740.00112 European War 1939/5642: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:29 p.m.]
806. An influential and well disposed Foreign Office official in charge of the Division of Economic Affairs sought a private interview with us yesterday.
The object of his visit was to express his personal and deep concern at the failure of our Government to resume the operation of the North African economic program. He told me bluntly that in the course of his last two meetings with the members of the Armistice Commission in Paris the Germans had brought up this question and that with the best will in the world he had found it extremely difficult in view of their present inactivity to justify the continued presence of our control officers in North Africa. He recalled that with the exception of the sailings of two vessels from New York to Casablanca in January last the program had been in suspense since November, 1941, but he pointed out that the Weygand–Murphy accord is nevertheless still effective insofar as France is concerned and that it provides for: (a) The non-reexportation of imported products and of similar products; (b) the control of this non-reexportation by our officers.
He felt that the unilateral maintenance by the French Government of the above provisions might result in serious difficulties. To illustrate the point he said that while on the one hand, under the terms of the agreement, no alcohol for fuel purposes of French North African origin could be shipped to metropolitan France or to French West Africa on the other hand for 6 months no supply of American petroleum products had been received. The situation he felt could not be indefinitely prolonged without creating difficulties especially from the Germans.
He reminded me that the time the French Government had agreed to cease delivery of supplies through French North Africa to the Axis forces in Libya the American Government had been urgently requested [Page 306] to resume the program. So far and despite an apparently favorable reaction on our part nothing had been done.
As concrete proposals for a step towards the resumption of the program as a whole he suggested that our Government should give its approval without delay to the immediate departure from New York of the two French vessels Ile de Noirmoutier and Ile d’Ouessant and that the French Embassy in Washington should be authorized by means of the renewal of a Treasury license to make purchases in the American market. Even if an approximate date for the departure of these two vessels could not be announced he considered the granting of such facilities would be highly desirable as they would serve to shorten the delay which must inevitably elapse between the adoption of a favorable decision and the resumption of the traffic and loading of cargoes.
Rochat52 asked me to come to see him this morning. He said that he felt obliged to tell me that the Germans were placing such insistence on the matter that he feared that unless our Government was prepared to resume the program in the near future, and could give some indication to that effect, the Embassy might at any time be faced with an official request from the French Government for a reduction in the number of our consular representatives in French North Africa to that which existed on January 1, 1939; it being understood, however, that with the resumption of the program, this number would be restored to its present strength. Rochat explained that German pressure was alone responsible for this attitude and that it was well nigh impossible for the French Government to attempt to justify—in view of their continued inactivity—the further presence of these control officers in North Africa. I said that as far as I was aware it was not the intention of our Government to abandon the North African economic program and that if delays had occurred in its resumption these were due to political factors which he would understand.
I fully realize the importance of recent political developments which may have decided the Department to defer action—not the least of these being the return to power of Laval and our negotiations in Martinique. I venture, however, to submit certain considerations in support of the resumption of the program which I hope will be given consideration.
I am confident that Laval believes it in his best interest to maintain friendly relations with the United States and there is not the slightest doubt that this firm and conciliatory attitude at the time of the Martinique affair has served greatly to enhance his prestige locally. This opinion incidentally is shared by those who dislike him most. On the other hand anti-Laval German pressure shows no signs of subsiding [Page 307] and Doriot’s candidacy with German backing as Laval’s successor is now a matter of open discussion. I believe therefore that if we were to declare our intention of resuming the operation of the North African program at an early date (and should we only make a “token” shipment in one vessel) such a step would be received with genuine appreciation and would be interpreted as concrete evidence of a desire on our part to bring that assistance to France and her possessions which they stand so critically in need of.
I need not emphasize the pressing economic needs of North Africa. These have been repeatedly and clearly set forth in Murphy’s telegrams. It may, however, be significant to report in this connection that I have learned on the best of authority that Admiral Esteva who recently completed a brief visit to Vichy has informed the Government that unless he could be supplied with 600 tons of fuel oil by June 15 he did not expect to be able to harvest the Tunisian wheat crop.
If the Department is in a position to inform me that it contemplates an announcement as to the resumption of the North African economic program at an early date I request authority to convey the information officially to Rochat. The Armistice Commission is to meet in [apparent omission] time and if the French representatives could be fortified with such an assurance I am convinced that it would do much to forestall the virtual ultimatum which the Germans will almost certainly deliver with regard to the necessity for the continued presence of our control officers in [North Africa?].
I respectfully request that the contents of this telegram be brought to the attention of Ambassador Leahy53 whose views as to the advisability of the resumption of the program are already a matter of record in the Department.
For the reasons stated in the Embassy’s 790, June 1, 5 p.m.54 this message has not been repeated to Murphy. Should the Department consider it advisable to do so I suggest that it be repeated to him direct.