740.0011 European War 1939/19060: Telegram
The Minister in Finland ( Schoenfeld ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 12:51 p.m.]
77. In conversation last night with former Foreign Minister Erkko he told me there was no doubt of the overwhelming majority of Finnish people for withdrawal from war. Question was how to secure this end and when. He thought the time was not yet and believed that it would depend upon right combination of external circumstances which might be presented at moment when it would be to distinct advantage of Russians to see Finland out of war and when Germans had success somewhere which would make them relatively indifferent to Finland’s withdrawal. It would be necessary to watch carefully for opportunity presented by some such combination of events and to seize it with skill and firmness.
He said prime consideration from Finnish standpoint remains assurance that Russians keep out of this country. If this were assured it might even be possible to face risk German displeasure perhaps involving outright attack on Finland but in this event question of supply [Page 33] from overseas would be paramount and there would have to be some guarantee in that respect to save Finns from starvation.
Although Erkko did not say so I am convinced he also believes Finnish Government missed opportunity to reach settlement afforded by our intervention last year because he adverted to his own experience when Minister at Stockholm in establishing contact which led to Moscow peace,37 saying that contact was tenuous enough at first but became most definite with careful handling. I gathered he feels next opportunity must not be missed.
Erkko said that being in military service he cannot express his views openly, but that he can discuss such questions with a few people in authority including Prime Minister Rangell and does so.
He confided that from purely human standpoint friction between Finnish troops and Germans is growing and that there is increasing dissatisfaction in military circles with German incapacity on Finnish front. Indeed he intimated that Finns were inclined to question that capacity on rest of the front and asked how it was that Finns were able consistently to throw Russians back and Germans could not do so.
- For correspondence on negotiation of this treaty signed March 12, 1940, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 298–317; for translation of text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1940, p. 453.↩