Colonel Van Hecke (Commissaire Général for French Africa of the
Chantiers de Jeunesse, a French national organization comparable to
the American CCC camps) is evolving as the potential military chief
of the several groups. I enclose biographic data84 regarding him. He is able,
fearless, young, experienced, and enjoys the essential elements of
prestige which could be rapidly developed. He is the leader in North
Africa to whom youth looks for guidance and inspiration. He is
aggressive and as are his associates, disdainful of many of the
old-line military officers who, in his mind, are far more interested
in their daily comfort and regular promotions than they are in the
welfare of their country. He maintains that many of them must be
eliminated. He is ably assisted by Lt. Colonel Fredaigue and
Lieutenant d’Astier de la Vigerie, both of whom are Assistant
Commissioners for French Africa of the Chantiers de Jeunesse
organization.
At the present moment, Colonel Van Hecke heads a group of
approximately 26,000 disciplined, trained and hardened young men of
the average age of 21 who would form an admirable nucleus for
action.
Colonel Van Hecke is in close liaison with a number of rightminded
regular army officers, including the Chief of Staff of General Juin,
the Major-General commanding all French forces in all French Africa.
That officer, Colonel Jousse, and his associates, have now prepared
the enclosed program dated March 13, 1942, for American intervention
in French North Africa. This replaces and supplements the program
enclosed with my letter of January 12.
I urgently call your attention to certain features of this revised
program as follows:
May I respectfully urge that you give me a directive in this
connection. Do you wish me to continue these conversations, or do
you wish them dropped? Do you wish the conversations conducted by
someone else?
I approved in this connection a meeting between Colonel Van Hecke and
his two assistants, and Lt. Colonel Eddy, our Naval Attaché at
Tangier, and control officer Vice Consul King.85 Colonel Van Hecke supplied Colonel Eddy with
a copy of the enclosed program. If you are interested in these
propositions, it is suggested that you arrange as soon as may be
practicable to send at least one qualified regular army officer who
would be able to discuss the technical features of the military
operation with these French officers. Lt. Colonel Eddy, as you may
know, is an able person, a reserve officer in the Marine Corps. I do
not believe that he is equipped to discuss technical questions of
modern warfare, and he should have the assistance of at least one
trained regular army officer if these negotiations are to progress
effectively.
The political phase is naturally of great importance. You will
probably advise me when practicable of your ideas regarding the
political possibilities and what form, in your opinion, the future
political set-up in this area should assume to facilitate the
accomplishment of whatever policy you may determine.
Our Economic Accord with North Africa has proved, and is continuing
to prove its value in preparing the ground for more serious
operations. It seems to me essential that it be continued and that
we enlarge our publicity efforts by radio and other means to ensure
knowledge of our efforts to supply this area with its essential
needs on as large a part of the mass of the North African population
as possible. I think that our radio broadcasts, which frequently
underscore violent criticism of Vichy policy, would be fortified if
they also demonstrated some affirmative facts such as the material
benefits which flow to the North African population from cooperation
with the United States. They should emphasize that only the United
States is able to provide for their needs as contrasted with enemy
action which is depriving the French people of its property, its
food and its opportunity to earn a livelihood.
The time has arrived, I believe, for you to give me a directive, if
circumstances permit, by whatever means you may deem
appropriate.
[Enclosure—Translation]87
Memorandum Regarding American Intervention in
French North Africa
Note No. 2
In a preceding memorandum88 we indicated, in the order of urgency and
time necessary for delivery, the needs of the land army for
matériel, supplies and specialists during the first month in the
event that French North Africa would resume its liberty of
action and fight on the side of the Allies.
We have already shown that this hypothesis could not be
contemplated if the following conditions did not obtain:
- (a)
- The destruction or at least immobilization of the Axis
armored forces in Libya.
- (b)
- The initiative or at least the consent of a high
ranking chief with indisputable authority (General
Weygand) taking advantage of favorable political
circumstances.
- (c)
- The action to be launched at an appropriate moment
taking the initiative in advance of the enemy and
blocking his reactions.
- (d)
- The existence of allied aero-naval supremacy in the
Mediterranean. (This was not specified because admitted
implicitly.)
With the fulfillment of these conditions, it was admitted that
the liberating operation in North Africa could be executed with
a weak military support from abroad evaluated at:
One to two armored divisions in Morocco, pending [depending?] upon the
reinforcements which the Spaniards or the Germans could
develop in their Moroccan zone at the moment of the
operation.
100 anti-aircraft batteries.
Aviation support as then described.
