740.0011 European War 1939/21085a

The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

Dear Mr. Under-Secretary: I take the liberty of referring to my strictly confidential letter of December 7, 1941,82 and my urgent and secret letters to you of January 12 and January 13, 1942,83 [Page 264] regarding the developing organization in French North Africa of groups desirous of resuming hostilities against the Axis. I wish to refer particularly to my letter of January 12 which transmitted a plan (Memorandum No. 1 [Note No. 1.]) for American intervention in French North Africa in cooperation with French elements.

Colonel Van Hecke (Commissaire Général for French Africa of the Chantiers de Jeunesse, a French national organization comparable to the American CCC camps) is evolving as the potential military chief of the several groups. I enclose biographic data84 regarding him. He is able, fearless, young, experienced, and enjoys the essential elements of prestige which could be rapidly developed. He is the leader in North Africa to whom youth looks for guidance and inspiration. He is aggressive and as are his associates, disdainful of many of the old-line military officers who, in his mind, are far more interested in their daily comfort and regular promotions than they are in the welfare of their country. He maintains that many of them must be eliminated. He is ably assisted by Lt. Colonel Fredaigue and Lieutenant d’Astier de la Vigerie, both of whom are Assistant Commissioners for French Africa of the Chantiers de Jeunesse organization.

At the present moment, Colonel Van Hecke heads a group of approximately 26,000 disciplined, trained and hardened young men of the average age of 21 who would form an admirable nucleus for action.

Colonel Van Hecke is in close liaison with a number of rightminded regular army officers, including the Chief of Staff of General Juin, the Major-General commanding all French forces in all French Africa. That officer, Colonel Jousse, and his associates, have now prepared the enclosed program dated March 13, 1942, for American intervention in French North Africa. This replaces and supplements the program enclosed with my letter of January 12.

I urgently call your attention to certain features of this revised program as follows:

1
—The Allied reverses exploited by enemy propaganda have discouraged many leaders and disturbed opinion which, at the moment, regards resumption of hostilities as exceedingly risky. This state of mind makes it necessary to contemplate an important increase of initial foreign support.
2
—The revised estimate of the strength of an American expeditionary force necessary for this area is:
  • 7 motorized divisions (20,000 effectives each)
  • 5 armored divisions (7 to 700 tanks [sic] each—10,000 effectives each)
3
—The ultimate French strength available, as soon as equipped, would be:
  • 12 motorized divisions
  • 4 armored divisions.

May I respectfully urge that you give me a directive in this connection. Do you wish me to continue these conversations, or do you wish them dropped? Do you wish the conversations conducted by someone else?

I approved in this connection a meeting between Colonel Van Hecke and his two assistants, and Lt. Colonel Eddy, our Naval Attaché at Tangier, and control officer Vice Consul King.85 Colonel Van Hecke supplied Colonel Eddy with a copy of the enclosed program. If you are interested in these propositions, it is suggested that you arrange as soon as may be practicable to send at least one qualified regular army officer who would be able to discuss the technical features of the military operation with these French officers. Lt. Colonel Eddy, as you may know, is an able person, a reserve officer in the Marine Corps. I do not believe that he is equipped to discuss technical questions of modern warfare, and he should have the assistance of at least one trained regular army officer if these negotiations are to progress effectively.

The political phase is naturally of great importance. You will probably advise me when practicable of your ideas regarding the political possibilities and what form, in your opinion, the future political set-up in this area should assume to facilitate the accomplishment of whatever policy you may determine.

Our Economic Accord with North Africa has proved, and is continuing to prove its value in preparing the ground for more serious operations. It seems to me essential that it be continued and that we enlarge our publicity efforts by radio and other means to ensure knowledge of our efforts to supply this area with its essential needs on as large a part of the mass of the North African population as possible. I think that our radio broadcasts, which frequently underscore violent criticism of Vichy policy, would be fortified if they also demonstrated some affirmative facts such as the material benefits which flow to the North African population from cooperation with the United States. They should emphasize that only the United States is able to provide for their needs as contrasted with enemy action which is depriving the French people of its property, its food and its opportunity to earn a livelihood.

The time has arrived, I believe, for you to give me a directive, if circumstances permit, by whatever means you may deem appropriate.

Faithfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy
[Page 266]
[Enclosure—Translation]87

Memorandum Regarding American Intervention in French North Africa

Note No. 2

In a preceding memorandum88 we indicated, in the order of urgency and time necessary for delivery, the needs of the land army for matériel, supplies and specialists during the first month in the event that French North Africa would resume its liberty of action and fight on the side of the Allies.

