Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/20096

The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

Algiers, January 12, 1942.

Dear Mr. Under-Secretary: I take the liberty to refer to my letter of December 7, 1941,⁴⁰ enclosing a memorandum of a conversation with M. J. Lemaigre-Dubreuil who, in the interim, has been active in the development of an organization for the defense of French Africa against Axis aggression. His plan is based on the seven points mentioned in that memorandum. The plan, you may recall, contemplates the temporary separation of French Africa from metropolitan France and the establishment of a provisional government in this area. I enclose the following:

A self-explanatory letter, in original and translation, from Mr. Jean Rigaud, a collaborator of M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, covering:

a) Supplemental note, in original and translation, to the conversation of December 6, 1941. (This has reference to the seven points outlined in the memorandum transmitted by the above mentioned letter of December 7, 1941.)

b) Note 1, in original and translation. An interesting analysis of the current French African situation.

c) Note 2,⁴¹ in original and translation. Means necessary for French North Africa in order to resist German aggression. (This interesting estimate of military needs has been prepared by competent French staff officers).

I shall be grateful if early study could be given to the enclosures which suggest that our Government agree to support the plan described herein for the defense of French Africa against the Axis. The persons who are involved urge that time is short; there is much preliminary work to be done in building up and perfecting such an organization; much time would be necessary for the arrival of matériel and other necessary supplies and that desirable progress in the development of the contemplated organization cannot be accomplished unless the United States Government agrees in principle to lend its active support.

It would be most helpful if you could give me the benefit of your telegraphic comment in regard to the enclosures.

Faithfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy

[Enclosure—Translation]

Mr. Jean Rig and to the Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy)⁴²

Algiers, January 2, 1942.

Sir: I have dictated to Mrs. Hardy the text of memoranda 1 & 2 revised, as well as the general memorandum contemplated by our yesterday’s conversation.

As I said yesterday, I believe it would be well to consider:

1) That the conditions contemplated by the conversation of December 6 would be completed by a clause regarding the future of French naval units in Africa, of the officers and crews in the sense indicated, that is, the possibility of their return to metropolitan France.

2) Request, if the question of principle is decided, the designation of one or more experts who would be able to analyze and make suggestions regarding the several memoranda annexed.

3) To have conversations with representatives of the British Government, requesting them to segregate from this affair any conversations with so-called Free French elements.

4) In the case of an agreement, the constitution of military stocks and, if possible, their preliminary delivery to points accessible to French Africa, even if it would never be necessary to execute the agreement.

Respectfully yours,

Jean Rigaud

[Subenclosure 1—Translation]

Supplemental Note to the Conversation of December 6, 1941

[December 6, 1941]

In the course of the conversation of December 6 the general conditions favorable to a common effort were discussed—these have not been modified in their essential parts. However, since then, the general situation has evolved and it has become necessary to prepare the attached notes 1 & 2.

In transmitting these notes, and should the situation continue to evolve as suggested below, it has appeared useful to indicate in which way American reaction would receive most favorable welcome by French public opinion, and thus facilitate the work of those desiring to resist the Axis:—

a) In the near future and upon German pressure, France’s failure to honor the guarantees given the United States will no doubt become apparent.

b) The United States will note this failure and no doubt will make appropriate protests, meanwhile continuing to express its desire to guarantee the integrity of the French Empire.

c) Upon further failures of a particularly important nature on the part of the French Government, the United States should decide to apply the program of French African resistance which would permit it to assure its own defense along the lines suggested in the conversation held on December 6, 1941, and in notes 1 & 2.

d) At the same time, the Anglo-Saxons should decide to interrupt communications between France and French Africa; the American Government should notify the French Government of this decision “x” hours before its entering into effect, indicating that thereafter only planes and specially authorized vessels will be permitted to cross the Mediterranean.

e) It is believed that French opinion will welcome such a notification, based on the decision of the Anglo-Saxons not to tolerate any longer the inability of the French Government to oppose itself to the desires of the Axis, provided the above notification were accompanied by declarations more or less as follows:

The American Government would declare itself ready to:

