860D.00/1005: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:11 p.m.]
1206. In light of Ryti’s speech as summarized in my 1199, yesterday,85 I desire to draw Department’s attention to conclusions in latest of series of memoranda on Finnish war covering last year of Finnish-American relations which went forward by courier day before President spoke. This study was transmitted under cover of my despatch 2484, November 30.86
Our conclusions are as follows:
- 1.
- There has been no basic change in Finnish policy whatever.
- 2.
- The Finns are impressed by deeds not words. Breaking of consular relations by United States moved them more profoundly than any of our representations expressing menace and displeasure.
- 3.
- Major result of American policy during year was negative achievement of restraining further Finnish advances, particularly against Sorokka and possibly further Finnish military cooperation with Germany, at least so far as active operations were concerned.
- 4.
- The Legation is not informed as to directives of American policy toward Finland but infers that it is similar to that maintained toward Vichy. Legation is unaware if USSR wishes separate peace with Finland or if USSR plans to eliminate Finland before end of war.
- 5.
- The Finns uniformly share Ryti’s cynical conviction that Atlantic Charter does not mean what it says.
- 6.
- With growing German weakness and signs that Germany will not win war, there is some possibility that if Finns can be assured of supplies and peace with Russia with guarantees from United States and Britain, they might conceivably turn against Germans in Finnish territory. Landing of British and American troops in far north after these conditions had been met might be signal for such action, but most definitely Russian troops should not cooperate.
- 7.
- Finland’s possibly fatal mistake has been to cling stubbornly to its static policy in a dynamic situation. Finnish dogma of the “separate war” is a purely artificial concept proved not by argument but by blind repetition to reconcile Finland’s desire not to be in the World War with the fact that it is. The Finns have wished to enjoy all the advantages of co-belligerency with Germany and none of the liabilities. Finland will be held responsible for sharing in Hitler’s plans for attack on Russia but in its state of quasi-occupation is not free by itself to get out of its “separate war” even if it wanted to.
- 8.
- It is certain that if United Nations win this war and integrity of Finland is to be maintained, Finnish policy will have to change. Signs of a desire for such a change are beginning to be evident.
- 9.
- American interest would be served by getting Finland out of the fight to deprive Hitler of Finnish support entirely. To do this, however, more than negative means are required. Positive means include first of all food, guarantees, peace.
It is now seen from Ryti’s speech that there is still a long road to travel before the Finns can be got out of the “motti” in which they have been trapped by bullheadedness, bad policy and Nazi guile.