740.0011 European War 1939/22218: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 14—4:10 a.m.]
852. I spent hour with Laval this morning during which time he gave me an exposé of his views with regard to his Government’s policy. Our interview had its origin yesterday when I met him at luncheon. He then suggested that it might be to our mutual advantage to have a frank conversation and asked me to come to see him this morning at 11 o’clock. On my arrival I found both Rochat and his son-in-law René de Chambrun present.
Laval was in good humor and the conversation opened with reference to the request contained in the Department’s 359, June 6, 4 p.m.,80 for transit visas to be accorded to certain members of our clerical personnel now in Lisbon who have been assigned to our Legation at Bern. This [Page 188] matter which has now assumed a complicated phase will form the subject of a separate telegram.
Laval then referred to our conversations in Martinique and while he did not go into detail I gathered that he felt that these negotiations were progressing favorably. It was clear, however, from his remarks that he continues to resent our method of procedure in not having taken the matter up directly with his Government.
He expressed his satisfaction that the North African economic program was to be resumed81 and referred to the German stand in connection with the activities of our control officers. He remarked humorously that he would be glad to give as many additional consuls as we wanted provided we sent North Africa what was needed; I suggested that it might be a good time to give the resumption of the program some much needed press publicity. He replied that until German agreement had been obtained for the departure of the two ships from Casablanca he felt that no such publicity could be given but that he would do his best to comply with my request once this agreement had been obtained.
Laval then embarked upon a general expose of the problems of policy both exterior and interior which confront his Government at the moment. In reply to my direct question he refused to commit himself with regard to the present state of relations with Italy in connection with Italian territorial claims. He said, however, that he could give me a formal assurance that at no time had the Italian Government made any official démarche in connection therewith.
He then proceeded to an almost word for word reiteration of what he had said to Ambassador Leahy on the occasion of his visit to the Embassy (our 623, April 27, 8 p.m.) again laying stress on the dangers which he felt certain would accompany a Soviet victory in the form of the inevitable spread of Communism throughout Europe. He repeated that he would prefer (je souhaiterais) a German victory to a Soviet or British victory. Waxing eloquent—and in an outburst of savage Anglophobia—he declared that England was alone responsible for the plight in which France found herself today and cited Eden as the perfect example of futile British statesman whose presence in the Government could be explained but not justified by his membership in the hierarchy of the “old school tie” brigade (it was apparent to me that perhaps the basic reason for Laval’s intense dislike for the British Foreign Secretary can be attributed to the marked difference in their social origin). He declared that he would never place the United States in the same category with England but that for the life of him he could not understand what had induced President Roosevelt to throw our nation into the conflict. I replied somewhat sharply that [Page 189] if he did not understand the reasons for which the United States was at war with the Axis Powers it was hardly worth while attempting to explain them to him.
As I listened to the development of his ideas I was forced to the conclusion that Laval is still convinced of the possibility either of a German victory or of a negotiated peace. I asked him if he had any real conception of the extent of our war effort and the part it was destined to play in the eventual outcome of the war. His reply seemed to indicate that we would have our hands full with Japan for a long time to come and that the best we could achieve with Germany would be a stalemate (part in UL [sic]). He therefore considered our participation in the war an unwise and futile effort.
As regards his interior policy Laval referred to several of the measures enumerated in the Embassy’s telegram 841, June 11, 8 p.m.82 as evidence of the immediate necessity for restoring order in France’s interior economy adding that until full power was in his hands he could do nothing. The Germans he said were becoming increasingly exacting in their demands and his position as Chief of the Government was probably the most difficult one that any statesman faced in the world today. Only one thing was important however and that was the ultimate destiny of France and he was prepared to make almost any concessions to his country’s enemies provided that in so doing this policy of sacrifice would in the long run benefit the nation. Many Frenchmen might not agree with such a policy but their opinions were a matter of complete indifference to him. He had but one desire—that France should emerge from this national catastrophe clothed again in that dignity and self-respect of which incompetent statesmen had despoiled her.
As I left he suggested that we might with advantage resume our conversations in the future.
Repeated to London and Murphy.