740.0011 European War 1939/19533: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:29 p.m.]
129. Your 85, February 13, to Stockholm. I asked my Swedish colleague56 today whether he thought it possible at present for Finns [to reach understanding?] with Russians for cessation of hostilities. He answered in negative pointing out that though there was considerable body of opinion among Social Democratic and Swedish parties in favor of some action to that end this body had no effective leadership and would go along with Government on ground of national unity. I also asked Westman whether he felt it was possible for him to exercise any influence in that direction and he likewise answered in negative saying he would not wish even to try to do so since if he should talk along those lines with Witting it was not unlikely latter would report it to Germans and thereby further increase German displeasure with Sweden. He said he believed Finns for present neither can nor desire to come to understanding with U. S. S. R., mentioning that during recent visit here of Swedish newspaper editors Witting had emphasized dependence of Finland on Germany for essential supplies and that at same time Finns had sought to impress Swedes with merits of their annexation policy by circulating to the editors copies of Professor Jaakkola’s57 book entitled Finland’s Eastern Problem to which I referred in my telegram No. 718, December 29, last,58 and which purports to make out case for extensive acquisitions of Soviet territory.
Westman said that while there had been some wavering and uncertainty here a few weeks ago, recent reverses of Allies had again strengthened Finnish confidence in German success against Russians, although there was still anxiety as to possible effect on Finland of German exhaustion next fall, when Russians might be in position to concentrate their strength against Finland. Field Marshal Mannerheim was, therefore, giving very anxious thought to military situation and was finding it hard to reach any decision.
Westman added that Finns had begun their war thinking it would be short, victorious and ignored by Britain but that in all three respects [Page 44] they had miscalculated. They had “gone into the air without a parachute.” He was not able to express opinion as to whether Finns will themselves undertake further offensive operations against Russians in immediate future and seemed to feel, as I do, that this is still an open question.
Repeated to Stockholm.