740.0011 European War 1939/20170½

The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)

Dear Jimmie: Remembering previous items of interest in our French African policy, I enclose a memorandum prepared by one of our valued contacts in Morocco as a result of a conversation with him, Lt. Colonel Eddy, Vice Consul Mayer and myself on February 8 at Casablanca. This conversation took place right after the receipt of your telegram No. 44 of February 4, but before I had seen Hibbard at Tangier.

A copy of this memorandum, which is a preliminary outline of our contact’s ideas on this subject, has been given to Colonel Eddy.

Sincerely yours,

Robert D. Murphy
[Enclosure]

Memorandum

Objective.

The principal vital centers of Morocco—the nerve centers of the Protectorate—can be occupied and held for about 15 hours following a “coup de force” effected by surprise and at night by very small groups.

Advantage must be taken of this period of a few hours to land an important air force and light air-borne reinforcements, the first to repel any reaction which may be made by air, the second to consolidate the objectives attained.

Within the 48 hours following the “coup d’état”, the allied naval forces must land in the ports which will have been opened to them the landing forces necessary to assure that the entire country will fall into line and the protection of the frontiers.

All critical posts will be occupied at the beginning of the movement by trusted Frenchmen who will take such measures as will insure the support of the French population and of the native chiefs.

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Morocco will then be able to reinforce the ranks of the Frenchmen who are fighting with the United Nations against the Axis and will thus be able to contribute effectively, thanks to the key position which it occupies, to the delivery of France and to the establishment of its independence and territorial integrity.

Execution.

On the appointed day, at about 1 o’clock in the morning, three small ships will disembark, the first ship, about 150 men in the neighborhood of Safi, the second ship, about 500 men in the neighborhood of Casablanca, the third ship, about 450 men in the neighborhood of Rabat. These detachments should be composed exclusively of Frenchmen wearing French uniforms, equipped with light motorcycles. Guided by trusted men, they would operate as follows:

Casablanca group. Should be in the immediate neighborhood of Casablanca at about 2:30 a.m. so that it may take up positions and do as follows at exactly 3 a.m.

  • 70 men to occupy the Admiralty;
  • 160 men to occupy the port and the naval ships in it, (a few French naval reserve officers replacing immediately the Admiral’s staff and the commanders and seconds in command of the ships in port).
  • 50 men to occupy the airfield;
  • 100 to immobilize the Armistice Commissions;
  • 20 to occupy the Police station;
  • 15 to occupy the military headquarters;
  • 10 to occupy the Post Office and the military telephone switchboard;
  • 10 to occupy the Région Civile;
  • 10 to occupy the telephone central;
  • 5 to occupy the office of the newspaper Le Petit Marocain;
  • 40 to constitute a mobile reserve at the disposition of Colette, to enable him to take care of any incident which may occur.

By 4 a.m., all groups should report to headquarters on the success of their missions.

Northern Group. A sub-group of about 185 men assigned to Rabat should be in the neighborhood of that city at 2:30 a.m. so as to be able to take up positions as follows at exactly 3 a.m:

  • 30 men to occupy the aviation field;
  • 15 men to immobilize the Resident General;
  • 5 to immobilize the Delegate General;
  • 5 to immobilize the Secretary General;
  • 15 to immobilize the Commanding General;
  • 20 to occupy the Region Militaire;
  • 15 to occupy the Bureau de la Place;
  • 30 to occupy the offices of the Direction de la Sécurité Publique;
  • 10 to occupy the Post Office and the Military telephone switchboard;
  • 10 to occupy the Services Municipaux;
  • 5 to occupy the office of the newspaper L’Echo du Maroc;
  • 25 to constitute a mobile reserve at the disposition of Roger, to enable him to take care of any incident which may occur.

By 3:30 a.m. all groups should report to headquarters on the success of their missions.

Raoul would then call upon the Sultan, accompanied by a “guard of honor” and notify him, with due deference, of the organization of a provisional French Government in Morocco, having the support of the United States.

Meanwhile, a sub-group of 100 men would occupy the vital centers of Port Lyautey and another sub-group of 165 men would occupy the vital centers of Meknes (office of the Région Militaire and staff, aviation field, post office, telephone central, etc.).

Southern Group. Would occupy the vital centers of Safi at the same time and in the same way as the other groups occupied their objectives.

At 3:45 a.m. the northern sub-groups and the southern group would report by radio to Casablanca.

At 4 a.m. Morocco would report and ask immediate help from the allied forces and such help, in the shape of fighting aircraft and air-borne troops, arriving at daybreak would complete the total occupation of western Morocco.

The allied fleet, which until then would have remained far from the Moroccan coast in order not to arouse suspicion, would then proceed at full speed toward the occupied ports and disembark as soon as possible the troops needed to protect the frontiers.

Other points to be considered: orders to be given to the military and civilian authorities in the French Zone; the possibility of a reaction from the Spanish Zone.