740.0011 European War 1939/22096: Telegram
The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 9—10:37 a.m.]
257. In a conversation with Noguès on June 5 he remarked “Morocco is very favorably disposed to the United States but we shall resist any effort which may be made to attack us and I hope you will emphasize this to your Government”. Noguès said nothing in his opinion would draw the Germans quicker to North Africa than the belief that there is a serious chance of an Anglo-American landing. [Page 309] He added that the Germans are already much disturbed on this score owing to the great number of reports that the British have been pressed to create a diversion in French North Africa, on the Continent or in Norway.
I pointed out that we had not taken any aggressive action against any French possessions during this war and that I thought it extremely unlikely that we should take action to land in Morocco contrary to French wishes. Noguès answered that he had a great deal of confidence in us and he did not think we would but he was afraid that the British might.
I replied that we were acting today in such concert that it was not possible to foresee one of the partners taking independent action.
I asked Noguès if he had any reason to believe that the Germans had become particularly anxious recently or had begun to make any special plans in anticipation of an invasion of French ports Africa. He observed the Germans are a very methodical people and since the arrival of the German Armistice Commission they have made plan for taking action in presumably every possible circumstance.
I asked him about the Spanish press campaign and agitation concerning Spain’s aspirations in French North Africa. He said this was inspired by Suñer55 and the Falange but did not reflect the attitude of the Spanish generals. He felt confident of Orgaz56 and did not anticipate any military action.
He spoke with great assurance and confidence and seemed more sure of himself than I have found him for a long while.
He went on to say that the advent of Laval to power had changed nothing. He added that Pétain previously had distrusted Laval and believed the latter was working behind his back.
I asked the Resident General if Laval had not been brought back under German pressure. He said “indirectly if you like” but that “the Germans are already dissatisfied with him”. Noguès added that Laval now has the full confidence of the Marshal in a way in which he did not have it before and he confers every day with him. He emphasized that it is Pétain who continues to exercise chief power in the Government.
Noguès stated he did not anticipate any changes in French North Africa. He stressed that Laval is above all a good Frenchman. He added that when he was in Vichy he, Noguès, was told that his directives remained the same as they had been before.
I asked him for his views concerning the international situation.
He said the Germans had a formidable task on the Russian front.
I remarked that the fact that they had not launched their offensive seemed to be itself a check.
[Page 310]He agreed and said the Russian counter-offensive appeared to have seriously upset German plans. He thought the Germans greatly over-extended in their communications and that they were beginning to suffer the consequences. They had been obliged, he said, to double the number of their divisions in occupied France after the St. Nazaire affair57 and they were beset with the problem of not knowing where the enemy would strike next. He left the impression that he felt the Germans had lost the initiative.
Repeated to Vichy and Algiers, true reading to Madrid and Casablanca.