740.00112 European War 1939/5001

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of European Affairs

Participants: Sir Ronald Campbell, Mr. Noel Hall, Mr. Helm, Mr. Barclay and Mr. Wyndham White, of the British Embassy.
Mr. Dunn, PA/D
Mr. Murray, PA/M92
Mr. Atherton, Eu93
Mr. Villard, NE94
Mr. Reber, Eu

Subject: North African Supply Program.

In opening the discussion Mr. Dunn explained that the assurances which the American Government had requested of Vichy regarding the supply of goods to the Axis, the use of French territories or harbors by the Axis Powers, the situation in Madagascar, and the French Fleet, have now been received for what they are worth. This would appear to indicate that Vichy finds it advisable to give up the practices which brought about tension in Franco-American relations and the suspension of the North African program.

In the light of these assurances the question now arose whether the North African traffic should be resumed and, if so, in what form.

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Mr. Noel Hall explained that in the opinion of the British Government, there were three approaches to the problem. The first involved a substantial offer for a considerable quantity of goods for North Africa which might be used both as a lever to obtain vital war materials from North Africa, or at least prevent them from reaching the enemy, and to have a political effect among the French people when it became known that the British and American Governments were embarking on an ambitious program to supply North Africa. A refusal on the part of the French Government to put this in effect would be regarded by the people as evidence of Germany’s unwillingness to allow them to receive supplies. The second method would be to work out a minimum program which would enable the United States to keep its present position. The third would be to establish a program sufficient to maintain the economic life of North Africa on the basis of agreed quotas of regular limited shipments in return for which such products as cork, could be secured.

It was agreed that the success of the larger program would depend, in the first instance, upon the availability of means of transportation. In view of the British Government’s expressed preference for this program, however, it was felt that further study should be given to it in order to determine the commodities which might be needed by the United Nations, the commodities which they did not wish to have the Germans get through shipments to Metropolitan France, and the commodities which might be offered. An adequate supply of the latter would be determined on a barter basis in return for the strategic materials desperately needed. It was appreciated, however, that there might be certain difficulties in obtaining authorization for export in view of increasing shortages of goods in the United States.

After discussing whether a resumption of the regular program, without going into the larger possibilities, might weaken the political value of the latter, full agreement was reached upon one sailing of the two vessels now in American ports and that the Department should communicate this to the French Government.

The British representatives at the meeting recognized and so stated the importance of maintaining, for political and military reasons, relations with the French Government which would permit American observers and control officers to remain not only in France, but which was more important, in North Africa as well.

The British Embassy undertook to continue studies for a larger program and the American representatives on their part were to communicate the decision regarding the release of vessels with cargoes to the French.

  1. Wallace Murray, appointed Adviser on Political Relations, March 13.
  2. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.
  3. Henry S. Villard, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.