The unfavorable evolution of the situation makes it necessary to
revise that estimate. In Libya the Axis forces considerably
strengthened have the initiative; they retain an important
liberty of action as well as their communications with
Italy.
In the Mediterranean the Allies have lost aero-naval supremacy.
They have suffered reverses in Cyrenaica and important reverses
in the Far East.
These reverses, exploited by propaganda, disturb the population
and the army and inspire prudence on the part of leaders who
would have the courage to assume the risks of independent action
in North Africa. The least that one can say is that opinion is
not favorable
[Page 267]
at
present time to an action of this nature which would be regarded
as a risky adventure.
This state of mind and the political situation which it develops
makes it necessary to contemplate an important increase in the
initial foreign support—this support must in effect permit:
For one thing, the guarantee of a favorable command and the
reassurance of public opinion by the manifestation of massive
force.
For another, blocking the reactions of the Axis and the temporary
replacement of French forces whose modernization may be retarded
by the housecleaning necessary in the high command.
Considering the present situation we will examine the following
points:
Preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled.
The expeditionary force to be contemplated for French
North Africa.
General conditions of intervention.
The employment of the intervening forces and initial
French possibilities.
A.—Preliminary Conditions for
Fulfillment by the Allies Outlined as Follows:
- (a)
- To immobilize definitely by action starting from Egypt
the Axis forces in Libya in order that they may not be
able even temporarily to detach armored forces in French
North Africa. This fixation is a minimum which must end
in the destruction of those forces at the earliest
possible moment.
- (b)
- To recover aero-naval supremacy in the western
Mediterranean even in the hypothesis of a hostile
intervention by the French Navy.
- (c)
- To dispose of reserve forces in tonnage in addition to
the actual expeditionary forces in order to provide for
the unforeseen and to enable certainty of action.
- (d)
- To be able to furnish to French North Africa in the
time requested technicians, matériel and supplies listed
in memorandum No. 1.89
B.—Expeditionary Forces
Necessary for French North Africa;
The land forces necessary may be estimated as follows:
- 7 motorized divisions
- 5 armored brigades (700–800 tanks)*
- 120 anti-aircraft batteries (one half of small
caliber) for the defense of the debarkation
zones.
[Page 268]
Corresponding services.
These forces must be provided with supplies of the following
sufficient for one month:
- Munitions
- Liquid fuel
- Foodstuffs (flour, canned goods, sugar, tea,
coffee)
- Spare parts
- Tent equipment
- Sanitary equipment and medicine (vaccines and
anesthetics, bandages, surgical equipment)
- Coal (see memorandum No. 1)
The aviation forces necessary will be outlined subsequently.
To assure the protection of the debarkation, however, the needs
can be evaluated at about 500 pursuit planes, or approximately
100 per debarkation zone.
The aviation forces must also have on the ground means of supply
and maintenance (personnel and matériel) delivered at the
aviation bases by transport planes arriving at the same time as
the combat planes.
The anti-aircraft defense of the bases must also be insured at
the rate of from 5 to 10 batteries per base, or about 100
batteries.
C.—General Conditions of
Intervention:
The following general ideas should guide the enterprise:
- (a)
- The preliminary conditions having been fulfilled, the
initiative must be taken deliberately in liaison with
favorable French elements. It is absolutely essential to
avoid a set-back at the beginning. Intervention
conceived as a counter attack would lead inevitably to a
set-back. If the Axis take the initiative it will have
the advantage of being first in action on a strategic
chess board favorable to it.
- (b)
- To operate simultaneously, on a large scale and by
surprise; to avoid all adverse reaction susceptible of
compromising the initial debarkations which are the most
difficult.
- (c)
- To assure the immediate possession without combat to
the American forces of the vital centers of the country,
the naval bases and the indispensable aviation
installations, as well as the best ports with the most
adequate equipment.
- (d)
- To follow as soon as possible the landing of the
forces with the shipment of means, both personnel and
matériel, necessary for the ravitaillement of the French troops as well as
the supplies designed to influence public opinion
(textiles, liquid fuel, tea, sugar, coffee,
coal).
The vital centers, naval bases and indispensable ports include
essentially:
- The Zone of Casablanca–Fedala–Rabat;
- The City of Oran, including Mers-el-Kébir;
- The City of Algiers;
- The group Tunis–La Goulette–Bizerta.
One could add as secondary urgency:
- The Atlantic Moroccan ports of Mogador, Safi, and
Mazagan.
- In Algeria; Mostaganem and Bône.
