and let me have their views.