We have already shown that this hypothesis could not be contemplated if the following conditions did not obtain:

(a)
The destruction or at least immobilization of the Axis armored forces in Libya.
(b)
The initiative or at least the consent of a high ranking chief with indisputable authority (General Weygand) taking advantage of favorable political circumstances.
(c)
The action to be launched at an appropriate moment taking the initiative in advance of the enemy and blocking his reactions.
(d)
The existence of allied aero-naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. (This was not specified because admitted implicitly.)

With the fulfillment of these conditions, it was admitted that the liberating operation in North Africa could be executed with a weak military support from abroad evaluated at:

One to two armored divisions in Morocco, pending [depending?] upon the reinforcements which the Spaniards or the Germans could develop in their Moroccan zone at the moment of the operation.

100 anti-aircraft batteries.

Aviation support as then described.

The unfavorable evolution of the situation makes it necessary to revise that estimate. In Libya the Axis forces considerably strengthened have the initiative; they retain an important liberty of action as well as their communications with Italy.

In the Mediterranean the Allies have lost aero-naval supremacy. They have suffered reverses in Cyrenaica and important reverses in the Far East.

These reverses, exploited by propaganda, disturb the population and the army and inspire prudence on the part of leaders who would have the courage to assume the risks of independent action in North Africa. The least that one can say is that opinion is not favorable [Page 267] at present time to an action of this nature which would be regarded as a risky adventure.

This state of mind and the political situation which it develops makes it necessary to contemplate an important increase in the initial foreign support—this support must in effect permit:

For one thing, the guarantee of a favorable command and the reassurance of public opinion by the manifestation of massive force.

For another, blocking the reactions of the Axis and the temporary replacement of French forces whose modernization may be retarded by the housecleaning necessary in the high command.

Considering the present situation we will examine the following points:

Preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled.

The expeditionary force to be contemplated for French North Africa.

General conditions of intervention.

The employment of the intervening forces and initial French possibilities.

A.—Preliminary Conditions for Fulfillment by the Allies Outlined as Follows:

(a)
To immobilize definitely by action starting from Egypt the Axis forces in Libya in order that they may not be able even temporarily to detach armored forces in French North Africa. This fixation is a minimum which must end in the destruction of those forces at the earliest possible moment.
(b)
To recover aero-naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean even in the hypothesis of a hostile intervention by the French Navy.
(c)
To dispose of reserve forces in tonnage in addition to the actual expeditionary forces in order to provide for the unforeseen and to enable certainty of action.
(d)
To be able to furnish to French North Africa in the time requested technicians, matériel and supplies listed in memorandum No. 1.89

B.—Expeditionary Forces Necessary for French North Africa;

The land forces necessary may be estimated as follows:

  • 7 motorized divisions
  • 5 armored brigades (700–800 tanks)*
  • 120 anti-aircraft batteries (one half of small caliber) for the defense of the debarkation zones.

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Corresponding services.

These forces must be provided with supplies of the following sufficient for one month:

  • Munitions
  • Liquid fuel
  • Foodstuffs (flour, canned goods, sugar, tea, coffee)
  • Spare parts
  • Tent equipment
  • Sanitary equipment and medicine (vaccines and anesthetics, bandages, surgical equipment)
  • Coal (see memorandum No. 1)

The aviation forces necessary will be outlined subsequently.

To assure the protection of the debarkation, however, the needs can be evaluated at about 500 pursuit planes, or approximately 100 per debarkation zone.

The aviation forces must also have on the ground means of supply and maintenance (personnel and matériel) delivered at the aviation bases by transport planes arriving at the same time as the combat planes.

The anti-aircraft defense of the bases must also be insured at the rate of from 5 to 10 batteries per base, or about 100 batteries.

C.—General Conditions of Intervention:

The following general ideas should guide the enterprise:

(a)
The preliminary conditions having been fulfilled, the initiative must be taken deliberately in liaison with favorable French elements. It is absolutely essential to avoid a set-back at the beginning. Intervention conceived as a counter attack would lead inevitably to a set-back. If the Axis take the initiative it will have the advantage of being first in action on a strategic chess board favorable to it.
(b)
To operate simultaneously, on a large scale and by surprise; to avoid all adverse reaction susceptible of compromising the initial debarkations which are the most difficult.
(c)
To assure the immediate possession without combat to the American forces of the vital centers of the country, the naval bases and the indispensable aviation installations, as well as the best ports with the most adequate equipment.
(d)
To follow as soon as possible the landing of the forces with the shipment of means, both personnel and matériel, necessary for the ravitaillement of the French troops as well as the supplies designed to influence public opinion (textiles, liquid fuel, tea, sugar, coffee, coal).

The vital centers, naval bases and indispensable ports include essentially:

  • The Zone of Casablanca–Fedala–Rabat;
  • The City of Oran, including Mers-el-Kébir;
  • The City of Algiers;
  • The group Tunis–La Goulette–Bizerta.

