740.00112 European War 1939/5247: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)1
From Murphy. Your March 28, noon. On my return from a trip to Southern Algeria, Admiral Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa, asked me to call for a discussion of questions relating to the resumption of shipments under the North African economic accord urging that we recommend the immediate shipment of petroleum products, copper sulphate, cotton textiles, et cetera. Fénard of course was informed by Vichy of the contents of Department’s last note (Department’s 198 of March 22, 4 p.m., to you2).
[Page 276]Under injunction that he be not quoted as he is timid about discussing politics without Darlan’s permission he referred to the current deterioration of Franco–German relations mentioning the increasing pressure which the Germans are bringing to bear with especial relation to this area. He said, however, that the pressure was rather in the form of bribes than threats saying that “he feared that the Germans would offer to supply this area with gasoline and gas oil in a manner that would be difficult to refuse”; that the German aim is to manipulate us out of this area. He urged that it is definitely our interest to resume shipments promptly as a play to defeat German and Italian intentions.
Fénard and others also refer to the possibility of Laval3 resuming power as remote. According to Fénard, Admiral Darlan “has reason to believe” that Laval would not accept power now at any price, and the Marshal has no intention of inviting him. According to Fénard and another well-informed source who said he lunched with Laval recently the latter is too intelligent to undertake an all-out collaborationist program at the present time, he knows the country would not tolerate it, and he is said furthermore to have evolved away from the beliefs he expressed so often after the Armistice in the certainty of a German victory.
A week’s trip in the Algerian Sahara where conditions are comparable to other North African districts leaves no doubt in my mind regarding the adverse economic situation in this area. The rail head is approximately 300 kilometers to the south of Algiers. Beyond that stage motor transport was the rule prior to the Armistice. Automotive traffic is now practically non-existent (I saw less than a dozen cars in 1400 kilometers traveled) and the camel and burro now provide the only means of transport. The reorganized camel caravans which operated to and from the far south as in ancient times provide many local cities with only a thin margin of subsistence. There is need of practically every type of essential commodity, and that of clothing and textiles by both Europeans and natives is of course urgent.
On the other side of the medal there is the story of possibly over a million sheep smuggled during the past months by the Arabs with Italian connivance to Libya as well as the smuggling of large quantities of cereals, olive oil, wine and other foodstuffs. That there is a considerable clandestine traffic via the wide open spaces of the Sahara is undoubtedly true.
It is also unfortunate that on the part of some civilian and military officials in that district as in others, there is noticeable Anglophobia and distrust of British military ability as well as of British long-term [Page 277] intentions regarding this area. On the other hand anti-Axis and pro-American sentiment is the rule. I have the growing conviction that if by some stretch of the imagination it could be supposed that the United States should decide to send a large scale expeditionary force to French North Africa that it would be welcomed with open arms by the general population and the bulk of officials. But so many who bring up that subject in informal discussion volunteer the suggestion that it must be an American force with no British participation “at least for the beginning”.
I should like to make the following suggestions regarding the North African economic accord of which I believe it may be said that it has proven a useful instrument in supporting those French elements who have desired to resist Axis demands for concessions in this area. The suspension of the accord’s operator [operation] subsequent to the departure of General Weygand was fully justified by the dubious situation then existing. If the accord is to be useful in the future I believe we have arrived at a point where we should breathe some life into it. It should be stressed that our performance under the accord in the past year of its existence has never been of really important volume. I estimate that thus far we have not shipped under the accord more than about 60,000 tons of American products. The essential needs of French North Africa for imported goods, however, are measured in hundreds of thousands of tons. Unquestionably there is an urgent present need of over 300,000 tons of merchandise. But the four available French ships in the New York-Casablanca traffic cannot possibly deliver more than a maximum of 25,000 tons of goods monthly. I believe that of the quotas approved for North Africa by our Government and the British less than 15% were actually delivered during the past year. No petroleum products have been delivered for the past 6 months. Since the departure of Weygand only two small cargo ships have sailed from New York for French North Africa together with some small lots of merchandise from Martinique. It is obvious that the material basis on which we reply [rely] to influence the French aside from the question of principle is exceedingly flimsy.
It is also fairly obvious that we can count on basic sympathy for our cause in this area. If that did not exist I believe the accord would have been denounced long ago. It is increasingly difficult to persuade North African officials and the business community of the value of our economic cooperation in the light of our skimpy performance during the past 6 months. Some officials and businessmen say quite openly that we seem to enjoy talking in a grand manner of the economic aid we give North Africa but that our actual deliveries are ridiculously insignificant; that we are only bluffing.
[Page 278]I believe also that if we undertake really substantial performance under the accord we should also insist on some control of the North African food deliveries to France where according to the stories reaching us here a large share falls to German and Italian hands.
I recommend that in view of the fact that this area still remains free of Axis occupation 5 months after the departure of General Weygand; that the status of our control personnel and consular establishments is unchanged; that the disposition of French officials continues friendly and cooperative; that the accord enables the United States to obtain some strategic materials such as cork from North Africa; and that an opportunity to use this area for our future war purposes seems to exist, that we make a substantial effort to cooperate economically with French North Africa. If we are to hope for the possibility of independent North African action it would be well to prove that this area which is dependent on France for the bulk of its supplies can look to us (naturally on a pay as you go French shipping basis) for that support. I think it is very important to bear in mind that if we are to hope for independent action from this territory which industrially is dependent on France it would be well to prove that we are able to provide for its needs.
I should be grateful if you would have any part of this telegram which you might consider of interest repeated to the Department with whatever comment if any you may feel disposed to make. [Murphy.]