851.00/2757: Telegram
The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 22—2:43 p.m.]
169. Following repeated to Algiers, Vichy, and Madrid are observations of one of Noguès’24 personal advisors who is a friend of mine of longstanding.
Laval’s entry into the Government is not expected to result in granting to Germany of bases in Morocco or any advantages they do not now possess.
No changes in either personnel or policy are anticipated in French Protectorate as the withdrawal of economic aid to Morocco and French North Africa by United States can only play into the hands of the Germans. The rupture of the economic accord will make it all the easier for Germany to press for the withdrawal of our control officer whose raison d’être is the continued existence of the accord.
My informant sees a close parallel between the role which Laval essays to play in present history of France and that of Talleyrand. He commented “I do not admire Talleyrand the man but one cannot gainsay his political genius”. This is a parallel which has been [Page 288] made to me recently by other Frenchmen whose detestation of Laval and friendship for United States is beyond question.
My interlocutor said there was no doubt that Pétain’s25 action had been taken in the interest of France as Pétain saw it under the inexorable pressure of circumstances and events. However one might dislike Laval it was a lack of realism to consider him as a traitor or one who would not consider first of all France’s interests and who would not seek to achieve them by all the passionate devotion to France of the French peasant.
Laval was consumed by hatred for England because that power had in his opinion destroyed his plan for European peace. Then too there was the deep-seated French peasant’s distrust as personified by Laval of Bolshevism.
“I for my part,” it was said, “do not have this fear which animates so many Frenchmen. In any case the world faces the greatest social revolution in its history. It will come willy nilly Russia. It is more likely to be a social revolution dominated by the Anglo-Saxon world. But this Bolshevist bogey must be taken into account in estimating and seeking to understand French politics.”
I said so far as my information went of American public opinion the Marshal’s acceptance of Laval was interpreted as complete submission to Germany.
He thought this a mistaken interpretation.
The turn of events would mean a closer economic collaboration dictated by France’s imperative need to survive but would not involve a military collaboration or concessions of the fleet or North Africa. Even in 1940 Laval had opposed the granting of facilities in North Africa to the Germans and it was unreasonable to suppose he would grant them more now than he had been disposed to give them.
My informant hoped we would not by breaking relations deprive France of its only support against Germany.
I referred to the great activity of the Germans in Tangier (see my 162 of April 17 [18] and 166, [April 19] and 167 of April 1826 and asked his interpretation. He said he thought the increase in the staff of the German official establishment was due to two factors. First, Germany had a great surplus of diplomatic officers with little outlet for them. Tangier offered a field for their activity. Second, the Germans were obviously disturbed by the increase in our staff and were determined to match it. They had shown themselves singularly inattentive to North Africa and were now repairing this omission.
[Page 289]He saw no sign whatsoever of an imminent German military move in French North Africa. The French military in Morocco saw no sign of such a move. They believe the Germans would concentrate everything on the eastern offensive with any additional activity directed toward Egypt. A military move in Morocco would represent a diversion entirely foreign to German strategic conception and would serve no apparent German interests.
The pressure exercised by Germany to obtain a new government in France had been undertaken owing to German desire to protect its rear at this critical movement [moment?]. To initiate a military move in French North Africa now would be to undertake what Germany was precisely seeking to avoid, the opening of another front and the assumption of new liabilities.