• —Assure to French Africa sufficient matériel for its own defense;
• —Recognize officially and by radio the integrity of the French Empire, and its faithfulness to the Vichy Government or its representatives;
• —Guarantee the reestablishment of normal relations between Africa and France, as soon as the French Government would commit itself to maintain strict neutrality, this neutrality thereafter being guaranteed by armed forces capable of resisting the pressure of the Axis;
• —Insure the supply of foodstuffs to French Africa.

f) After presentation of this notification, either of the following may happen:

• —Either the French Government would sign an agreement with the American Government, and the situation immediately would return to normal without the program mentioned having been executed further than preliminary preparations. It would be in accord with the French Government and through its mediation that the furnishing of matériel to French Africa would be made.
• —Or, this agreement would not be made, and the relations between France and Africa would be broken, and various dispositions taken on the spot, these automatically provoking the installation of an independent Government in French Africa, decided to insure its defense in every possible way.

[Subenclosure 2—Translation]

Note No. 1

French African Situation:

Since the Armistice the resources and military means of French Africa have never been sufficient to insure its defense.

Present effectives are relatively important and recruiting among the native population would permit of a substantial increase of effectives if necessary. On the other hand industrial equipment is mediocre; inventories are extremely low, military armament is old-fashioned and notoriously insufficient: the means for defense, therefore, must come from abroad.

To these material difficulties are added others caused by the departure of General Weygand. The latter has not been replaced. His civil and military functions, the coordination and control which he exercised on the ensemble of French Africa disappeared with him. The direction of civilian and military affairs are at present divided among civilian and military officials, in other words, among six different people, to say nothing of the officials in charge of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (a Governor, two Residents and a General commanding the armed forces in North Africa; a Governor and a General commanding the armed forces in French West Africa).

To resume, at the present moment, there does not exist in French Africa a civilian official or an army officer who has the prestige or the authority necessary to undertake the initiative to place the country in a state of defense and to obtain from abroad the necessary deliveries of matériel: these decisions must be provoked. Furthermore, if the large majority of the population and civilian and military authorities is either favorable to the Anglo-Saxon cause or more precisely hostile to the axis, this large majority is apathetic: favorable in principle to a reaction of defense, the mass of people will undertake no initiative, but on the contrary will submit if other decisions are taken.

Normal Measures:

To remedy this situation it would appear normal first of all to count on the French Government. There is no doubt that Marshal Pétain wishes sincerely that French Africa, strictly neutral, would remain outside the conflict. It remains to be seen whether he will or whether he will [not] be able to cause this neutrality to be respected in every circumstance.

1) That he wishes to do so in every circumstance is problematical. It is certain that it can be expected that he has given or that he will give such assurances to the American Government. At present, German demands are relatively moderate, with the reserve, however, that the transit be permitted of military supplies and other articles to Libya. Tomorrow these demands may be increased (accord regarding bases or occupation) and there is reason to fear that then the French Government will not resist. Circumstances today lend themselves to every possibility of denunciation of any engagement.

2) That he will be able to do so is also problematical. Problems of supply and direction regarding the defense of Africa cannot be resolved without diplomatic conversations and without substantial delays. As far as we know, nothing has been done in this respect. Furthermore, nothing can be done regularly without the agreement of the Armistice Commission. There is little likelihood that the French Government will give the necessary orders in time in order that a decision to resist, if it had a desire to take such a decision, would be susceptible of execution effectively: indecision regarding policy reacts on the preparation for defense, and at a given moment the lack of preparation for defense will react in its turn on the political decision.

To summarize—there is reason to fear that the future of French Africa is dependent in the last analysis on the decision of Germany.

Exceptional Measures:

Certain Frenchmen who are worried regarding this situation are making an effort with the cooperation of civilian and military experts:

1) To study the political conditions of an agreement which would permit Africa to remain French and to receive outside support.^*

2) To study the material conditions of such an agreement (intervention, supplies, cooperation of specialists, etc.)^†

3) To obtain the necessary cooperation from the ranks of the civilian officials, the police authorities and the army.

4) To find a solution of the problem of the High Command which this project raised.

Attitude of the United States:

This project cannot be developed normally if the American Government does not approve in principle.

The defense of Africa cannot be assured except by supplies from abroad, and it is impossible to contemplate that any initiative may be undertaken in an important manner without preliminary satisfaction in this regard.

