740.0011 European War 1939/26615: Telegram
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 19—7 p.m.]
2218. Department’s 1604, December 14, 5 p.m. Naval Attaché of Legation25 called on Admiral Godefroy in Alexandria at my request [Page 222] yesterday to transmit message. Admiral received Attaché on shore and following oral delivery of President’s message handed Attaché copy of speech delivered by Admiral to his officers on December 7, which he said fully expressed his sentiments and constituted reply to President’s communicated [communication].
Full text of message being sent by airmail tomorrow but following summary main points:
Natural that after 30 months of inaction, recent events should have caused, desire to act but matter not one for personal decision, but for collective action by whole squadron. Necessary therefore to analyze situation objectively and in so doing to take cognizance of following considerations:
- 1.
- From standpoint of principle, necessary to understand that French people can only constitute a nation by obeying a government, whether such government pleases them or not and this obligation more stringent for persons in military service. France has such a legitimate government, the consent of which is necessary in respect of disposition of fleet. It could possibly be maintained that Marshal Pétain is acting under duress against his will but such difficult to prove and even if admitted it would not give reason for rash and ill-timed action by fleet in Alexandria which might only serve to burden France with new troubles.
- 2.
- From standpoint of logic, what has in fact happened to change situation in respect of previous and continued refusal to yield to British pressure? Simply that the Americans have landed with British aid in North Africa contrary to international and all law. It would be absurd to argue that such an action should motivate the desire to rush to the aid of the aggressors and it would be overly facile reasoning to argue after the fact that the Armistice terms have been broken by the Germans and that Frenchmen therefore obligated to resume struggle even if claim were admitted that it is only final liberation of France that counts. It should be observed that occupation of North Africa, even if completed, will only serve to improve Anglo-American communications with the Orient without relieving France or constituting a definite step toward the defeat of Germany.
- 3.
- From standpoint of sentiment is it possible to accept cooperation with the British with memories still fresh of insults heaped on France by head of British Government, of tragedy of Mers-el-Kebir and vexatious and humiliating treatment suffered locally by fleet in Alexandria at hands of British during past 30 months, due allowance being made for efforts at courtesy by certain British officers? This is not a question of grudge but necessary that British should understand wrongs inflicted and the effects thereof. Furthermore as regards the Americans it would be impossible to accept incorporation in the American naval forces without feeling misgivings because of fact that it was owing to the occupation of North Africa at American instigation that France was subjected to a new catastrophe. What honorable avenue of action then remained? Not surely joining the de Gaullists26 who are directly or indirectly responsible for troubles [Page 223] heaped on France since Armistice and as for rallying to French in North Africa such would merely constitute recognition of another dissident element by whose acts motive was given for occupation of Toulon and disbanding of French Army. Furthermore how could a person be recognized as legitimate chief there who has been destituted of civil authority, his military command and even his nationality and whom Americans treat openly and cynically as a political instrument?
- 4.
- From practical standpoint would participation of squadron constitute an effective contribution? In long war which is in prospect the intervention or non-intervention of squadron would have no effect on final result and would only give Germans another reason for crushing unhappy France. Surely it is not by killing France that one can begin to save it. Rallying of fleet would only be symbolic and propaganda value for the British and Americans whose guilty consciences it would serve to absolve. Furthermore Americans and British have not kept promises in past as evidenced by American pledge to support French institutions and sovereignty in North Africa, only to be followed by President Roosevelt’s “ordering[”] the release of certain detained persons, the abrogation of laws affecting Jews and further proof afforded by issuance of occupation currency and fixing artificial exchange rate to permit invaders to live on country. If North Africa is being treated thus as conquered country would not same be fate of France? Necessary to beware of those merely desiring to profit by France and make light of her. If struggle in fact is to be taken up again, necessary to do so in certainty that such action is in real interests of France and not merely “pulling chestnuts out of fire” for others. At time when whole world is acting criminally against France necessary to avoid becoming accomplices “of so many executioners, hypocrites and traitors”.
In supplementation of foregoing, Admiral criticized British press for having 2 months ago published stories regarding Darlan which subsequently proved false and with direct reference to President’s message he emphasized that, unlike the Army, naval vessels continue property of the State which he could not honorably appropriate and that even though he desired to do so the majority of his officers and men would oppose. Should “poor old Marshal Pétain” die or be forced from office and a new government be put in by Germans then he would be free to take the fleet over but as matters stood he was bound by duty and oath to Pétain, contrary to his own personal desires, to maintain the fleet in its present status.
In ensuing conversation and in reply to inquiries Naval Attaché, Admiral expressed view that it would be desirable to set up coalition government in North Africa under recognized leader of French State (not necessarily Darlan) but such would take some time and he would not use fleet in support of formation of such a government at least for the time being. Admiral also acquiesced in suggestion of Attaché regarding desirability of cooperation of all Frenchmen in North [Page 224] Africa against common foe and lessening breach between followers of Darlan and de Gaulle.
Regarding difference of tone between Admiral’s speech to officers and remarks to Attaché, latter suggest possible that speech designed to prevent deflection [defection?] of crews and that his informal remarks to Attaché probably more truly reflected his personal feelings. Second reason for difference might also be effect of recent conversations with Admirals of north [North Africa?] as reported in my 2214, December 17, 6 p.m.27
Admiral told Attaché that text of speech had not been given British and he requested that if [it] not be communicated to them. Should it eventually reach them he would regret the fact but would be prepared to admit if necessary that he had made it available as expression of his sentiments.
Naval Attaché asks Navy Department be informed.
[In May 1943, Admiral Godefroy joined his squadron to the naval forces of France in North Africa.]