One could add as secondary urgency:

  • The Atlantic Moroccan ports of Mogador, Safi, and Mazagan.
  • In Algeria; Mostaganem and Bône.

It would be well also to control as a minimum the following aviation bases:

Morocco: Rabat, Casablanca, Meknes, Fez, Kasbah Tadla, Marrakech;
Algeria: La Senia, Lartigue, Maison-Blanche, Blida and eventually Satif and Bône.
Tunisia: El Aouina, Souk el Arba.

The initial division of the forces and their zones of debarkation could be outlined as follows:

Morocco: 3 motorized divisions
2 armored brigades
40 anti-aircraft batteries

Debarkation region: Casablanca–Fedala and, depending on enemy reaction, in the southern ports: Mazagan, Safi and Mogador.

Algeria: 3 motorized divisions
2 armored brigades
40 anti-aircraft batteries

Debarkation region:

(a)
Oran, Mers-el-Kebir, Beach at Arzew, 2 divisions, 1 armored brigade, 20 anti-aircraft batteries.
(b)
Algiers (port and bay) 1 division, 1 armored brigade and 20 anti-aircraft batteries.

Tunisia: 1 motorized division
1 armored brigade
40 anti-aircraft batteries.

Debarkation region: Bizerta–La Goulette–Tunis. Eventually these might be transferred partially to Bône and Philippeville in case of too active enemy reaction.

The general mechanism of debarkation must be the following:

(a)
Debarkations executed at dawn simultaneously in all the ports;
(b)
With a view to avoiding all unfortunate reaction on the part of the police forces and the forces guarding the ports, patriots would take the control of the zones in question during the course of the night preceding the debarkation. This preliminary action is of capital importance, but it is necessary to underscore the difficulty of its preparation and its execution because of the lowered morale resulting from the recent allied setbacks and incessant Vichy propaganda.

[Page 270]

As accessory, several special points of execution should be noted:

(a)
The transports used for the first debarkation must carry a mixed load (infantry, armored units, anti-aircraft units). As soon as the infantry and armored units debarked are sufficient to support the patriots, and to avoid all possibility of an immediate internal threat, the anti-aircraft equipment must be debarked and put in place;
(b)
It would be well to assure a strict liaison between the patriots and the expeditionary troops:
  • Before debarkation, by radio, the radio units not entering into existing networks;
  • After debarkation, by liaison personnel.
(c)
The debarkation corps must include personnel necessary to assure port service in order to prevent all momentary defection of French personnel and to constitute in each debarkation zone a maritime base.

D.—Employment of the Expeditionary Forces and Initial French Possibilities:

The expeditionary forces will be used to oppose all diverse reactions until the French forces of French North Africa are at least partially transformed and reconstituted.

The expeditionary forces would be engaged:

For one part, in Tripoli, to combine their action with British forces operating in Cyrenaica;

For the other part, in Spanish Morocco, to insure a preventive occupation of this territory. The Moroccan operation will be assisted from the beginning, without transformation or preliminary reconstitution of regular French troops acting in the mountain zone.

As concerns French troops, their immediate possibilities are limited except for action in the mountainous region of French Morocco indicated above. It would be committing a great error to throw into the battle the Armistice (French) Army troops in their present state, that is to say, deprived of all modern matériel. One would thus destroy without appreciable result personnel of a quality difficult to replace under present circumstances.

An initial échelon of forces could comprise:

2 armored divisions } 12 to 1500 tanks
6 motorized divisions

The preparation of this échelon would be achieved toward the fifth or sixth week, if the technicians and the matériel indicated in Memorandum No. 1 are furnished under the conditions requested.

The second échelon of forces of the same importance as the first could be organized toward the third month (certain elements much earlier—starting with the second month) with the reserve that the [Page 271] corresponding supplies of matériel would be assured in the time desired (these needs do not figure in Memorandum No. 1).

It appears from the foregoing indications that within a short delay there could be made available four armored divisions and twelve motorized divisions for action abroad—either in France or in another theatre of operations.

An effort of mobilization in North Africa would be pursued further, but it does not seem possible to increase the battle corps thus constituted.

The European personnel resources are limited, and it should be noted:

On the one hand, the necessity of conserving the resources necessary to supply fresh personnel to the troops in operation;

On the other hand, the obligation of allowing to remain in North Africa a French minimum to carry on economic activity and to guarantee order in the country.

  1. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 494.
  2. Letter of January 13 not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. David W. King, Vice Consul at Casablanca.
  5. File translation revised by the editors.
  6. Not printed.
  7. Not printed.
  8. It should be noted that the French “division” contemplates 20,000 effectives, and the French “brigade” about 10,000 effectives. [Footnote in the original.]