It is certain that the preliminary work can be undertaken, especially that relating to the study of the technical problems regarding defense and the enlistment of civilian and military collaborators. But this work, which as a matter of fact is now in course, cannot usefully be pushed beyond a certain point which will soon be reached without information on the question of the attitude of the United States and the importance of the foreign cooperation which may be expected and the delays which may occur.

Refusal to take a favorable attitude will lead undoubtedly to the interruption of the only substantial work which at present is being done to place French Africa in a state of defense. The decision to proceed to the execution of the program may on the other hand remain in a state of suspense until circumstances require it.

Objections:

Several objections may be made to an American reply which would approve the matter in principle.

1) Such a reply might be considered incompatible with steps already undertaken or which might be undertaken or with engagements taken or given in respect of the French Government.

We mentioned above for what reason it is to be feared that such engagements may not be executed or may not be possible of execution. In any event, the approval in principle which we suggest would not in any sense be contradictory of such engagements; it would be supplementary. It would not contemplate breaking engagements, but it would simply supplement them in the event that circumstances would prevent their execution. In effect, the execution of the program contemplated is dependent in any case on these two factors.

2) It may be considered preferable to postpone such an approval in principle until a solution has been found to the problem of the high command.

We have indicated above that this question cannot at present be solved as a result of the dispersion of powers and of the absence of a man who possesses sufficient personal authority. This problem does not appear insoluble when the time comes, and already the cooperation obtained is important. It would be, of course, always possible to suspend the execution of the program if the problem has not been satisfactorily solved. It should be added that an approval in principle would not contemplate any operation on French territory, but only preparation abroad and the establishment of liaisons.

It would seem, therefore, that the temporary impossibility regarding the high command should not call for a refusal to agree strictly confidentially in principle to a project, the execution of which would remain subordinated to a subsequent accord.

To these considerations there should be added two propositions which are, it seems, advisable:

1) The development of a program of defense of French Africa is a time taking matter. It requires political consultations, conversations with the British Government, the assembly of stocks and the routing of deliveries and the accomplishment of liaisons which is very delicate in its execution. In addition, the difference in the types of military matériel would require a period of instruction. This program cannot be improvised.

2) The realization of the program necessitates considerable cooperation in the civilian administration, with the police and with the Army. This cooperation is at present assured. It can disappear tomorrow as a result of shifting of personnel (by Vichy) and such changes depend for a large part on the collaborators of Marshal Pétain who are particularly favorable to Franco-German rapprochement. If such changes occur, the difficulties which will result will be of a nature to seriously diminish the chances of success of such an undertaking if not to suppress it entirely.

To summarize, it seems that the reply in principle should not be long deferred at a time when external incidents may at any moment intervene in a way which would make desirable the application of the program described, and when a delay of several weeks is necessary to prepare completely such a program from the moment that the reply in principle has been given.

Conclusion:

To résumé, the operation in question, which is exclusively of French origin, will retain, in case of its execution, its initial character (matériel delivered against payment, defense of the country assured by French effectives except for specialists necessary during a period of instruction, and of course subject to any new accord which might be necessitated in case of a German aggression after the establishment of the new regime).

The program contemplated does not tend to a rupture with the French Government. On the contrary, it would only be applied in case it is revealed that a satisfactory accord, accompanied by appropriate guarantees, is impossible with the French Government. By the same token the preparations which it requires may be accomplished without incurring the risk of a legitimate objection on the part of the French Government.

Note 2 contemplates that French Africa, in accord with the American Government, would take the initiative in the operation. It should be specified further, to avoid all misunderstanding, that there is no question of taking such initiative in any event, but only in the case that the internal and external political situation would require. In other words, there is question only of anticipating an adverse initiative at a moment when such initiative appears immediate and certain.

It is hardly necessary to add that the French people in Africa would have the greatest interest in what, in the light of experience, might be the possibility that the execution of this prepared program would be unnecessary. However that may be, it appears opportune now to take the necessary precautions and in any event, the American Government has the assurance that the execution of the program is impossible without its agreement because it is subordinate to the deliveries which are requested.

40. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 494.
41. Not printed.
42. Filed separately under 740.0011 European War 1939/20098.
43. A memorandum has been furnished on this subject. [Footnote in the original.]
44. Memorandum 2 and 3. [Footnote in the original.]