It would be well also to control as a minimum the following
aviation bases:
Morocco: |
Rabat, Casablanca, Meknes,
Fez, Kasbah Tadla, Marrakech; |
Algeria: |
La Senia, Lartigue,
Maison-Blanche, Blida and eventually Satif and
Bône. |
Tunisia: |
El Aouina, Souk el
Arba. |
The initial division of the forces and their zones of debarkation
could be outlined as follows:
Morocco: |
3 |
motorized divisions |
|
2 |
armored brigades |
|
40 |
anti-aircraft batteries |
Debarkation region: Casablanca–Fedala and, depending on enemy
reaction, in the southern ports: Mazagan, Safi and Mogador.
Algeria: |
3 |
motorized divisions |
|
2 |
armored brigades |
|
40 |
anti-aircraft batteries |
Debarkation region:
- (a)
- Oran, Mers-el-Kebir, Beach at Arzew, 2 divisions, 1
armored brigade, 20 anti-aircraft batteries.
- (b)
- Algiers (port and bay) 1 division, 1 armored brigade
and 20 anti-aircraft batteries.
Tunisia: |
1 |
motorized division |
|
1 |
armored brigade |
|
40 |
anti-aircraft batteries. |
Debarkation region: Bizerta–La Goulette–Tunis. Eventually these
might be transferred partially to Bône and Philippeville in case
of too active enemy reaction.
The general mechanism of debarkation must be the following:
- (a)
- Debarkations executed at dawn simultaneously in all
the ports;
- (b)
- With a view to avoiding all unfortunate reaction on
the part of the police forces and the forces guarding
the ports, patriots would take the control of the zones
in question during the course of the night preceding the
debarkation. This preliminary action is of capital
importance, but it is necessary to underscore the
difficulty of its preparation and its execution because
of the lowered morale resulting from the recent allied
setbacks and incessant Vichy propaganda.
[Page 270]
As accessory, several special points of execution should be
noted:
- (a)
- The transports used for the first debarkation must
carry a mixed load (infantry, armored units,
anti-aircraft units). As soon as the infantry and
armored units debarked are sufficient to support the
patriots, and to avoid all possibility of an immediate
internal threat, the anti-aircraft equipment must be
debarked and put in place;
- (b)
- It would be well to assure a strict liaison between
the patriots and the expeditionary troops:
- Before debarkation, by radio, the radio units
not entering into existing networks;
- After debarkation, by liaison
personnel.
- (c)
- The debarkation corps must include personnel necessary
to assure port service in order to prevent all momentary
defection of French personnel and to constitute in each
debarkation zone a maritime base.
D.—Employment of the
Expeditionary Forces and Initial French Possibilities:
The expeditionary forces will be used to oppose all diverse
reactions until the French forces of French North Africa are at
least partially transformed and reconstituted.
The expeditionary forces would be engaged:
For one part, in Tripoli, to combine their action with
British forces operating in Cyrenaica;
For the other part, in Spanish Morocco, to insure a
preventive occupation of this territory. The Moroccan
operation will be assisted from the beginning, without
transformation or preliminary reconstitution of regular
French troops acting in the mountain zone.
As concerns French troops, their immediate possibilities are
limited except for action in the mountainous region of French
Morocco indicated above. It would be committing a great error to
throw into the battle the Armistice (French) Army troops in
their present state, that is to say, deprived of all modern
matériel. One would thus destroy without appreciable result
personnel of a quality difficult to replace under present
circumstances.
An initial échelon of forces could
comprise:
2 armored divisions |
} |
12 to 1500
tanks |
6 motorized divisions |
The preparation of this échelon would be
achieved toward the fifth or sixth week, if the technicians and
the matériel indicated in Memorandum No. 1 are furnished under
the conditions requested.
The second échelon of forces of the same
importance as the first could be organized toward the third
month (certain elements much earlier—starting with the second
month) with the reserve that the
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corresponding supplies of matériel would
be assured in the time desired (these needs do not figure in
Memorandum No. 1).
It appears from the foregoing indications that within a short
delay there could be made available four armored divisions and
twelve motorized divisions for action abroad—either in France or
in another theatre of operations.
An effort of mobilization in North Africa would be pursued
further, but it does not seem possible to increase the battle
corps thus constituted.
The European personnel resources are limited, and it should be
noted:
On the one hand, the necessity of conserving the resources
necessary to supply fresh personnel to the troops in
operation;
On the other hand, the obligation of allowing to remain in North
Africa a French minimum to carry on economic activity and to
guarantee order in the country.