711.60D/139
Memorandum by the First Secretary of Legation in Finland (McClintoch)64
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This Legation, as most Legations the world over, is not informed as to the directives of American policy toward Finland. It infers from the record of the past year, however, that American policy toward Finland is much the same as stated by the Secretary of State toward Vichy France. The Legation is not aware whether the American Government has reached an understanding with the Soviet Government as to Finland. The Legation is not aware whether indeed the Soviet Government presently wishes peace with Finland or [Page 99] whether the Kremlin now believes it is good policy to continue the war with Finland to crush this country before the final peace treaty is written and thus to claim that there is no Finnish problem for the conference.
As for the Atlantic Charter,65 most Finns at present share the profound cynicism of President Ryti as to that document or any other declaration of principles by the Great Powers.
The Legation does feel, however, that with growing German military weakness the Finns indeed might reach a separate peace with Russia if they could be assured of economic support, largely in the form of food. Given first some sort of peace with Russia, which they would more quickly accept after assurance of guarantees by the western democracies, and given the promise of being fed by the United Nations, the Finns conceivably might turn against their German cobelligerents and lock them in a mighty motti66 in the Far North, where their superior knowledge of forest warfare would stand them in deadly stead. The landing of British or American troops—but most definitely not Russian troops—in Northern Norway or Finland might be a signal for Finnish co-belligerency with the United Nations against their former co-belligerent.
What seems certain at this writing is that American diplomatic pressure has at least resulted in the negative success of staying a further Finnish advance against Russia and of impeding a German military thrust in the Far North. This was perhaps no mean success, and it was achieved because political relations between Finland and the United States were maintained. Should diplomatic relations be broken the door would be closed in the face of the Finns and their last hope would be the dwindling hope of German victory.
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The answer is largely out of Finnish hands. The “separate war” would imply the possibility of a separate peace. Finland, even if Russia were willing to conclude a separate peace, is powerless to do so. Finland’s partner is Germany, and Finland is not a free agent. A factor which has given the diplomatic correspondence of the last eleven months an unreal quality is Finnish insistence that Finland is a sovereign state with American willingness to accept this theoretical concept and thus to charge Finland with responsibility for its acts. Finland must indeed be held responsible for preparing and sharing in Hitler’s plans for an attack on Russia. To this extent Finland was and is still responsible for the consequences of this cooperation. But to pretend that Finland can cease cooperating with Germany at the [Page 100] present time, or stop fighting, is to assume that Germany does not have Finland in a state of quasi-occupation. At the peace conference Finland would have been better off as a fully occupied country than to appear, as Mr. Churchill said, in the same dock with the guilty and defeated Nazis.
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One thing is certain and that is that if the United Nations win this war Finnish policy must change if there is to be a Finland. Perception of this fact is growing in this country and people are awakening to the realization the [that] Finland will find security against Russia not in any particular chain of lakes and rivers but in a political basis whereby a small country can live beside a big one. Presumably such a basis would be found in the promises of the Atlantic Charter. If a way could be discovered to show the Finns that the Atlantic Charter means what it says, much progress could be made toward reaching that strategical frontier of the mind which the Finns have yet to win.
As for our own interest in getting Finland out of the fight, this country is a candidate with Italy and the Balkan satellites of the Axis for detachment from Germany. Already American diplomacy has succeeded in limiting the Finnish war effort. This has been a negative accomplishment. The positive deed is yet to come, to deprive Hitler of Finnish support entirely. To accomplish this objective positive means will have to be used, not merely the negative means of threats and re-statement of disapproval. The Finns under admonition merely dig in their heels and grit their teeth. However, like a mule, they will move toward a carrot held in front of their nose. In other words, we must be prepared to feed them. We must be able to offer them some framework for political security or else they will feel their present sacrifices have been in vain. The Finns would probably settle now for the return of their 1939 frontiers, if they had some guarantee from the United States and Great Britain that those frontiers would be respected by the Soviet Union. If we can offer food and guarantees there will be an earnest effort to end Finnish co-belligerency with Germany.
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- Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Finland in his despatch No. 2484, November 30, 1942; received December 29.↩
- Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩
- Elsewhere expressed as “pocket”.↩