711.51/235½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called at his request and stated that when he and I discussed some days ago the question of the issuance of a joint statement of policy toward Vichy by Great Britain and the United States Government, clarifying the matter in various ways, it was understood that on that very day Canada was announcing the severance of diplomatic relations with Vichy. The Ambassador inquired whether, in the light of the abandonment of that step by Canada, this Government still desired to work out a joint statement.
I thanked him for bringing up this question and added that, in view of Canada’s recall of her representative to the Vichy Government for consultation without severing relations, it might well be left to each of our two Governments to prepare and make public its respective statements dealing with the relations of each Government with Vichy. [Page 183] I then said that the Free French and some of the British propagandists have devoted a great deal of time which could have been used with better results and with more propriety to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy in an endeavor to make it appear that the relations between this Government and Vichy were in some ways incompatible and inconsistent with the real interests of the British and American peoples and Governments. The impression, I added, that we have consistently sought to convey was that, in maintaining relations with or recognizing Vichy, or whatever one chooses to call it, this Government has been bitterly opposed to everything the Vichy Government stands for as it relates to a denial of the aspirations of the French people for the restoration of their freedom, their free institutions, and their way of life. While this Government has consistently upheld all of the rights, interests and freedom, et cetera, of France, it has most strongly and consistently opposed everything the Vichy Government stands for that is of a pro-German or pro-Hitler nature. Furthermore, this Government has uniformly asserted to the world that the Vichy Government does not represent the French people and the true interests of France. This Government, therefore, has continued relations with the Government at Vichy solely for the advantages derived from having representatives in Vichy, French Africa, et cetera, affording channels for our insistent demands that the Vichy Government observe the rules of neutrality and not go beyond the terms of the Armistice. This position is calculated to safeguard the French fleet and French bases in North and West Africa, et cetera, from being in any sense transferred to Hitler or Axis agencies. Likewise this course is based essentially and solely on a policy of promoting to the fullest extent the military progress of the twenty-six united nations, et cetera. I strongly pointed out the absurdity of attempting to misinterpret the entire policy and attitude of this Government as some of the Free French and other propagandists have endeavored to do.
I brought up the question of just what is the present policy of the British toward the French from a political standpoint, with special reference to the Free French situation. I first repeated what the Ambassador already knew, to wit, that this Government has consistently given the fullest possible cooperation to the Free French in a military way and that we are continuing to do this, but that this Government did not contemplate the recognition of de Gaulle and his organization from a political standpoint. The Ambassador said that his Government, in his opinion, which he would confirm, would, while supporting de Gaulle to an unlimited extent militarily, likewise support him in dealing with any local situation arising in connection with the prosecution of the war, but that this was entirely different [Page 184] from political recognition in the broader sense, such as de Gaulle control of France as a political government both now and in the post-war period. Bearing in mind that the British dealings with the Free French are mainly confined to London, I inquired of the Ambassador whether this course was practicable, especially in cases where it might be necessary for a military force to move rapidly and to work with any local officials who might be in control and disposed to cooperate. I further inquired as to whether his Government would be disposed to urge the organization of a political committee to work coordinately with the de Gaulle military committee in order to compose all angles of this situation. The Ambassador agreed that he would query his Government on this point, as I had requested, but he expressed doubt about the practicability of any other course except recognition of the existing de Gaulle organization which dealt with local political questions arising in connection with the military problems. This would not, however, involve recognition of its authority as regards any general French political policy. I emphasized finally that military movements must be swift and far distant from de Gaulle headquarters, and that there would be no time for such detailed discussions as de Gaulle is reported to have been carrying on with respect to questions arising both of a military and political nature, and possibly some of a personal nature. I illustrated the present confused and complicated situation with the remark that de Gaulle is reported to be not on too good terms with most British officials with the exception of Prime Minister Churchill, the Governor of Central Africa and with the civil government in New Caledonia, and that this Government has found it most advantageous to deal quickly with the local governor in charge, especially when he is going in our direction.