Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume II

740.00112 European War 1939/5299

The French Embassy to the Department of State

[Translation]

No. 524

Washington, April 8, 1942.

Note

(1) In a note of February 26, 1942,⁵² the Embassy of the United States at Vichy notified the French Government that the United States Government could no longer authorize the shipment of petroleum products to North Africa if the deliveries of French fuels to the Axis armies in Libya were to continue.

(2) In another communication, dated March 5,⁵³ Admiral Leahy stated that the deliveries of food, fuels, trucks, etc. to the Axis forces in North Africa and in other theatres of operations were considered by the United States Government as constituting military aid.

(3) The reply sent to Admiral Leahy on March 14⁵⁴ contained in particular the following considerations:

(a) It is true that certain deliveries of petroleum products consigned to Libya have been effected. The German and Italian Governments had requested them at a moment when the execution of the agreements on the supplying of North Africa had been suspended on the initiative of the United States Government. This circumstance made it impossible for the French Government to justify a refusal by invoking the American deliveries of fuels, as it had done in March 1941 on the occasion of an Italian request relative to the supplying of 5,000 tons of gasoline for automobiles to be taken from the Algerian stocks.

(b) As the United States Embassy had been informed before, it is to be remarked that the fuels delivered to Libya had, for the most part, merely passed in transit through North Africa, since they originated chiefly in the stocks of the home country. To the limited extent in which these shipments had had to be taken from the North African stocks, they have been entirely compensated for new shipments from France to North Africa.

(c) The quantity of fuels originally demanded by the Axis Governments was 3,600 tons. As the United States Government had given the assurance that the program of economic assistance to North Africa would be put into effect again in a short time, the French Government immediately seized the opportunity to intervene with the Axis Governments with a view to inducing them to renounce any new supplying of fuels over and above the 3,600 tons in question. It obtained satisfaction on this point.

(d) The note transmitted to Admiral Leahy March 14 stated further that the French Government was disposed to attempt another effort with the Armistice Commissions with a view to being relieved of the delivery of the balance of those 3,600 tons. As a matter of fact there remained on March 14 about 1500 tons to be delivered, and the French Government considered that it would be possible to liberate itself from the engagements undertaken in this connection, if it could invoke the immediate resumption of the exports of American petroleum products to North Africa.

(4) At the same time the French Government gave the assurance that the engagement undertaken by it not to furnish any military aid to the belligerent forces of the Axis Powers extended to the delivery and transportation of goods, of any kind whatever.

(5) In giving these various assurances, the French Government clearly emphasized that it expected to obtain from the United States Government certain quid pro quo considered by it as indispensable to the maintenance of the political position resulting from these exchanges of notes. It emphasized in particular that it expected the resumption of the supplying of North Africa, under the conditions agreed upon by both sides originally.

(6) The decisions which the United States Government has made up to now on the subject of putting into effect again of the plan of supplying North Africa have been of extremely limited scope.

Assurances have been given relative to the departure of the Ile de Noirmoutier and of the Ile d’Ouessant, which are at present at New York. But as of April 7, the economic services of the French Embassy are not yet in possession of the payment license, without which no new purchase can be made. On the same date the said services have not yet received from the Board of Economic Warfare any indication concerning the nature and quantities of the goods the exportation of which to North Africa could be immediately authorized.

Moreover, the United States Government has not undertaken any formal engagement with respect to the subsequent movements of the four vessels assigned since July 1941 to the New York–Casablanca line, nor with respect to the use on this line of the other three vessels which the Maritime Commission has left at the disposal of the French Government for approved traffic.

A note transmitted to Vichy March 24 by Admiral Leahy⁵⁵ indicates that the functioning of the New York–Casablanca line will be governed by the conditions in force at the moment of possible proposed departures and that steps must be taken to bring favorable solution to the problem resulting from the existence in North Africa of strategic matériel, such as cobalt and rubber.

(7) On receiving this communication, the French Government indicated its surprise at the new conditions thus placed upon the continuation of the supplying of North Africa with American goods, when the said supplies had already been limited for several months past to products other than petroleum products. It urgently requests the United States Government to understand that regular and substantial imports of American goods into North Africa are indispensable for it to be able to maintain both the economic balance and the economic independence of those territories and thus meet the engagements it has assumed. North Africa cannot subsist without outside aid. If this aid does not come from the United States, the French Government will be deprived of any argument to resist the pressures it is under from the Axis Powers on the economic plane.

(8) For it is to be observed that the French Government was able to obtain the stoppage of the exports to Libya only by emphasizing the vital character of the supplying of North Africa with American products and by maintaining that the suspension of such supply had been provoked only by the deliveries allowed to the Axis forces.

