851.01/443
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
The French Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request.
When the Ambassador entered the room he said that I knew of course that he had come in to present the official reply of his Government to the note which I had sent him on April 13.59
I answered that there was no use in the Ambassador’s wasting my time and his own by reading me the text of this communication since I had already received the full text from Ambassador Leahy.60 I said that this communication constituted probably the most amazing incident in the more than 150 years of unbroken friendship between the United States and France. I said it was impossible for me officially to accept any communication from the French Government which referred to an American note, in which the traditional friendship between our two countries had been emphasized, in which the earnest hope of the United States for the restoration of French independence had been underscored, and in which the United States had announced as its policy its conviction that the victory of the United Nations would restore to the French people their liberty and would preserve the integrity of French territorial possessions, as “injurious” to France. I said that of course it was notorious that this communication from the French Government had been submitted to and had received the prior approval of the German authorities. For all of these reasons, I said, the Ambassador would understand it was impossible for me officially to accept any such interpretation as that placed upon the note of April 13 by the French Government.
The Ambassador made no reply whatever and was very evidently extremely reluctant to transmit such a message from his Government.
During the rest of our interview which lasted for over an hour, the Ambassador attempted to prove that Laval, whom he knew well, might not be as bad as this Government believed.
In reply to these comments I merely said I was entirely familiar with the history of M. Laval, and particularly with his recent history, and that because of the fact that M. Laval had openly and publicly announced as his policy intimate cooperation between France and Germany, it would obviously be out of the question for the United States to maintain the same kind of relations with the government of M. Laval as with preceding French governments. I stated that our [Page 173] viewpoint on this score had been made known on March 27 to Marshal Pétain, as I myself had informed the Ambassador, and I said that the President had likewise informed me that he had made the same statement to M. Henry-Haye in the last interview the President had had with him.
I said that for all of these reasons I felt it necessary to let the Ambassador know that the end of the chapter had been reached.
The Ambassador inquired persistently whether this implied a rupture of diplomatic relations.
To this I answered that I was not prepared to give any specific or detailed reply to this question. I said that the policy of this Government would be announced in the near future.
The rest of the interview was taken up by very fervent appeals on the part of the Ambassador to the effect that this Government should not break diplomatic relations. He emphasized the value to the United States of our agents and observers, particularly in North Africa, and of the need of the French people to know that a friendly power like the United States was still represented in France.
I stated that the French people, in my judgment, would most certainly not understand a continuation of apparently normal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Laval government which was pledged to complete subserviency to Germany, and to a policy which could only result in an attempt permanently to enslave the French people.
The Ambassador attempted to make out that Marshal Pétain would remain the controlling factor in the new Government.
I said it was impossible for me to accept this thesis. I stated that in view of the well known distrust by Marshal Pétain of Laval and his personal objection to him and his recent statement to Admiral Leahy that Laval was the most hated man in France, it was inconceivable that Marshal Pétain would of his own free will have appointed Laval to power. It was evident that the Marshal had only taken such action under direct and overwhelming pressure from Germany. Under these conditions, I said, it was quite out of the question for this Government to believe that Marshal Pétain would remain a dominant factor in the new governmental framework.
When the Ambassador finally left, he said he hoped he would see me again before he left the United States.
I said that of course I expected to see him.