740.00112 European War 1939/5629
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
Mr. Berle: While it is realized that the assumption of power by Mr. Laval makes it difficult to announce publicly the resumption of shipments to French North Africa, there are a number of important reasons why it seems desirable to continue our trade with that area. Aside from the main objective of our program, which has been to maintain the status quo in the strategic French North African territories, the chief advantage derived from our agreement with the French is the presence of control officers in the principal North African sea ports. Their continued functioning is perhaps the most important single advantage to be derived by the United States from resuming shipments to North Africa.
The twelve Vice Consuls who are serving as control officers have supplied us in the past with the most valuable kind of information, including military, naval, and economic data of great interest not only to this Department but to the War Department and the British Government. Their presence in North Africa is justified only by the shipment of supplies in accordance with the provisions of the so-called Weygand-Murphy Agreement. There are many indications that the suspension of all shipments and the absence of any indication that they will be resumed may lead to a request on the part of the French Government for the recall of these officers. Unless the officers are given some active work in supervising the distribution of supplies, there is little doubt that their activities will not be tolerated much longer, and we shall lose a highly important source of information.
[Page 296]Officers in the military intelligence division of the War Department have expressed themselves informally in favor of continuing the economic plan and thereby obtaining the information supplied regularly by the control Vice Consuls. We understand that the War Department is desirous also of maintaining, if possible, the status quo in North Africa and keeping both the French and native population friendly to the United States. This view is shared by the Coordinator of Information, who has a number of representatives in North Africa and whose organization benefits by the data sent in by our control officers. Officials of the British Embassy are also deriving much benefit from the reports of the control officers, and certainly would be loath to see their work interrupted.
Under the new plan of marking all articles sent to North Africa with American flags and appropriate indication of their source, the Board of Economic Warfare has displayed a lively interest in having the shipments resumed. Economic Warfare officials, in cooperation with the Coordinator of Information, have worked out this scheme which would doubtless add greatly to the effectiveness of the shipments to North Africa. The supplies of sugar, tea, matches, et cetera, would be sent in small packages, numbering several millions, which would reach the greatest possible number of inhabitants and carry the message of American interest and friendship. It is felt that this form of propaganda alone would make the continued flow of shipments worthwhile.
The materials to be obtained by us from North Africa in return must also be taken into account. The French have tentatively offered us cargoes of cork, tartar, red squill, and olive oil, all of which are vitally needed in the United States. It is possible that other commodities, such as wool, may also be obtained. None of these products would be forthcoming, of course, unless we resume our shipments to North Africa.
The amounts involved in sending supplies to North Africa are relatively small. The two vessels now waiting to load at New York have a combined carrying capacity of between 13,000 and 15,000 tons. The goods which could be thus transported represent only a very small fraction of the needs in North Africa, and, even if they fell into unauthorized hands (which would automatically terminate the agreement), the loss would be negligible. On the other hand, the propaganda value of impressing ourselves upon the local population and thus detracting from the influence of collaborationist elements would be very great. There is naturally some hesitancy in resuming shipments to North Africa because of the public reaction against Laval and the Vichy Government. However, in sending the next two vessels to Casablanca, there would seem to be no reason for making a public announcement. The ships could be permitted to sail without [Page 297] notification, and our censorship facilities could be utilized to keep the sailings confidential.
The shipments to North Africa may best be regarded, at this juncture, in the light of a weapon in economic warfare. Their propaganda and psychological value are closely related to this economic phase. From a military and strategic point of view, the shipments offer great importance as a means of continuing the work of the control officers. Lastly, the purely humanitarian aspect may be considered in the case of such commodities as cotton cloth for the Arab population, many of whom, through no fault of their own, are going about naked and a prey to disease because of lack of clothing.