(9) If such supply should be made subject in the future not only to the conditions agreed upon originally (non-exportation of the imported products or of like products; control of the distribution by American agents), but also to new conditions, such as the furnishings to which the American note of March 24 alludes, the French Government would lose every means of discussion with regard to the demands of Germany and Italy.

(10) Indeed, the cobalt and other ores of North Africa are normally considered as contraband of war. All transportations of this nature would certainly be intercepted by the maritime forces of the Axis, as they would be by the maritime forces of the Allied Powers if they were destined for a German or Italian port. Their delivery to the United States therefore encounters a manifest impossibility.

During the suspension of the supplying of North Africa the German Armistice Commission already made the claim of treating cork and tartar as contraband of war. The French Government is trying to have this interdiction removed, in order to permit the loading of the two cargo vessels which are at Casablanca. But there is no probability that it can obtain a similar decision with respect to cobalt and other ores.

(11) In order for the supplying of North Africa in American products to have the scope and stability which are desirable, it seems necessary that the conditions set forth below be met:

(a) use of all the vessels left at the disposal of the French Government, that is, the four cargo ships assigned to the New York–Casablanca line since July 1941 and the three vessels approved by the Maritime Commission: Indiana, Mont Everest and Angoulème;

(b) the fixing of quarterly programs, which would involve not only, as that has been the case hitherto, the approval in principle (de principe) of the Department of State, but also the assurance that we would obtain in useful time the corresponding payment and export licenses and that priorities of sufficiently high rank will be granted to permit the manufacture and delivery of orders which necessitate the use of controlled raw materials. Such a program should include, in a general way, the products necessary for the subsistence of the natives, (green tea and cotton cloth particularly) and for the maintenance of the economic balance of North Africa (sulphate of copper, binder twine, spare parts for agricultural machinery, etc.).

(12) Lastly, in view of the special structure of North Africa, the economic assistance which these territories expect of the United States cannot be considered as completely efficacious unless it involves a regular supplying of fuels. The latter are indispensable, indeed, not only for highway transportation (by reason of the insufficiency of the railway system), but also to agriculture (fuel for tractors, agriculture machinery, water lifts, and auxiliary engines), for coastal fishing and for certain industries, particularly the electric power industry in Algeria and Tunisia.

The French Government recently reminded Admiral Leahy that it remained disposed to stop execution of the deliveries of fuel promised to Libya (there remained still 1,057 tons to be furnished March 26), as soon as it should have obtained sufficient assurances with respect to the resumption of the supplying of North Africa with petroleum products.

So far as concerns the possible use of these products, the control which is exercised in North Africa by the American agents (and which, up to the present at least, has no equivalent in the Iberian peninsula, although the latter likewise is dependent on America for its supply of petroleum), should give all the guarantees that could be wished to the United States Government.

(13) In a new note which has just been transmitted to Admiral Leahy, the French Government has emphasized that the resumption of the supplying of North Africa with petroleum products would enable it to obtain, with respect to cobalt and the other strategic products of North Africa, solutions corresponding to the wishes of the United States.

It could be understood particularly that no exportation of cobalt would be effected to any destination whatever.

Moreover, regular deliveries of olive oil, in quantities to be determined, could be made to the profit of the United States, this question, however, continuing to be bound up, in a certain measure, as has been indicated in other communications, with the problem of the supplying of French West Africa.

The notes exchanged between the French Government and the United States Embassy at Vichy do not seem to have mentioned, at least up to now, of other North African products considered as strategic. But, if the case should arise, of course solutions inspired by the same spirit could be envisaged for these products, in particular, for molybdenum.

As to Indochinese rubber, there is at this time no stock in North Africa, and it is not to be foreseen that such stocks can be reconstituted in the future.

(14) The principal idea which appears from this ensemble of communications is that a regular and substantial supplying of North Africa with American products is considered by the French Government as indispensable, not only because it permits assuring the economic equilibrium of North Africa, as was the object of the agreement entered into at Algiers between General Weygand and Mr. Murphy February 21 [26], 1941,⁵⁶ but also because it is the only effective argument which the French Government has in order to resist the economic pressures of which it is the object on the part of the Axis Powers and to maintain thus the political position which it has of its own free will adopted with respect to the United States.

52. See telegram No. 127, February 23, 8 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 140.
53. See telegram No. 139, March 2, 8 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 144.
54. See telegram No. 390. March 14, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 148.
55. See telegrams No. 198, March 22, 4 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, and No. 511, April 7, 11 a.m., from the Ambassador in France, pp. 152 and 164, respectively.
56. See telegram No. 249, February 28, 1941, 10 a.m., from the Ambassador in France, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 226.