845.01/206
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
| Participants: | Colonel Johnson |
| Colonel Herrington | |
| Mr. Murray | |
| Mr. Alling | |
| Mr. Parker | |
| Mr. Oakes |
In the course of their conversation today in Mr. Murray’s office, Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington both reported, without using the word, that in their opinion the British Government had deliberately sabotaged the Cripps Mission and indicated that likewise in their opinion the Government in London had never desired that the Mission be other than a failure. It appears to be their firm conviction that, had it not been for certain actions of the British Government, Cripps would have secured a settlement.
There follows the recountal given by Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington.
Upon Cripps’ arrival in India, he set forth orally four points by which agreement on the part of the Congress and the Moslem League would have been assured. These four points were: 1. the India Office would be abolished; 2. the Viceroy’s veto power would be rescinded; 3. dominion status would be granted immediately after the war; 4. the Indians would have immediate participation in the Government of India. According to Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington, the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League were prepared to accept the proposals on these grounds and had so stated, whereby collaboration with the British, in so far as the war effort is concerned, would have been assured. Settlement of differences of opinion regarding the manner in which the long-range provisions of the proposals were to be implemented would take place after the war.
That the essential political parties in India were prepared to come to an agreement was published in India and abroad. The Viceroy and/or Wavell apparently immediately notified London of the terms advanced by Cripps and warned London that agreement could be expected. London was likewise informed through press reports. London is then reported to have cabled Cripps that he had no authority to go beyond the draft proposals as prepared in London. Cripps was then obliged to inform Nehru that his offer could not vary from the written text. Nehru then came in great despair to see Colonel Johnson, explaining that no agreement was possible unless Cripps was [Page 661] empowered to amplify the written proposals in the manner previously indicated. Colonel Johnson immediately called upon Cripps, pointing out that Nehru had informed him that he, Cripps, had withdrawn his previous terms, and asked for an explanation. Cripps is reported to have been extremely embarrassed and after some hesitation to have admitted that he had that afternoon received cabled instructions from London rescinding the authority which he had believed himself to possess.
Mr. Murray asked whether Cripps had willfully exceeded his authority in the first instance or, if not, what had occasioned the contretemps. Colonel Johnson replied that Cripps had been misled by a speech made by Churchill while Cripps was en route to India, in which the British Prime Minister expressed great hope for a successful settlement and intimated, in Cripps’ opinion, that he, Cripps, could make such concessions as might in his discretion be necessary in order to effect a settlement.
Colonel Johnson continued that the British Government desired that the world believe that the proposals had failed of acceptance on the question of defense. This, according to Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington, is not the case. Colonel Johnson had advanced a plan whereby the Commander in Chief would have a position similar to that of General Marshall73 in the United States with the added safeguard that no restrictions should be placed on the Commander in Chief’s decisions in matters which he considered essential for the defense of the country. To satisfy the Indian demand for a voice in defense matters, there would be created a Defense Minister corresponding somewhat to our Secretary of War. Colonel Johnson had eventually convinced General Wavell that this was a satisfactory solution; the solution was satisfactory to the Congress and to Cripps; and hence agreement on this point was actually reached.
Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington both maintained that in their opinion neither Churchill, the Viceroy nor Wavell desired that the Cripps Mission be a success and that in fact they were determined that it should not be. They stated that they believed the telegraphic instructions previously mentioned to have been sent solely to prevent the success which Cripps was on the point of attaining. Cripps is said to have admitted that he considered it possible that Churchill had sent him to India with the deliberate intention of destroying his political future.
Colonel Johnson emphasized that he had injected himself into the discussions at the written request of Sir Stafford. This he said had never been made clear despite Sir Stafford’s promise that it would be.
[Page 662]Colonel Johnson’s and Colonel Herrington’s remarks as set forth above have explained the statement previously heard from several sources that the British wilfully sabotaged the Cripps proposals. It is not thought, however, that this claim has been proved. With regard to the four points made orally by Sir Stafford, the latter two as listed earlier in this memorandum are contained in the draft proposals. Abolition of the India Office would appear to have only administrative significance in so far as London is concerned and as a factor in the outcome of the discussions may be disregarded. However, the remaining point, namely, agreement to rescind the veto power of the Viceroy, is of supreme importance, and is probably the point on which the discussions collapsed. Unwillingness on the part of the British Government in London to make any such concession, or insistence on the part of the Viceroy and Wavell that no such concession should be made, does not in itself indicate that Churchill, the Viceroy or Wavell were in any way intent upon “sabotaging” the proposals. To have deprived the Viceroy of this power would have been to make supreme for the duration of the war the majority group in the Viceroy’s Executive Council. This group would have been responsible to no authority or to no person other than themselves. The Congress, as the leading party in India, would presumably have had a definite majority in the Executive Council, and the Hindus certainly would have had one. Thus there would have been established for the duration of the war an irresponsible Congress–Hindu Government and this the British have always insisted could not be permitted. Sir Stafford himself, in discussing the failure of the Mission, is reported repeatedly in the press to have maintained that an Executive Council responsible to nothing but itself was unthinkable if any consideration was to be given to fairness and justice. The question arises in this connection as to whether Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington are correct in believing that Jinnah was willing to acquiesce to any such arrangement. If, for reasons best known to himself, he did not protest publicly, it would appear that he could not have failed to protest privately to the Viceroy. Both Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington dismiss Jinnah and the Moslem League as creatures of the British. While the latter have unquestionably used both for their own ends, it is felt that the Moslem League is a force in India which the British can by no means ignore. It happens often to be in their own interests not to ignore it, but that does not signify that the force is fictitious.
While Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington may be correct in believing that Churchill, the Viceroy and Wavell were pleased to see the Cripps Mission result in failure, it is not considered that a sound basis has been set forth for the belief that Cripps was denied necessary discretionary powers in order that the Mission should fail.
- Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.↩